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In the past ten years, the law of landlord-tenant relations has
been completely rewritten. The lease, which was once considered
primarily a conveyance of real property, is now regarded principally
as a contract. The landlord, who once could let a tumble-down
house with impunity, now leases residential property subject to an
implied warranty of habitability. The tenant, no longer shackled by
the doctrine of independent covenants, can assert the full panoply
of contract remedies against the landlord who breaches an express
or implied covenant in the lease.
But what of the tenant (or other person on the property with
the tenant's consent) who sustains personal injuries or property dam-
age due to a defective or dangerous condition in the premises?
What remedies does he have against the landlord? As a general
rule, he has none at common law. The landlord is still regarded
as the conveyor of an estate in real property who is immune from
liability for personal injury or property damage.
It is the thesis of this article that recent developments in the
law of landlord-tenant relations necessitate a reexamination of the
common law principles governing the tort liability of a landlord. If
a lease is a contract containing an implied warranty of habitability,
a landlord should at least be held to a duty of reasonable care regard-
ing the condition of the leased premises. Moreover, if he is in the
business of leasing, he should be held strictly liable for personal in-
jury or property damage caused by a defect in the premises.
Any change in the law regarding a landlord's tort liability will
probably be made by the judiciary. Therefore, this article is written
principally for those private practitioners and judges who will be-
come involved in the litigation of negligence or strict liability
actions against landlords. It is also addressed to the American Law
Institute, which is currently revising the Restatement of Property.
The first division of the revised Restatement is devoted to the law
of landlord-tenant relations, and will contain a chapter on the tort
liability of a landlord.1 It is hoped that this chapter will not blindly
incorporate those sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
which set forth the common law principles governing the tort liability
of a landlord, for they are premised on the notion that a lease is
a conveyance. The doctrine of caveat lessee should be reconsidered
in the light of the Restatement (Second) of Property's characteriza-
tion of a lease as a contract.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1974). The portion dealing with tort liability of landlords will be chap-
ter 21 which is still unpublished as of this writing. For a selective, annotated bib-
liography on recent developments in landlord-tenant law see Special Project, Develop-
ments in Contemporary Landlord-Tenant Law: An Annotated Bibliography, 26
VAND. L. REv. 689 (1973).
1975:19
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This article will not only propose specific changes in the law
but will also survey the cases and scholarly literature discussing the
common law tort liability of landlords and relevant aspects of land-
lord-tenant relations. It is hoped that such an approach will prove
helpful as well as persuasive to those who must decide the future
direction of this area of the law. The article consists of five sections.
Section one is devoted to the history of landlord-tenant relations, first
at common law and then under legislation imposing a duty to repair
on the landlord. This section focuses on the tenant's remedies for
economic loss caused by the landlord's failure to repair and is de-
signed to provide the personal injury lawyer with background infor-
mation on landlord-tenant law. The second section describes a land-
lord's current tort liability for defective premises, with an emphasis
on the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The third
summarizes recent developments in the law of landlord-tenant rela-
tions. The fourth and fifth propose the abolition of a landlord's
immunity from tort liability in light of the recent developments out-
lined in the third section. The fourth section advocates the imposi-
tion of a duty of reasonable care while the fifth advances an alterna-
tive theory of strict liability for landlords who are in the business
of leasing.
I. LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONS:
COMMON LAW AND HOUSING CODES
In the United States, landlords are one of the few classes of
defendants who generally remain immune from tort liability. Un-
like the manufacturers and distributors of defective products, 2 the
lessors of defective goods,8 and the builder-vendors of defective
housing,4 lessors of defective premises can still invoke the ancient
maxim, caveat emptor.3 To be sure, numerous exceptions to the
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
3. E.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178
(1970); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965).
4. E.g., Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648,
525 P.2d 88 (1974); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314
(1965).
5. E.g., Oliver v. Hartzell, 170 Ark. 512, 280 S.W. 979 (1926); Walsh v.
Schmidt, 206 Mass. 405, 92 N.E. 496 (1910); Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23
N.E. 126 (1889); Fields v. Ogburn, 178 N.C. 407, 100 S.E. 583 (1919); Branham
v. Fordyce, 103 Ohio App. 379, 145 N.E.2d 471 (1957); Luedtke v. Phillips, 190
Va. 207, 56 S.E.2d 80 (1949); Teglo v. Porter, 65 Wash. 2d 772, 399 P.2d 519
(1965); Comment, Landlord and Tenant-Implied Warranty of Habitability-De-
mise of the Traditional Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, 20 DE PAUL L. REv. 955, 971
(1971). For an excellent general discussion of the historical origins of caveat emp-
tor in the context of commercial transactions see Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim
Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE LJ. 1133 (1931).
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maxim have been recognized,0 but they merely attest to the vitality
of the general rule. To understand the tenacity of caveat emptor
in the law governing the tort liability of lessors of real property, it
is necessary to become conversant with the law of landlord-tenant
relations. And in order to understand landlord-tenant law,
one must forget the modem urban complex with its towering of-
fice buildings, its sprawl of huge apartments, and its teeming
slums. The place to start is with the countryside, i.e., the grass,
trees and grazing sheep. We are back to the land now, and land
is what landlord-tenant law is still all about.7
A. The Nature of a Real Property Lease
It is Dean Lesar's theory that the landlord-tenant relation has
moved "from status to contract to property to modern contract."8
The first three stages of this progression will be traced in this sub-
section because they form the backdrop for the development of
caveat lessee in modern tort law.
1. STATUS
Following the Norman Conquest in 1066, William the Con-
queror held title to all the lands in England. He divided this prop-
erty among his subjects, but instead of granting them rights of own-
ership, he "leased" the land to his immediate followers in exchange
for their services.' Each of these tenants-in-chief subinfeudated
some or all of his holdings to a pyramid of subtenants, who held the
land in either "free" or "unfree" tenure.10 If the subtenant was ob-
ligated to perform definite and certain services, his tenure was classi-
fied as "free"; if he was obligated to perform indefinite services
(i.e., if he did not know in the evening what his lord would require
him to do in the morning), his tenure was "unfree."" The majority
of individuals who performed agricultural and other manual services
held their lands in "unfree tenure" and were classified as "vil-
leins."' 2
6. See note 151 infra and accompanying text.
7. Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the
Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 226-27 (1969).
8. Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to Contract
and Back in 900 Years? 9 KAN. L. REv. 369, 377 (1961).
9. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 210-11 (1895)
[hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND].
10. Id. at 211-12, 214-18, 310-12, 325-27; Comment, The Landlord-Tenant Rela-
tionship: A New Urban Structure, 18 N.Y.L.F. 725 (1972).
11. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 337, 353-54; Hicks, The Contractual
Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REv. 443, 447 (1972); Lesar, supra
note 8, at 369.
12. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 9 at 354; Hicks, supra note 11, at 447;
Lesar, supra note 8, at 369.
1975:19
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When Dean Lesar suggested that the tenant in early English
history had status, but no contractual or property rights, he was re-
ferring to the tenant in villeinage. 1 The freehold tenant, having
seisin, possessed property rights, and he was protected in the king's
courts against ejectment. 4 But when the tenant in villeinage was
ejected, either by his lord or by a third person, the king's court would
not restore him to the land, nor would it give him damages.' 5 In
the eyes of the king's court, the tenant in villeinage was a "tenant
at the will of the lord."'16
In reality, the villein tenant's status was not quite as precarious
as suggested above. In addition to the king's courts there were the
lord's courts, and in these courts the "custom of the manor" became
recognized as law.' 7  According to the custom of the manor, the
tenant in villeinage was seised of the land and could protect his inter-
est against all potential ejectors except the lord of the manor, who
could not be sued in his own court.' 8 Normally, however, the lord
complied with the manorial custom.' 9  Therefore, although the vil-
lein tenant had nothing but status under the law, by custom he en-
joyed a limited possessory interest in the land.
2. CONTRACT
As the status of the villein tenant became more secure,20 social
and economic forces were at work which reduced the amount of land
held in villein tenure and replaced the villein tenant with a tenant
who held the land for a term of years.2 ' This change marked the
transition of the landlord-tenant relation from status to contract.
Historically, the tenancy for years was developed to circumvent
the church's strict prohibition against usury. A landowner in need
of funds would make a lease for a term of years to a tenant in return
for a lump sum consideration, payable in advance. The tenant
would then recoup his rent, plus a healthy profit, from the use of
the land during the term.22
13. Lesar, supra note 8, at 369; accord, I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 9,
at 339-40.
14. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 338-39.
15. Id. at 340-41.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 342; Hicks, supra note 11, at 447-48; Lesar, supra note 8, at 369.
18. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 342.
19. Id. at 359; Lesar, supra note 8, at 369.
20. Between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, the status of the villein ten-
ant improved. First the courts of equity and then the common law courts began to
enforce the manorial customs, culminating in the creation of "copyhold tenure" by
the common law courts. Hicks, supra note 11, at 448; Lesar, supra note 8, at 370.
21. Hicks, supra note 11, at 448; Lesar, supra note 8, at 370.
22. This "premium lease" was the predecessor of the modern mortgage. 1 AMERI-
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After the Black Death of 1348-49, the tenancy for years began
to be used in an agricultural context.2" There was a shortage of
labor and an increased amount of land suitable for cultivation. To
encourage laborers to engage in agricultural pursuits, the lords began
to pay wages and the villein tenancy was replaced by the husbandry
lease for a term of years.2 4
When the lessee was a moneylender engaged in sharp business
practices, the courts were not inclined to recognize or protect his
possessory interest in the land.25 Instead, the landlord-tenant rela.
tion was regarded as purely contractual, and the tenant was denied
the benefit of real actions in the king's courts.26  His only remedies
were specific performance against dispossession by his lessor or dam-
ages in an action of covenant against his lessor.27  Not until 1235
was he given an action (quare ejecit infra terminum) to recover pos-
session against an ejector who had purchased from his lessor, and
he still had no possessory action against strangers.2 8  Despite the fact
that these rules had been developed in a commercial setting, initially
they governed the lease for a term of years in an agricultural context
as well.2" The villein tenant, who had at least enjoyed a limited
possessory interest in the land by custom, now found himself with
virtually nothing but contract rights at law.
3. CONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY
With the advent of the husbandry lease, the courts began to
look more favorably upon the tenant for years. By the early four-
teenth century, he could recover damages against third parties, and
in 1499 he was permitted to bring a possessory action against strang-
ers known as the action for ejectment (de ejectione firmae).,0 The
development of the action for ejectment marked the end of the era
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.1, at 175 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as
ALP]; Hicks, supra note 11, at 448-49; Lesar, supra note 8, at 370.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 2-3 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); Hicks,
supra note 11, at 449.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 2-3 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); Hicks,
supra note 11, at 449; Lesar, supra note 8, at 370.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 1-2 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); Hicks,
supra note 11, at 448-49.
26. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.1, at 175; 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROP-
ERTY 221[1], at 177 (rev. ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as 2 POWELL]; Hicks, supra
note 11, at 449; Lesar, supra note 8, at 370.
27. 1 ALP, supra note 22 § 3.1, at 175; Hicks, supra note 11, at 449; Lesar, supra
note 8, at 370.
28. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.1, at 175; Hicks, supra note 11, at 448-49; Lesar,
supra note 8, at 370.
29. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.1, at 175-76.
30. Id. at 175-76; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 2-3 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973); Hicks, supra note 11, at 450; Lesar, supra note 8, at 370.
1975:19
HeinOnline  -- 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 25 1975
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
in which the lease was considered primarily as a contract. The
termor could now enforce his property rights against any dispossessor
by a remedy analogous to the real actions available to the owner of
a freehold estate."' Although for some purposes the tenant's inter-
est was still classified as a "chattel real, 82 it was primarily an estate
in land.1 In fact, the lease came to be regarded as a conveyance
of real estate. The tenant acquired possession of the property for
a term (with all the incidents of ownership) in exchange for rent,
which was the equivalent of the purchase price. 4
4. CONTRACT OR CONVEYANCE?
In sixteenth century England, when the lease was first charac-
terized as a conveyance of property, the typical lease involved the
transfer of land for agricultural purposes to a tenant who paid the
rent from the proceeds of tilling the soil. Often there were no physi-
cal structures on the land, and if such improvements were present,
they were of secondary importance.8 5 Therefore, it was not incon-
sistent with the nature of the landlord-tenant relation to characterize
the lease as a conveyance of property. This designation actually
worked to the tenant's advantage, since it permitted him to enforce
his legal rights through the real action of ejectment, rather than the
contractual action of debt. 6
With the shift in population from rural to urban areas during
the Industrial Revolution, lessees of both residential and commercial
property became increasingly interested in the structural improve-
ments on the premises. Simultaneously, the lease became a more
complex transaction.87 As a result, the typical lease began to look
more like a contract than a deed of real estate. The parties would
31. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.1, at 176; Hicks, supra note 11, at 450; Lesar, supra
note 8, at 370.
32. For example, the lease continued to be classified as personal property for pur-
poses of testamentary or intestate succession. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.12 (general
discussion of situations in which a lease continues to be characterized as personal
property). See also 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 221[2], at 185.
33. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.1, at 176-77; Lesar, supra note 8, at 371.
34. 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 225[2][a], at 232; Quinn & Phillips, supra note
7, at 227-28; Comment, implied Warranty of Habitability: An Incipient Trend in
the Law of Landlord-Tenant? 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 123 (1971).
35. Lesar, supra note 8, at 371; Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability: An
Incipient Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant?, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 123 (1971);
Comment, Tenant Remedies-The Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habitability, 16
VILL. L. REV. 710, 711 (1971).
36. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HisToRY OF THE COMMON LAW 599 (5th ed.
1956).
37. 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 221[1], at 178-79; Hicks, supra note 11, at
451-52; Lesar, supra note 8, at 372; Note, Landlord v. Tenant: An Appraisal of the
Habitability and Repair Problem, 22 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 739, 740 (1971).
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frequently include express covenants that, for example, placed limi-
tations on the use of the land and the tenant's right to transfer, gov-
erned the time and manner of paying rent, regulated the erection
and removal of improvements, fixed or apportioned liability for in-
surance and taxes, provided for security deposits and options to pur-
chase or renew, and allocated responsibility for repairing defects in
the premises. 8s
As the nature of the lease changed, commentators began to ask
whether it was a contract or a conveyance. The typical scholarly
response was that it was both:
,[I]t is idle !to speculate whether the land or the promise is the
principal element of a lease of an apartment with a promise to
furnish heat from a central heating plant or of a lease of space in
a modem business building with a promise not to lease other
parts of the building to an operator of a competing business.
The bargain is for both. If the warp is conveyance, the woof is
contract -and neither alone makes a whole cloth.8 9
But the courts persisted in regarding the land as of primary impor-
tance. Consequently, the lease continued to be characterized as a
conveyance of property, and real property law governed the land-
lord-tenant relation.40
B. The Development of Caveat Lessee
In sixteenth century England, a purchaser of real property was
expected to inspect the premises prior to the sale and, in the absence
of express contractual provisions to the contrary, he took the prem-
ises "as is."'" In the words of Lord Coke:
Note, that by the civil law every man is bound to warrant the
thing that he selleth or conveyeth, albeit there be no expresse
38. 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 221[l], at 178-79; Lesar, supra note 8, at 372;
Note, Landlord v. Tenant: An Appraisal of the Habitability and Repair Problem, 22
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 739,740 (1971).
39. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.11, at 203. The authors of two leading treatises
on contracts agreed that a lease is both a conveyance of property and a bilateral con-
tract. See 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 686, at 236 (rev. ed. 1960); 3 S. WILLIS-
TON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CoNTRACTs § 890, at 580-81 (3d ed. 1962)
[hereinafter cited as WLLISTON].
40. 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 220, at 174. Milton R. Friedman, who conducted
a careful study of the judicial decisions in New York, observed that a lease is contrac-
tual in execution and delivery, but like a conveyance of property with respect to the
landlord's duty to deliver possession to the tenant, the independence of lease cove-
nants, and the rules governing reentry, surrender by operation of law, and survival
of tenant's liability. Friedman, The Nature of a Lease in New York, 33 CORNELL
L. REV. 165 (1947). Consequently, he concluded that "most of the law of leases
is based on a lease as a conveyance. . . ." Id. at 194.
41. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 299 (1803).
1975:19
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warranty . . . either in deed or in law; but the common law
bindeth him not, for caveat emptor .... 42
Thus, as a result of characterizing a lease as a conveyance of real
property, the doctrine of caveat emptor became applicable to the
landlord-tenant relation.4 s Although the landlord covenanted that
he had the power to transfer possession to the tenant and that he
would leave the tenant in quiet enjoyment of the leasehold, 4 there
was no implied covenant or warranty of the habitability or fitness
of the premises for any particular purpose. This meant that the ten-
ant took the premises with whatever defects were present at the time
of the lease and that the landlord had no responsibility to maintain
the premises in a reasonable state of repair during the term of the
lease.
The doctrine of caveat lessee was probably of little concern to
the agrarian leaseholder of the sixteenth and seventeenth centur-
ies.45 He was capable of inspecting the real estate for defects prior
to the inception of the lease, for even if there were improvements
on the property, they were relatively simple in design. As for de-
fects arising during the term of the lease, he probably had both the
skill and the financial resources to make the necessary repairs.46
However, as the agrarian leaseholder was replaced by the urban ten-
ant, the rule of caveat emptor became less and less appropriate to
the landlord-tenant relationship. As buildings became more com-
plicated and expensive to repair, and as the tenant population be-
came more mobile, many tenants found themselves occupying dwell-
ings which they had neither the expertise nor funds to repair.4Y Yet
caveat emptor had acquired the inertial force of precedent and it
continued to be the general rule in both England48 and the United
42. 2 E. COKE, A COMMENTARY ON LITrLETON 102(a), c. 7, § 145 (1853 ed.).
43. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.45, at 267; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 225[21[a],
at 232; Grimes, Caveat Lessee, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. REv. 189, 190, 192 (1968); Note,
Landlord v. Tenant: An Appraisal of the Habitability and Repair Problem, 22
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 739 (1971).
44. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.47, at 271-72; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, § 225[1,
at 232.5-233.
45. 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 233, at 300-01.
46. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
47. Id. at 1078-79.
48. There is some evidence that the courts did not apply the caveat emptor doc-
trine to leases of dwellings in the early 1800's. In three cases, the tenant was re-
lieved of his obligation to pay rent on the grounds that the premises were unfit for
habitation. Edwards v. Etherington, 171 Eng. Rep. 1016 (Q.B. 1840); Collins v.
Barrow, 174 Eng. Rep. 38 (Ex. 1831); Salisbury v. Marshall, 172 Eng. Rep. 268
(C.P. 1829). Since none of the cases mentioned the caveat emptor doctrine, it was
not clear whether they intended to repudiate the rule. Grimes, supra note 43, at 194-
95. However, in 1843, the English judges firmly reinstated the general principle of
caveat lessee. Sutton v. Temple, 152 Eng. Rep. 1108 (Ex. 1843) (lease of agricul-
tural land); Hart v. Windsor, 152 Eng. Rep. 1114 (Ex. 1843) (lease of unfurnished
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States.49
In recognition of the harsh result wrought by the strict applica-
tion of caveat lessee in an urban environment, the English courts
recognized one exception to the rule: the implied warranty of
habitability in the lease of a furnished house or apartment for a short
term."0 The reason given for this departure from the general rule
was that the premises were intended for immediate occupancy and
thus there was no time for the tenant to make an adequate inspec-
tion or to put the premises in a habitable condition.51 Moreover,
it was theoretically more difficult for the tenant to detect defects
upon initial inspection of a furnished dwelling.5 2  The exception ap-
plied regardless of whether the defect was in the furniture or in the
property itself,5" but it only protected the tenant against defects
which were present at the beginning of the lease.54 The English
exception was adopted in the United States, 55 although it was strictly
construed to apply to the lease of furnished premises 6 for residential
house for 3 years). The English courts have continued to adhere to the general doc-
trine of caveat lessee, although commentators have urged that it be overruled. North,
The Liability of a Landlord for Dangerous Premises, 29 CONVEY. (n.s.) 207 (1965);
West, Implied Obligations of a Landlord as to the Condition of Premises at the Time
of Letting, 25 CONVEY. (n.s.) 184 (1961).
49. The doctrine of caveat lessee was accepted in the United States as part of the
common law of England. Grimes, supra note 43, at 198-99. Initially the American
courts were reluctant to recognize the rule. Carson v. Godley, 26 Pa. 111, 117-18
(1856); Godley v. Hargerty, 20 Pa. 387 (1853). However, it soon became as firmly
entrenched in the United States as it had been in England. 2 POWELL, supra note
26, at 225[2]; see cases cited at note 5 supra.
50. Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843) (lease of furnished house
for approximately 5 weeks); Sarson v. Roberts, [1895] 2 Q.B. 395 (lease of fur-
nished apartment).
51. North, supra note 48, at 217-19; West, supra note 48, at 184, 194.
52. J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 413 n.19 (4th ed. 1971); Harkrider, Tort
Liability of a Landlord, 26 MICH. L. REV. 260, 281-85 (1928).
53. Wilson v. Finch-Halton, L.R. 2 Eq. 336 (1877); North, supra note 48, at 208.
54. Sarson v. Roberts, [1895] 2 Q.B. 395; North, supra note 48, at 209 & n.20.
55. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.45, 267-68; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, at 225[2],
225[2][a]; Grimes, supra note 43, at 200-01; Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases:
The Need for Change, 44 DENVER L.J. 387, 391-92 (1967); Comment, Implied
Warranty of Habitability in Lease of Furnished Premises for Short Term: Erosion
of Caveat Emptor, 3 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 322, 322-23 (1969).
The American courts recognized the exception for the reasons set forth in the
English decisions:
One who lets for a short term a house provided with all furnishings and ap-
pointments for immediate residence may be supposed to contract in reference
to a well-understood purpose of the hirer to use it as a habitation. An impor-
tant part of what the hirer pays for is the opportunity to enjoy it without de-
lay and without the expense of preparing it for use. It is very difficult, and
often impossible, for one to determine on inspection whether the house and
its appointments are fit for the use for which they are immediately wanted,
and the doctrine caveat emptor, which is ordinarily applicable to a lessee of
real estate, would often work injustice if applied to cases of this kind.
Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
56. E.g., Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922); Davenport v. Squibb,
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purposes57 for a short term5" when the defect was present at the in-
ception of the lease.5 9 Some courts further restricted the exception
to defects in the furniture (as opposed to structural defects).60
A second exception, closely related to the first, was created by
the American courts. They held that there was an implied covenant
of fitness when the subject of the lease was a structure to be used
for a particular purpose, and the lease was negotiated while the
structure was still under construction."' In such circumstances, the
lessee had little or no opportunity to inspect the premises for final
fitness, and therefore, caveat lessee seemed unduly harsh.62 It has
been suggested, however, that this warranty is "implied in the con-
320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947); Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E.
286 (1892); Morgenthau v. Ehrich, 77 Misc. 139, 136 N.Y.S. 140 (Sup. Ct. 1912);
Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Lease of Furnished Premises for a
Short Term: Erosion of Caveat Emptor, 3 U. RICHMOND L. RE. 322 (1969). The
restriction of the implied warranty of habitability to furnished premises has been crit-
icized by Judge Bazelon in Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1952)
(dissenting opinion), and it was rejected in Delameter v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428,
239 N.W. 148 (1931) (implied warranty of habitability in lease of furnished apart-
ment; vermin infestation).
57. When a building is leased for business purposes, the majority of courts refuse
to recognize an implied warranty of fitness, even though the building contains equip-
ment and is rented for immediate occupancy. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.45, at 268
n.10; Grimes, supra note 43, at 201. See, e.g., Gade v. National Creamery Co., 324
Mass. 515, 519, 87 N.E.2d 180, 182 (1949): "The renting of a refrigeration room
for commercial purposes and for an indefinite time, although the room was needed
by the tenant for immediate occupancy, is not within the Ingalls v. Hobbs exception".
58. The warranty of habitability has normally not been recognized in leases for
a period of more than one year. Skillern, supra note 55, at 392; Comment, Implied
Warranty of Habitability in Lease of Premises for Short Term: Erosion of Caveat
Emptor, 3 U. RiCHMOND L. REV. 322, 324 (1969). An excellent discussion of the
issue appears in Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 144-45, 116 A. 26, 27 (1922) (eight-
month lease):
The phrase "short term," as used in the Ingalls Case, comes within the rule
of implied warranty. Conversely, the phrase "long term" would come within
the rule of caveat emptor. Where, then, between the two, is the line to be
drawn...?
It is apparent from the statement of these legal principles that no arbi-
trary time can be fixed. . . . We are of the opinion, therefore, that this issue
must be treated as a question of fact depending upon the circumstances of
each particular case. We think that the phrase "for a temporary purpose,"
instead of the phrase "for a short term," under present methods of demise and
occupancy, would more definitely present the question of fact to be deter-
mined in this class of cases.
59. Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947); Ingalls v. Hobbs,
156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
60. E.g., Murray v. Albertson, 50 N.J.L. 167, 13 A. 394 (1888); 1 ALP, supra
note 22, § 3.45, at 268.
61. E.g., Friedman v. Isenbruck, 111 Cal. App. 2d 326, 244 P.2d 718 (1952);
Woolford v. Electric Appliances, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938);
J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Hardman
Estate v. McNair, 61 Wash. 74, 111 P. 1059 (1910). 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.45,
at 268; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, at 225[2]; Skillern, supra note 55, at 392-93.
62. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3,45, at 268-69; Skillern, supra note 55, at 393,
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tract to construct, and not in the lease agreement."6 8 Moreover, the
exception was strictly construed to apply only to premises under con-
struction. 4
A third exception was recognized when the landlord knew of
a dangerous condition or defect in the premises and failed to disclose
it to the tenant at the time the lease was negotiated.6" This excep-
tion was restricted to defects which were not discoverable by the ten-
ant upon an ordinary inspection of the premises, and in most jurisdic-
tions, was further restricted to those defects about which the lessor
had actual (as opposed to constructive) knowledge. 6
In summary, caveat emptor found its way into the law of land-
lord-tenant relations because the sixteenth century common law
courts characterized a lease as a conveyance of real property. Al-
though it may have been appropriate to the agrarian lessor-lessee
relationship, caveat emptor imposed undue hardships on the urban
tenant. The courts could have abolished the outmoded maxim, but
instead they chose to carve out three exceptions to it: 1) the implied
warranty of habitability in leases of furnished dwellings for a short
term; 2) the implied warranty of fitness in leases of premises under
construction at the time of the lease; and 3) the failure to disclose
defects of which the landlord had actual or constructive knowledge.
Significantly, none of these exceptions applied to the average tenant
residing in an unfurnished dwelling. In retrospect, caveat lessee
may have suffered some minor setbacks in the process of being
transplanted to America, but clearly it neither withered nor died.
C. Tenant's Remedies Against Landlord
1. INDEPENDENT COVENANTS
The hardships imposed by caveat lessee were compounded by
another vestige of real property law-the doctrine of independent
covenants. Even if the lessee were lucky enough to benefit from
one of the implied warranties regarding the condition of the prem-
ises or were able to negotiate an express warranty, his sole remedy
for breach of that warranty was an action for damages. He could
not vacate the premises or remain in possession and withhold the rent.
Another excursion into history is required to explain this anomalous
situation.
63. Skillern, supra note 55, at 393.
I64. d.
65. E.g., Gamble-Robinson Co. v. Buzzard, 65 F.2d 950, 954 (8th Cir. 1933);
Goldberg v. Reed, 97 N.J.L. 170, 116 A. 429 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922); Perkins v.
Marsh, 179 Wash. 362, 37 P.2d 689 (1934).
66. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.45, at 269; Grimes, supra note 43, at 202-04.
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a. Landlord's covenant of quiet enjoyment and tenant's
covenant to pay rent
Under the agricultural lease of the sixteenth century, the land-
lord's principal obligation was to convey possession of the land to
the tenant in return for which the tenant agreed to pay the rent.
There were two implied covenants in any lease: the landlord's
covenant to keep the tenant in peaceful possession (the covenant
of "quiet enjoyment") and the tenant's covenant to pay the rent. In
the absence of a provision making them conditional, these covenants
were deemed to be independent of each other.67  This meant that
the tenant who failed to pay his rent could remain in possession of
the premises; the landlord's sole remedy was an action for damages
as the rent accrued, coupled with a power to distrain the tenant's
chattels.6 8 Similarly, if the tenant were ejected, his duty to pay the
rent was not terminated; his only remedies were an action in eject-
ment to restore him to possession and an action for damages for
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.6"
The law was clearly not in harmony with the layman's expecta-
tions, since rent was commonly regarded as the quid pro quo for pos-
session. As to lessors, the discrepancy was rectified, not by abolish-
ing the doctrine of independent covenants, but rather by enforcing
Written lease provisions granting the landlord the power to terminate
the lease for nonpayment of rent.7" The legislatures then enacted
statutes creating a summary procedure for evicting a tenant who had
defaulted in his payment of rent, irrespective of the inclusion of a
forfeiture clause in the lease. 71 For all practical purposes, the
covenant of quiet enjoyment had become dependent upon the ten-
ant's payment of rent.
But what about the tenant whose right to peaceful possession
had been disrupted? Was he still obligated to pay rent? Mutual
covenants were still regarded as independent and the tenant did not
typically have the bargaining power to condition payment of the
rent upon his continued peaceful possession of the premises. There-
fore, when a tenant was physically ousted from possession, the courts
held that his rent obligation was not terminated (since the covenant
of quiet enjoyment was independent of the tenant's obligation to pay
67. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 227-28; Rapacz, Origin and Evolution of
Constructive Eviction in the United States, 1 DE PAUL L. REv. 69, 70-71 (1951).
68. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 228 n.4.
69. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.52, at 283; Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 229
nn. 6 & 7.
70. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 228 n.4; Note, Contract Principles and
Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. REv. 24, 26 (1970).
71. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §H 792, 1946 (West 1954); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
99 1159-79a (West 1972); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS LAW § 711 (McKinney 1963).
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the rent), but was suspended (since there had been a breach of the
implied covenant).7" This rule applied to partial as well as total
evictions by the landlord on the theory that the landlord could not
"apportion his own wrong. ' 7 But while the tenant's rent obliga-
tion was in theory "suspended," it was in fact terminated, for if the
tenant gave up his leasehold interest, he had no obligation to pay the
rent.74  Thus, in reality, the landlord's covenant of quiet enjoyment
and the tenant's covenant to pay rent were construed as mutually
dependent, although technically they continued to be characterized
as independent.
b. Landlord's covenant to repair and tenant's
covenant to pay rent
For reasons that were never fully articulated, the courts did not
extend their informal construction of lease covenants as mutually
dependent beyond the covenants of quiet enjoyment and payment
of rent.75 All other covenants in the lease, whether express or im-
plied, were construed as independent. 76 In the language of the Re-
statement of Contracts:
Non-performance of a covenant by one party to a lease or
other conveyance of land, unless performance of the covenant is
72. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.49-.50; 3 WILLISTON, supra note 39, § 891, at 636-
37; Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 229 n.6; Rapacz, supra note 67, at 72-73.
73. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.49-.50; 3 WILLISTON, supra note 39, § 891; Note,
Partial Constructive Eviction: The Common Law Answer in the Tenant's Struggle
for Habitability, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 417 (1970).
74. See 1 ALP, supra note 22, at § § 3.50, 3.52.
75. Williston has suggested several possible reasons for this judicial adherence to
the independent covenant doctrine:
[P]artly because a lease is regarded primarily as a conveyance by the com-
mon law, partly because the law governing leases has been dealt with in con-
nection with the law of real estate, and became settled before the law of mu-
tually dependent promises was established, and partly no doubt because leases
have ordinarily been elaborately written documents in which the parties might
be supposed to have expressed their intent with considerable fullness, cove-
nants in leases have been held mutually independent unless in terms expressly
conditional.
3 WILLISTON, supra note 39, § 890, at 587-89. Quinn and Phillips have offered an-
other, extremely cogent explanation:
What the law did was to preserve the old landlord-tenant law with its
fixation on possession as the crux of the lease, and with rent as the quid pro
quo for possession. Onto this was engrafted a new set of rights and duties
(concerning heat, hot water and repairs) which were independent of the pos-
session-rent relationship and considered incidental and unimportant relative to
possession. The result was a double set of relationships between the landlord
and the tenant, i.e., a two level relationship.
Significantly, the two levels were separate and distinct. A failure to per-
form on one level generated a remedy on that level, but in no way affected
the other level. In technical terms, the covenants on one level were not re-
ciprocal with the covenants on the other.
Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 233-34.
76. 3A A. CORBIN, CoNTRAcTS § 686, at 238 (rev. ed. 1960).
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an express condition, does not excuse the other party from per-
forming his covenants further than the law of property governing
the effect of eviction of the grantee or of waste by him pro-
vides. 77
Consequently, regardless of whether the landlord violated an ex-
press or implied covenant to repair the premises, the tenant's remedy
was the same: an action for damages.78  The tenant could not re-
main in possession and withhold the rent because a breach of the
landlord's covenant to repair was no defense to an action for rent
or eviction. 70  Furthermore, the tenant could not voluntarily vacate
the premises and terminate his rental obligation because his coven-
ant to pay rent was independent of the landlord's covenant to re-
pair.80
Like the maxim "caveat emptor," the application of the doc-
trine of independent covenants to the landlord's obligation to repair
did not work a serious injustice in a rural setting. But as an increas-
ing percentage of the tenant population moved to the city, and as mul-
tiple-dwelling apartments began to dot the skyline, the notion that
a tenant could neither withhold rent nor vacate the premises for a
breach of the landlord's obligation to repair became totally unaccept-
able.
2. CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION
The courts responded to the inherent injustice of the inde-
pendent covenants doctrine by creating a new concept: constructive
eviction.8 When the lessor had seriously interfered with the les-
see's use and enjoyment of the premises (e.g., by failing to perform
express or implied covenants to heat, repair, or make alterations in
the premises), the tenant was deemed to have been "constructively
evicted." The tenant was entitled to vacate the premises and defend
against an action for rent in the same manner as though he had been
77. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 290 (1932).
78. Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract (Damages for
Anticipatory Breach and Interdependency of Covenants), 16 TEXAs L. REv. 45, 63-
64 (1938); Comment, The Duty of Maintenance of Multiple Dwellings in California,
18 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1400-01 (1966).
79. Bennett, supra note 78, at 63-64; Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law:
A Survey of Modern Problems with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21
HASTINGS L. J. 369, 383 (1970); Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California: A
Study in Frustration, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 303 (1970); Quinn & Phillips, supra note
7, at 230, 232-35.
80. Bennett, supra note 78, at 64; Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 230, 235.
81. The first case to recognize the doctrine was Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727
(N.Y. Ct. Err. 1826), rev'g 4 Cow. 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825) (tenant allowed to
defend an action for rent by submitting evidence that other parts of the apartment
building were occupied by prostitutes).
HeinOnline  -- 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 34 1975
1975:19 Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises
physically evicted. 2  Although some courts were initially critical of
the doctrine, it was gradually accepted throughout the country.8
By the middle of the twentieth century, it was "by far the most fre-
quent defense offered to suits for rent where tenants quit tlhe
premises because of [their] condition ....
The doctrine of constructive eviction was based on the theory
that the covenant of quiet enjoyment could be breached not only by
an actual physical expulsion, but also by such a substantial interfer-
ence with the tenant's use and enjoyment of the premises that he
was, for all practical purposes, evicted. 5 A tenant who sought to
invoke the doctrine had to meet four very stringent criteria.8 First,
he had to show an act of misfeasance or nonfeasance by the land-
lord (or someone acting under the landlord's instructions or with his
permission).87 Second, he had to establish a substantial interfer-
ence with his use and enjoyment of the premises.88 Typical acts89
82. Bennett, supra note 78, at 65. See also Hicks, supra note 11, at 461; Quinn
& Phillips, supra note 7, at 235-36.
In terms of Quinn and Phillips' two-level analysis of the landlord-tenant relation-
ship mentioned in note 75 supra, the doctrine of constructive eviction had the follow-
ing effect:
Beneath the traditional exterior . . .a radically new idea was really at work.
What the law was doing was taking an obligation that clearly situated itself
on level two, i.e., the landlord's service obligation, and shifting it down to
level one. On this level, there was a relationship of dependence between it
and the rent .... What the law was accomplishing, therefore, was the fu-
sion of the two levels in the limited situation where the failure to provide serv-
ices was so severe that it shocked the court's conscience.
Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 236.
83. Rapacz, supra note 67, at 71-72.
84. Id. at 69. For a discussion of other defenses which are available to tenants
under such circumstances see Rapacz, Theories of Defense When Tenants Abandon
the Premises Because of the Condition Thereof, 4 DE PAUL L. REV. 173 (1955).
85. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.50, at 278; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, at 225[3];
Hicks, supra note 11, at 461-62; Rapacz, supra note 67, at 73-74.
86. Rapacz, supra note 67, at 75 (The author identifies only three elements, since
he combines the first and second elements discussed below in the text). Comment,
Constructive Eviction of a Tenant, 13 BAYLOR L. REV. 62, 70 (1961); Note, Partial
Constructive Eviction: The Common Law Answer in the Tenant's Struggle for Hab-
itability, 21 HAsTINGs L.J. 417, 421-23 (1970). The cases are collected in 1 ALP,
supra note 22, § 3.51 and 2 POWELL, eupra note 26, at % 225[3].
87. Rapacz, supra note 67, at 79-81; Comment, Constructive Eviction of a Tenant,
13 BAYLOR L. REv. 62, 64-65 (1961); Note, Partial Constructive Eviction, The Com-
mon Law Answer in the Tenant's Struggle for Habitability, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 417,
421-22 (1970). There are some modem cases which have held that the lessor's failure
to stop other tenants from interfering with the lessee's use and enjoyment of the
premises constitutes a constructive eviction, but such cases are relatively rare. E.g.,
Bruckner v. Helfaer, 197 Wis. 582, 222 N.W. 790 (1929); Rapacz, supra note 67,
at 80, 82-84.
88. Rapacz, supra note 67, at 81-82; Comment, Constructive Eviction of a Tenant,
13 BAYLOR L. REV. 62, 65-66 (1961); Note, Partial Constructive Eviction, The Com-
mon Law Answer in the Tenant's Struggle for Habitability, 21 HASTINoS L.J. 417,
422 (1970).
89. See the following sources for a complete list of acts constituting a constructive
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which have been held to constitute a constructive eviction include
the breach of express covenants to furnish services (e.g., heat, hot
water, elevator service) or to make repairs or improvements;90 the
breach of the implied warranty of habitability in the lease of a dwell-
ing for a short term;91 and, in some jurisdictions, the failure to rem-
edy defective conditions which the tenant is unable to repair, even
though there has been no breach of an express or implied warranty
regarding the condition of the premises. 2 Third, the tenant had to
establish that the landlord intended to interfere with his quiet pos-
session. 8 And fourth, he had to abandon the premises within a rea-
sonable time9 4 after the commission of the act.95
Abandonment was required because it seemed contradictory to
permit a tenant to claim a constructive "eviction" and remain in pos-
session at the same time.96 However, the requirement placed the
tenant in a terrible dilemma. If he remained in possession, he was
deemed to have waived the defects. But if he abandoned the prem-
ises, he ran the risk that the courts would subsequently find the land-
lord's breach "insubstantial," meaning that the tenant was still liable
for the rent. The tenant's problems were further compounded dur-
eviction. 1 ALP, supra note 22, at § 3.51; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, at 225[3];
Comment, Constructive Eviction of a Tenant, 13 BAYLOR L. REV. 62, 68-69 (1961);
Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1356 (1970) (water damage); Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 924 (1969)
(vermin infestation); Annot., 172 A.L.R. 18 (1948) (breach of covenant of quiet
enjoyment).
90. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.51, at 281-82; 3 WILLISTON, supra note 39, § 892,
at 651-53; Bennett, supra note 78, at 66.
91. Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Lease of Furnished Premisesfor Short Term: Erosion of Caveat Emptor, 3 U. RICHMOND L. RE. 322, 322-23
(1969).
92. E.g., Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 455-60, 251 A.2d 268, 274-
76 (1969) (recurrent flooding); Barnard Realty Co. v. Bonwit, 155 App. Div. 182,
139 N.Y.S. 1050 (1913) (rats in ceiling and walls of new apartment); 3 WILLISTON,
supra note 39, at § 892; Rapacz, supra note 67, at 80-81.
,93. Comment, Constructive Eviction of a Tenant, 13 BAYLOR L. Rv. 62, 62-64
(1961); Note, Partial Constructive Eviction: The Common Law Answer in the Ten-
ant's Struggle for Habitability, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 417, 422 (1970). One commentator
has suggested, however, that "we have reached the state in the law where intent to
evict is merely a technical requirement which might well be abandoned." Rapacz,
supra note 67, at 79.
94. What constitutes a reasonable time has been held to depend upon the circum-
stances of the case. See generally Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 638 (1963).
95. Rapacz, supra note 67, at 85-86; Comment, Constructive Eviction of a Tenant,
13 BAYLOR L. REV. 62, 66-67 (1961); Note, Partial Constructive Eviction: The
Common Law Answer in the Tenant's Struggle for Habitability, 21 HASTINGS L.J.
417, 422-23 (1970).
If the landlord had no knowledge of the defect, the tenant was also required to
notify him of the condition and give him an opportunity to remedy it. Rapacz, supra
note 67, at 85.
96. Rapacz, supra note 67, at 85; Note, Partial Constructive Eviction: The Com-
mon Law Answer in the Tenant's Struggle for Habitability, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 417,
422-23 (1970).
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ing periods when there was a housing shortage.97 In an effort to
ease the tenant's plight, a few courts recognized "constructive evic-
tion without abandonment'98 or "partial constructive eviction,"99 but
these modifications of the doctrine were never widely accepted. 100
A tenant who was able to bring himself within the doctrine of
constructive eviction had two remedies. He could defend an action
for eviction or rent, because the constructive eviction suspended his
obligation to pay rent.'' He could also sue for damages, since the
landlord had breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment. 0 2
Constructive eviction served two important functions. As is
widely recognized, it ameliorated the harshness of the independent
covenants doctrine by permitting a tenant to vacate the premises for
a substantial breach of an express or implied covenant to repair. 10 3
Moreover, it enabled the courts to carve out a fourth exception to
the general rule of caveat lessee. If a tenant in an unfurnished
dwelling (or in a furnished dwelling for a long term) could establish
that the premises were so uninhabitable as to constitute a breach of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment, he could defend an action for rent
or eviction and bring an action for damages.10 4  Despite its merits,
the doctrine still had one significant shortcoming: it was a posses-
sion-oriented remedy which required the tenant to abandon the
premises. 10 5 Therefore, the remedy's value became increasingly
ephemeral in the modem context of housing shortages and low-in-
come tenants who could not risk an adverse post-abandonment judi-
cial decision.
D. Housing Codes
The common law of landlord-tenant relations can be briefly
97. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 236-37; Note, Contract Principles and
Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. REV. 24, 31 (1970).
98. Quinn &-- Phillips, supra note 7, at 237; Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent
Tenant: Proposals for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519, 529-31 (1966); Note, Contract
Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. Rv. 24, 31-33 (1970).
99. Schoshinski, supra note 98, at 531-32; Note, Partial Constructive Eviction:
The Common Law Answer in the Tenant's Struggle for Habitability, 21 HASTINGS
L.J. 417, 429-31 (1970).
100. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 238.
101. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.52, at 283-84; Rapacz, supra note 67, at 87-88.
Rapacz notes that, in reality, the obligation to pay rent is terminated. Id. at 87.
102. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.52, at 284-85; Rapacz, supra note 67, at 88-89.
The tenant is entitled to recover damages for the loss of his contractual bargain, the
costs and expenses of eviction, and any lost profits he has sustained. Id. at 88.
103. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.51, at 281; 3A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 686, at
242-43 (rev. ed. 1960); Bennett, supra note 78, at 68-69.
104. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
105. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 236-37; Note, Contract Principles and
Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. REV. 24, 30-31 (1970); Comment, Implied Warranty of
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summarized: 1) The lease was a conveyance of real property; 2)
the doctrine of caveat emptor applied to the vast majority of lease
transactions; and 3) lease covenants were generally independent
covenants. The social and economic forces of the Industrial Revolu-
tion, coupled with this "common-law troika" of real property doc-
trines, produced large urban areas in which low-income tenants lived
in tenement houses which were both unsafe and unsanitary. The
tenants lacked the economic leverage to improve their living condi-
tions, and there was no recourse in the courts, for the law of land-
lord-tenant was heavily weighted in favor of the landlord. Since the
courts demonstrated no willingness to modify the common law, it be-
came necessary for the legislatures to take corrective action.
It would have been possible to have enacted legislation abro-
gating all three components of the "common law troika."' 6  Such
legislation would have decreed that a lease is a contract composed
of mutually dependent covenants, including an implied covenant to
put the premises in good repair and to maintain them in such condi-
tion during the term of the lease. A violation of the statutory coven-
ant to repair would have entitled the tenant to refuse to pay all or a
portion of the rent. Instead of following this course of action, how-
ever, legislatures in the United States focused their attention on the
doctrine of caveat lessee and enacted housing codes imposing on the
landlord a statutory duty to repair.
1. STATUTORY DUTY TO REPAIR
The typical housing code is a municipal ordinance enacted
pursuant to state enabling legislation, which makes a violation of its
provisions a misdemeanor. 10 7  Liability is imposed without proof of
criminal intent.' 08 A housing code normally 1) requires the installa-
tion of certain facilities, such as bathroom and kitchen facilities,
electricity, heating, lighting, solid and liquid waste disposal, and
ventilation; 2) establishes standards for the continued maintenance
of the structural facilities and for the elimination of unsanitary condi-
tions, such as rodents, vermin, and dampness; and 3) regulates the
Habitability: An Incipient Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant? 40 FORDHAM L.
REv. 123, 126 (1971).
106. See note 388 infra.
107. F. GRAD, LEOAL REMEDIES FOR HousiNo CODE VIOLAIONs 7 (National
Commission on Urban Problems, Research Report No. 14, 1968) [hereinafter cited
as GRAD]. The enabling legislation frequently establishes the manner in which the
housing code may be enforced, and therefore it should be consulted in addition to
the ordinance. Some states have enacted state housing codes. Id.
108. It is relatively simple to prove an offense, since it is necessary to establish
only two elements: the existence of a condition in a dwelling which violates the
housing code and the defendant's ownership of the dwelling at the time of the viola-
tion. Id. at 22.
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density of occupancy by prescribing the minimum size of dwelling
units for given numbers of occupants. 10 Initially, housing codes
covered only multiple-unit dwellings occupied by three or more
families. 110  Because these tended to be concentrated in large, ur-
ban areas, no more than 56 housing codes had been enacted as of
1954.11' In that year, federal legislation was passed requiring local
communities to enact housing codes in order to become eligible for
the receipt of urban renewal funds." 2 Today, in response to federal
prodding, more than 5,000 communities have enacted. housing
codes, many of which cover all residential dwellings."'
Although housing codes serve the salutary function of imposing
a duty to repair, they have been criticized" 4 for setting standards
that are too low to assure "a decent home and suitable living en-
vironment for every American family.""15  Since housing codes are
109. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN
CITY, H. R. Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 273-74 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY]; Mood, The Development, Objective and Ade-
quacy of Current Housing Code Standards, in HOUSING CODE STANDARDS: THREE
CRITICAL STUDIES 15-16 (National Commission on Urban Problems, Research Report
No. 19, 1968); Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1115, 1116-7
(1956).
110. The ancestry of the modem housing code goes back to the tenement house
laws enacted in the latter half of the nineteenth century to cope with the problems
created when conventional housing resources in urban areas were overburdened by
the immigration of large numbers of people from Europe. The early laws proved
inadequate, and a movement favoring more stringent regulations, spearheaded by
Lawrence Veiller, culminated in the enactment of the New York Tenement House
Act of 1901. Ch. 334 [1901] N.Y. Sess. Laws. The New York Act became a model
for other jurisdictions, and by 1910, over one-fourth of the states had passed similar
legislation.
Following World War 1, there was a shift away from tenement house laws to mul-
tiple dwelling codes. Again, New York was in the forefront with its Multiple Dwell-
ing Law of 1929, which covered all buildings inhabited by three or more families.
Ch. 713 [1929] N.Y. Sess. Laws. This time, however, there was no rush to follow
New York's example. In the 1930's, reformers were generally disillusioned with
housing codes and had directed their attention to public housing. See generally L.
FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING: A CENTURY OF FRUSTRATION 25-55
(1968); Mood, supra note 109, at 6-8; Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement:
Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1259-60 (1966); Comment, Build-
ing Codes, Housing Codes and Conservation of Chicago's Housing Supply, 31 U.
CHI. L. REV. 180 (1963).
111. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 109, at 277.
112. The Housing Act of 1954 required all communities receiving urban renewal
funds to have a "workable program ...to eliminate and prevent the development
or spread of slums and urban blight." Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, § 303, 68 Stat.
623 (1954), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1451 (1970). The enactment of a local hous-
ing code was a prerequisite to the certification of a "workable program." At first
the requirement was administrative; now it is statutory. Id.; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note
110, at 49-50; Gribetz & Grad, supra note 110, at 1260 n.19; Note, Federal Aids for
Enforcement of Housing Codes, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 948, 958-68 (1965).
113. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 109, at 277.
114. Id. at 274; Mood, supra note 109, at 13.
115. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 2, 63 Stat. 413 (1949).
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normally local legislation, the standards also lack uniformity. In an
effort to combat this latter problem, at least four model codes"' have
been promulgated by health groups and building official groups.
However, there is no uniformity among the model codes either.
Those drafted by health groups tend to use short, general phrases,
such as "sound condition," "good repair," "safe to use and capable
of supporting the loads," and "constructed and installed in conform-
ance with applicable state and local laws." Those issued by building
official groups often refer to specific sections in the companion
model building code, thereby encouraging local governmental enti-
ties to adopt the housing code which is tied to their building code." 7
The inadequate standards and lack of uniformity in today's housing
codes have prompted scholars and governmental commissions to call
for the development of a "new generation of model housing codes
using a common set of standards based on the specific national objec-
tive of achieving a decent home for every American family.""'
Meanwhile, there has been some movement toward the enactment
of comprehensive, statewide housing codes." 9 Such codes would
116. UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, APHA-PHS RECOMMENDED Hous-
ING MAINTENANCE AND OCCUPANCY ORDINANCE (1971); THE BUILDING OFFICIALS'
CONFERENCE OF AMERICA, THE BOCA BASIC HOUSING CODE (2d ed. 1970) (promi-
nent in the east and north central parts of the United States); THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF BUILDING OFFICIALS, UNIFORM BUILDING CODE: HOUSING (Vol. III)
(1973) (most influential in the west); SOUTHERN BUILDING CODE CONGRESS, SOUTH-
ERN STANDARD HOUSING CODE (1969) (dominant in the south). The APHA-PHS
code was drafted by mental health officers; the other three are the product of build-
ing officials' organizations, which have also promulgated model building codes gov-
erning the construction of new buildings.
Housing codes are to be distinguished from building codes. Building codes set
construction standards; housing codes establish use-and-occupancy standards. Mood,
supra note 109, at 3.
For a general analysis and evaluation of building and housing codes, with recom-
mendations for improvement see BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 109, at
254-307; Mood, supra note 109, at 11-38. For an analysis of the APHA-PHS Code,
see Polatsek, The New Model-An Analysis of the APHA-PHS Recommended Hous-
ing Maintenance and Occupancy Ordinance, 2 URBAN L. ANN. 101 (1969).
117. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 109, 279.
118. Id. at 306; accord Mood, supra note 109, at 35-38.
119. New Jersey, for example, has recently instituted a statewide system of code
enforcement under the Commissioner of the Department of Community Affairs, who
has authority to promulgate standards for both new construction and subsequent
maintenance. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 55:13A-1 to -28 (Supp. 1974). Because these
standards are embodied in administrative regulations, they have the potential for be-
ing more current and flexible than statutory standards. Metzger, Statewide Code En-
forcement: New Jersey, The Test Case, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 659, 664-66 (1974).
The regulations are enforced by the Bureau of Housing Inspection, an agency fi-
nanced through the assessment of registration and inspection fees. Id. at 659-64,
667-68. A large percentage of the cases are settled informally, but where the owner
refuses to comply, the Bureau is authorized to impose monetary penalties through an
administrative procedure. Id. at 668-71. The case does not go to court unless the
owner refuses to pay the fine, in which case there is a summary procedure for reduc-
ing the penalty to a judgment. Id. at 669 & n.71, 672. It is "somewhat early to
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certainly promote uniformity and facilitate the imposition of a rigor-
ous statutory duty to repair.
2. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
As originally conceived, housing codes were to be enforced by
public officials imposing criminal sanctions. 2 ° This method of en-
forcement did not disrupt the common law landlord-tenant relation
for it gave the tenant no direct right of action against the landlord.
Instead, housing inspectors were to inspect residential dwellings,
either in response to a specific complaint or as a routine inspection.
The inspector was then to notify the responsible party of the exist-
ence of any housing code violation. If the violation was not removed
within a reasonable period of time, increasingly coercive pressures
(first administrative, and then judicial) were to be used to persuade
or compel the responsible party to comply.' 2 '
For several reasons, this system of enforcement has never been
implemented successfully. 21 Code enforcement agencies are typ-
ically understaffed, 2 3 resulting in selective enforcement at the ad-
ministrative level. 124  This pattern is continued at the judicial
make conclusive statements about the Bureau's impact on the New Jersey housing
scene," but other jurisdictions will be watching New Jersey's program with interest.
Id. at 674.
120. Gribetz & Grad, supra note 110, at 1263. See statutes cited note 257 infra.
121. GRAD, supra note 107, at 3-4.
122. For a comprehensive assessment of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of
housing code enforcement and suggested recommendations see BUILDING THE AMERI-
CAN CITY, supra note 109, at 503-09.
123. Dick & Pfarr, The Detroit Housing Code Enforcement and Community Re-
newal: A Study in Futility, 3 PROSPECrUS 61, 77-79 (Dec. 1969); ABA Committee
on Leases, Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TRUST J. 550, 571 (1971); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes,
78 HARv. L. REV. 801, 804-05 (1965).A by-product of understaffed agencies is a complaint-initiated system of enforce-
ment, rather than enforcement through area-wide inspections. Comment, Rent With-
holding and the Improvement of Sub-standard Housing, 53 CAL. L. REV. 304, 316-
17 (1965); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801,
806-07 (1965). An effort has been made by the federal government to combat these
problems through the enactment of the Concentrated Code Enforcement Program,
whereby the federal government provides matching funds for local code enforcement
activities in those areas where decline would be arrested by the concentrated enforc-
ment of housing codes. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1468 (1970); Curry, The Federal Role in Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URBAN
LAWYER 567 (1971); Greenstein, Federally Assisted Code Enforcement: Problems
and Approaches, 3 URBAN LAWYER 629 (1971). However, the implementation of
this program by the Department of Housing and Urban Development has been se-
verely criticized by the Comptroller General of the United States. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, ENFORCEMENT OF HOUSING CODES: How IT CAN HELP TO
ACHIEVE NATION'S HOUSING GOAL (June 26, 1972).
124. Castrataro, Housing Code Enforcement: A Century of Frustration in New
York City, 14 N.Y.L.F. 60, 67-68 (1968); Dick & Pfarr, supra note 123, at 73-74;
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level 12 and compounded by prolonged delays. 126  At the end of the
process, if a conviction is obtained, jail sentences are almost never
imposed and the typical fine is $15 to $30,127 although the maximum
allowable fines range from $50 to $500 for a first offense, and most
ordinances permit the imposition of at least a 30-day jail sentence. 2 8
The reluctance of the judiciary to impose stiff penalties12 has made
the criminal process a system of licensing, rather than an effective
deterrent.13 0
3. CIVIL SANCTIONS
Once it became apparent that a housing code enforced solely
by criminal sanctions was a paper tiger, legislatures began to au-
thorize the imposition of civil sanctions. It was thought that civil
sanctions would be more effective than criminal sanctions because
Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801, 811-13
(1965). Enforcement is also discretionary and subjective, partly because the stand-
ards are broad (e.g., "shall be kept clean" or "shall be kept in good repair") and
partly because it is impossible to inspect all dwellings (dwelling units outnumber in-
spectors on a ratio of roughly 20,000 to 1). Burke, Redrafting Municipal Housing
Codes, 48 J. URBAN L. 933, 934 (1971).
125. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 239-40.
126. Tietz & Rosenthal, Housing Code Enforcement in New York, in HOUSING
IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 486-87 (1973); Castrataro, supra note
124, at 71-73; Gribetz & Grad, supra note 110, at 1277-78; Loeb, supra note 79, at
294; Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 824
(1965).
127. Daniels, Judicial and Legislative Remedies for Substandard Housing: Land-
lord-Tenant Law Reform in the District of Columbia, 59 GEO. L.J. 909, 913-16
(1971); Dick & Pfarr, supra note 123, at 75-76 (average fine in Detroit in 1966 was
$29); Gribetz & Grad, supra note 110, at 1276 (average fine in New York City in
1964 was $16.86); Loeb, supra note 79, at 294; Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at
240.
128. GRAD, supra note 107, at 22, 26; Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Codes, 78 HARv. L. REV. 801, 824-25 (1965).
129. The explanations for this judicial leniency are as varied as the persons offer-
ing them. Some say that it is the fault of the prosecutors, who are neither suffi-
ciently aggressive nor well-prepared. GRAD, supra note 107, at 25-26; Castrataro, su-
pra note 124, at 69-70; Lieberman, The Administrative Process-Housing Code En-
forcement, 3 URBAN LAWYER 551, 552-54 (1971); Loeb, supra note 79, at 293-94.
Others say that judges are unwilling to impose criminal sanctions on middle-class
businessmen. Note, Landlord v. Tenant: An Appraisal of the Habitability and Re-
pair Problem, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 739, 756 (1971); Comment, Rent Withhold-
ing and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CAL. L. REV. 304, 319 (1965).
A closely related explanation is that courts are reluctant to impose criminal sanctions
for "social welfare offenses," which are punishable regardless of criminal intent.
Gribetz & Grad, supra note 110, at 1279-80. Perhaps practicality is the principal
consideration. A landlord faced with the alternatives of making extensive repairs or
suffering harsh criminal sanctions will often either raise the rent substantially or va-
cate the building, thereby adding to the already severe housing shortage. Burke, Re-
drafting Municipal Housing Codes, 48 J. URBAN L. 933, 935 (1971).
130. See also Tietz & Rosenthal, supra note 126, at 486-87; Levi, Focal Leverage
Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66 COLuM. L. REV. 275, 277 (1966);
Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 240-41.
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a penalty could be imposed which created an economic incentive to
comply with the law-4he cost of noncompliance could be set to ex-
ceed the cost of compliance.1 31
At first it was principally public officials who were empowered
to invoke civil sanctions. Thus, over the years, enforcement agen-
cies have been authorized: 1) to order that a building be vacated
until such time as the necessary repairs have been made to restore
it to code standards;182 2) to obtain a prohibitive or mandatory in-
junction requiring compliance with the code; 88 3) to request the ap-
pointment of a receiver to collect the rents and use them to make
the necessary repairs; 3 4 4) to make repairs at the owner's expense,
131. With the development of civil as well as criminal sanctions, some jurisdic-
tions have created housing courts with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. GRAD,
supra note 107, at 75-76. New York City now has a housing court with the power
to impose the full panoply of civil sanctions discussed in this subsection. N.Y.C.
CrIL Cr. Acr §§ 110, 203, 204 (McKinney Supp. 1973). The proposal for New
York City's housing court was advanced by Gribetz and Grad. GRAD, supra note
107, at 43-48; Gribetz & Grad, supra note 110, at 1281-90. It has been described
in detail in Note, The New York City Housing Court: Consolidation of Old and
New Remedies, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 483 (1973).
132. GRAD, supra note 107, at 56-58; Indritz, The Tenants' Rights Movement, 1
N.M.L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1971); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78
HARv. L. REv. 801, 833-34 (1965).
Under this remedy, an administrative official makes a finding that a building
is unsafe or unfit for habitation, and then summarily orders that the building be va-
cated. The remedy may be used alone or in conjunction with an order to demolish
the building if it is not repaired. The vacate order was an extremely effective en-
forcement mechanism in the early 1900's, when there was a substantial vacancy ratio.
Gribetz & Grad, supra note 110, at 1261. But in the context of today's housing
shortage, it has fallen into disuse. Daniels, supra note 127, at 917-19; Gribetz &
Grad, supra note 110, at 1261; Indritz, supra, at 54-55 (1971).
133. The injunction may be issued on the basis of statutory authority or under
the court's common law power to abate a nuisance. The court may issue a prohibi-
tive injunction forbidding the defendant from operating his building until he has
brought it into compliance with the code. It may also issue a mandatory injunction
requiring the defendant to repair or vacate the building, with a failure to comply re-
sulting in a civil contempt citation, the demolition of the building, or the appoint-
ment of a receiver. GRAD, supra note 107, at 40-42; Indritz, supra note 132, at 54-
55; Moses, The Enforcement Process-Housing Codes, 3 URBAN LAWYER 559
(1971); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801, 827
(1965); Comment, The Duty of Maintenance of Multiple Dwellings in California,
18 STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1401-02 (1966); Comment, Building Codes, Housing Codes,
and The Conservation of Chicago Housing Supply, 31 U. Ci. L. REv. 180, 189-90
(1963). The principal drawbacks to the injunction are its procedural complexities
and the fact that the prohibitive injunction may simply lead to the abandonment of
the building. Levi, supra note 130, at 279-80.
134. GRAD, supra note 107, at 42-55 (excellent descriptions of the New York and
Chicago experience); Gribetz & Grad, supra note 110, at 1272-74 (New York); In-
dritz, supra note 132, at 55-60; Marco & Mancino, Housing Code Enforcement-A
New Approach, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 368, 376-83 (1969) (Cleveland); Comment,
Pennsylvania Housing Legislation: Proposals for Reform, 30 U. Prrr. L. REV. 95,
104-06 (1968) (proposed Pennsylvania legislation); Note, Enforcement of Municipal
Housing Codes, 78 1iARv. L. REv. 801, 828-30 (1965); Comment, The New Michi-
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secured by a priority lien on the property;'85 and 5) to impose a
cumulative civil fine for serious violations of a housing code.'8 6 But
it was unrealistic to expect the understaffed code enforcement agen-
cies to employ these civil sanctions much more effectively than they
had used criminal sanctions in enforcing the statutory duty to repair.
What was needed was a means by which tenants could act as private
attorneys general in enforcing the provisions of a housing code.'
8 7
gan Landlord-Tenant Law: Partial Answer to a Perplexing Problem, 15 WAYNE
L. REV. 836, 842-47 (1969).
The receivership is an effective tool for preserving and improving slum housing
because it poses a significant threat to owners who do not maintain their property
in habitable condition and, if the threat fails, it provides a viable means for making
the necessary repairs. However, there are some disadvantages: the procedure is
complex, there is disagreement as to which buildings should be placed in receivership,
it is difficult to obtain financing, and when the municipality serves as the receiver,
it becomes involved in managing an enormous number of privately-owned buildings.
L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 110, at 67-68; GRAD, supra note 107, at 46-48; Gribetz &
Grad, supra note 110, at 1273; Indritz, supra note 132, at 58-60; Comment, Rent
Receivership: An Evaluation of its Effectiveness as a Housing Code Enforcement
Tool in Connecticut Cities, 2 CONN. L. REv. 687 (1970); Note, Enforcement of Mu-
nicipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REV. 801, 828-29 (1965); Comment, Receiver-
ship: A Useful Tool for Helping to Meet the Housing Needs of Low Income People,
3 HARv. Civ. RIOHTs-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 311, 330-53 (1968) (excellent discussion
of how to avoid these problems through the enactment of carefully-drafted legisla-
tion).
135. The repair remedy is authorized by statute in most jurisdictions, but has
rarely been exercised due to lack of funds and the reluctance of local governments
to take on the additional burden of serving as a repairman for low-income tenants.
GRAD, supra note 107, at 62-63, 68-69; Gribetz & Grad, supra note 110, at 1274-75;
Daniels, supra note 127, at 919-20; Indritz, supra note 132, at 60-62; Loeb, supra
note 79, at 295; Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv.
801, 834-36 (1965).
136. N.Y.C. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ D26-51.01, .03, .05 (Supp. 1974); Note,
New York City, Civil Housing Court: Consolidation of Old and New Remedies, 47
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 483, 494-99 (1973). The following schedule per violation has
been established by §§ D26-51.01(a):
VIOLATION CIVIL PENALTY
Hazardous $25 to $100, plus up to $10 per day
Immediately hazardous $25 per day
Nonhazardous $10 to $50
Criminal sanctions have been abolished, except for defendants who willfully or reck-
lessly violate provisions of the Code. They may be convicted of a misdemeanor.
N.Y.C. ADMINISmTRATIVE CODE § D26-52.01.
The cumulative civil fine has the potential for being an extremely effective rem-
edy, since the sanction becomes more severe as the number of violations or the dura-
tion of a single violation increases. GRAD, supra note 107, at 36-39; Gribetz & Grad,
supra note 108, at 1281-86.
137. Traditionally, private citizens have not been allowed to file criminal com-
plaints when public officials have been authorized to enforce an ordinance. E.g.,
City of New Rochelle v. Beckwith, 268 N.Y. 315, 197 N.E. 295 (1935) (zoning ordi-
nance); Indritz, supra note 132, at 52. Recent efforts have been made to use manda-
mus proceedings to compel public officials to enforce housing codes, but they have
been largely unsuccessful. Gribetz, Housing Code Enforcement in 1970-An Over-
view, 3 URBAN LAWYER 525, 529-32 (1971).
Private citizens have also been denied standing to bring an action for injunctive
relief or the appointment of a receiver. E.g., City Bank Farmers Trust v. Short, 203
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In the 1930's, some tenants sought to enforce housing code pro-
visions by contending that a housing code created an implied coven-
ant to repair in a lease. They further contended that a violation of
a code provision constituted a breach of the covenant, thereby en-
titling them to "repair and deduct" or remain in possession and de-
fend a summary dispossession action. Since the courts insisted upon
characterizing a lease as a conveyance, however, the tenant's conten-
tions were rejected. 138  The only private remedy available at com-
mon law was the familiar defense of constructive eviction, with its
onerous requirement that the tenant abandon the premises as a con-
dition to invoking the doctrine. 189
In response to the rigidity of the common law and the inef-
fectiveness of traditional public enforcement techniques, several
states enacted rent impairment legislation14 0 authorizing a tenant 1)
Misc. 979, 120 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd mem., 283 App. Div. 779, 129
N.Y.S.2d 225 (1954). However, special legislation has been enacted in a few juris-
dictions permitting a tenant to enjoin a public nuisance or appoint a receiver. E.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.534(2) (Supp. 1974) (tenant may "bring an action
to enforce the provisions of this act in his own name"; act provides for both injunc-
tive relief and appointment of receiver); Angevine & Taube, Enforcement of Public
Health Laws-Some New Techniques, 52 MAss. L.Q. 206, 222-28 (1967); Comment,
The New Michigan Landlord-Tenant Law: Partial Answer to a Perplexing Problem,
15 WAYNE L. REv. 836, 850-52 (1969). One commentator has made the ingenious
suggestion that the landlord's failure to keep the common areas (and possibly the ten-
ant's premises) in a state of good repair during the term of the lease constitutes a
"private nuisance," thereby giving the tenant standing to bring an action for injunc-
tive relief. Schoshinski, supra note 98, at 538-41. See also Bragg v. Housing Au-
thority of Hartford, 42 U.S.L.W. 2567 (Conn. Super. Ct. Hartford Cty. April 10,
1974) (personal injury action for damage sustained in common area based on private
nuisance theory).
138. E.g., Davar Holdings, Inc. v. Cohen, 255 App. Div. 445, 7 N.Y.S.2d 911
(1938), afl'd mem., 280 N.Y. 828, 21 N.E.2d 882 (1939).
139. Annot., 63 A.L.R. 432 (1929).
140. Throughout this article, "rent impairment" is a general term used to refer
to all remedies which affect the tenant's obligation to pay rent. The terminology
of the Restatement (Second) of Property will be used to refer to specific rent impair-
ment remedies.
Approximately eighteen states have some form of rent impairing legislation.
Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability: An Incipient Trend in the Law of
Landlord-Tenant?, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 123, 130 n.79 (1971). It can be anticipated
that the Model Residential Landlord Tenant Code and the Uniform Residential Land-
lord and Tenant Act (URLTA) will stimulate further legislative activity in this area.
The Uniform Code was prepared by Julian Levi, Philip Hablutzel, Louis Rosen-
berg, and James White as a research project for the American Bar Foundation. It
gives a tenant the right to initiate proceedings for the appointment of a receiver and
creates a repair and deduct remedy, but it does not authorize rent withholding, and
it approves rent suspension only for the failure to supply heat or water. MODEL RES-
IDENTAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE §§ 2-204 to -207, 3-301 to -307 (Tent. Draft
1969). Several commentators have discussed the provisions of the Code. ABA
Committee on Leases, Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6
REAL PROP., PROB. & TRusT J. 550, 577-87 (1971); Daniels, supra note 127, at 927-
30; Gibbons, supra note 79; Levi, The New Landlord-Tenant Legal Relations-The
Model Landlord-Tenant Code, 3 UanAN LAwYER 592 (1971); Moskovitz, The Model
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to repair any conditions which make the premises "untentable" and
to deduct the cost of such repairs from the rent if the landlord fails
to make the requested repairs within a reasonable time after receiv-
ing notice from the tenant; 141 2) to withhold rental payments if the
landlord fails to make the requested repairs within a reasonable time
after receiving notice of a violation certified by a code enforcement
agency; 142 or 3) to suspend rental payments as long as a serious code
Landlord-Tenant Code-An Unacceptable Compromise, 3 URBAN LAWYER 597
(1971); Note, The Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code, 26 RUTGERS L. REV.
647 (1973).
The Uniform Act was endorsed by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in August, 1972. It permits the tenant to obtain injunctive
relief, creates a repair and deduct remedy for minor defects, and authorizes both rent
withholding and rent suspension. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT
AcT §§ 4.101-.107. It has been analyzed by several commentators, particularly in
conjunction with the Act's introduction as proposed legislation in a given jurisdiction.
2 POWELL, supra note 26, at 260.1; Blumberg & Robbins, The Uniform Residential
Landlord-Tenant Act: The National Experience, 1 HOUSINo & DEVELOPMENT REP.
§ E (Nov. 28, 1973) (overview of Act and discussion of the introduction of the Act
in Washington, Arizona, Oregon, and Ohio); Davis, URLTA, Kansas and the Com-
mon Law, 21 KAN. L. REV. 387 (1973) (Kansas); Williams & Phillips, The Florida
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 555 (1973) (Florida);
Strum, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: A Departure from
Traditional Concepts, 8 REAL PROP., PRon, & TRUST J. 495 (1973); Note, Landlord-
Tenant Reform: Arizona's Version of the Uniform Act, 16 ARz. L. REV. 79 (1974)
(Arizona); Note, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: Reconciling
Landlord-Tenant Law with Modern Realities, 6 IND. L. REV. 741 (1973) (Indiana);
Comment, The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: Effect of Adoption
on California Law, 4 PACiFIC L.J. 788 (1973) (California); Note, The Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: New Hope for the Beleagured Tenant? 48 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 546 (1974); Comment, Landlord-Tenant Reform: Habitability and
Repair under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 3 UCLA-ALAsKA L.
REV. 123 (1973) (Alaska); Comment, Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act: Facilitation of or Impediment to Reform Favorable to the Tenant, 15 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 845 (1974).
141. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West 1954) (cost of repairs must not ex-
ceed a month's rent). Indritz, supra note 132, at 71-72; Loeb, supra note 79, at 290-
93; Comment, The Duty of Maintenance of Multiple Dwellings in California, 18
STAN. L. REV. 1397, 1399-1403 (1966). California's legislation, discussed in the text
accompanying notes 293-98 infra, was recently amended to define the term "unten-
antable," void any waiver of a tenant's rights under the statute, and prohibit retalia-
tory acts by a lessor for a period of sixty days. CAL. Cirv. CODE §§ 1941.1, 1941.2,
1942.5 (West Supp. 1974). A brief history of the amendments is set forth in Com-
ment, Landlord and Tenant: Repairing the Duty to Repair, 11 SANTA CLARA LAWYER
298 (1971). For an excellent critical analysis of the amended California legislation
see Comment, California's New Legislation on a Landlord's Duty to Repair, 3 U.
CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 131 (1971).
142. Most statutes require the tenant to pay the withheld rent into an escrow ac-
count. Once the repairs have been made, the entire amount of money withheld is
payable to the landlord. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTIONS § 755 (McKinney Supp.
1973); GRAD, supra note 107, at 125-27; Daniels, supra note 127, at 924-25; Indritz,
supra note 132, at 72-78; Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 245-46; Annot., 40
A.L.R.3d 821 (1971). There are two problems with this type of statute. First of
all, it requires action by the code enforcement agency and by the courts as a condi-
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violation exists after a code enforcement agency has notified the
landlord and given him a substantial period of time in which to make
the necessary repairs. 4 ' Rent impairment legislation enables the
tenant to remain in possession of the premises and to exert economic
tion to withholding rental payments-two prerequisites which are apt to dissuade all
but the most activist tenants from invoking the remedy. And secondly, there is no
incentive for the landlord to make prompt repairs, as he will ultimately receive the
full amount of rent withheld. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 110, at 59-60; Angevine &
Taube, Enforcement of Public Health Laws-Some New Techniques, 52 MAss. L.Q.
205, 217-22, 228-31 (1967); Daniels, supra note 127, at 925-27; Indritz, supra note
132, at 72-78; Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard
Housing, 53 CAL. L. REv. 304, 323-27 (1965). To counteract these two detracting
features of the typical rent withholding statute, a few legislatures have authorized
"rent strikes" by at least one-third of all tenants in a multiple dwelling. E.g., N.Y.
REAL PROP. AcrIoNs §§ 769-82 (McKinney Supp. 1973). GRAD, supra note 107, at
128-29; Indritz, supra note 132, at 74-75; Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 248;
Comment, Tenant Remedies for a Denial of Essential Services and for Harrassment
-The New York Approach, 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 66, 69-71 (1972); Note, En-
forcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REV. 801, 844-46 (1965). Rent
strike legislation encourages class action, thereby overcoming the individual tenant's
reluctance to initiate judicial proceedings. L FRIEDMAN, supra note 110, at 60-62.
See generally Comment, Tenants in Court: The Class Action, 3 U. CAL. DAvIS L.
RiEv. 101 (1971). In fact, it has given significant impetus to the tenant union move-
ment. Indritz, supra note 132, at 72-78. See generally TENANTS AND THE URBAN
HOUSING CRISIS (S. Burghardt ed. 1972); Indritz, supra note 132, at 13-40, 115-26;
Moskovitz & Honigsberg, The Tenant Union-Landlord Relations Act: A Proposal,
58 GEo. L.J. 1013 (1970); Comment, Tenant Unions: Growth of a Vehicle for
Change in Low-Income Housing, 3 U. CAL. DAviS L. REv. 1 (1971).
In a few jurisdictions, including Illinois, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania,
public welfare agencies have also been authorized by statute to withhold rent; for ex-
ample, N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 143-b (McKinney 1966). Indritz, supra note 132,
at 62-63; Note, Landlord v. Tenant: An Appraisal of the Habitability and Repair
Problem, 22 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 739, 758 (1971); Comment, Tenant Remedies
For a Denial of Essential Services and for Harrassment-The New York Approach,
1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 66, 72-73 (1972); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801, 847 (1965). Such statutes were instituted because
public officials became outraged that government, through welfare payments, should
be subsidizing the activities of slumlords. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 110, at 62. Be-
cause these statutes pit the welfare department (rather than the tenant) against the
landlord, they have been quite effective. Simmons, Passion and Prudence: Rent
Withholding Under New York's Spiegel Law, 15 BUFFALo L. REV. 572 (1969); Note,
Landlord v. Tenant: An Appraisal of the Habitability and Repair Problem, 22
CASE W. RES. L. REy. 739, 760-61 (1971); Note, Rent Withholding for Public Wel-
fare Recipient: An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statute, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 798
(1970).
143. E.g., N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973). GRAD,
supra note 107, at 127-28; Daniels, supra note 127, at 925; Comment, Tenant Reme-
dies for a Denial of Essential Services and for Harrassment-The New York Ap-
proach, 1 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 66, 71-72 (1972). Rent suspension is a meaningful
economic sanction, but it tends to be blunted by the long period of time (e.g., six
months) which the tenant must wait before he is entitled to cease making rental pay-
ments. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 7, at 247; Note, Landlord v. Tenant: An Ap-
praisal of the Habitability and Repair Problem, 22 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 739, 763
(1971); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801, 847
(1965).
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pressure on the landlord to maintain them in good repair.144  In this
respect, it has eroded the common law doctrine that a lease is a con-
veyance of property composed of independent covenants. The inde-
pendent covenants rule has not been totally obliterated, however.
The tenant who withholds rent, for example, must pay all the with-
held rent to the landlord once the premises are brought into compli-
ance with the housing code'4 5 because the covenant to pay rent is
not dependent upon the landlord's statutory duty to repair.
In conclusion, the enactment of housing codes imposing a statu-
tory duty to repair enforced by criminal sanctions helped to improve
tenants' living conditions by abolishing the doctrine of caveat emptor
in residential leases. Further advances were made when public en-
forcement agencies and private individuals were authorized to ini-
tiate the imposition of civil sanctions for a landlord's violation of a
housing code. But rent impairment legislation did not abrogate the
common law characterization of a lease as a conveyance of property
composed of independent covenants. It merely created an economic
sanction which the tenant could exert against the landlord while re-
maining in possession of the premises.
II. LANDLORD'S LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE
PREMISES: COMMON LAW
A. General Rule: Immunity from Liability
The common law characterization of the lease as a conveyance
of property became the cornerstone of the legal framework govern-
ing the landlord's liability for defective premises. Like the vendor
of real property, the lessor wore the cloak of immunity created by
-the doctrine of caveat emptor.'46 Since the tenant had an oppor-
144. Landlords used to retaliate against the invocation of rent-impairing remedies
by evicting the troublemaker. However, recent legislation and court decisions have
provided increased protection against such retaliatory acts. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1942.5 (West Supp. 1974); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8590 (McKinney 1974); Ed-
wards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.
3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970); Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d
278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971) (action for damages); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis.
2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970); MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-
407 (Tent. Draft 1969); UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 5.101;
Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 753 (1971).
145. See note 142 supra.
146. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: AcTIONS, DEFENSES,
DAMAGES § 1.01[l], at 258-65 (rev. ed. 1971); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 27.16, at 1506 (1956); 2 PowELL, supra note 26, 233, at 300; W. PROS-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 63, at 399-400 (4th ed. 1971); Eldredge,
Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 467, 472 (1936); Grimes,
Caveat Lessee, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. REv. 189, 209 (1968); Harkrider, Tort Liability
of a Landlord, 26 MIcH. L. REV. 260, 260-63 (1928); Note, Lessor's Duty to Re-
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tunity to inspect the premises before leasing them, he was deemed
to have assumed the risk of any personal injury or property damage
caused by a defect present at the beginning of the lease;147 and once
the tenant acquired control of the premises, the landlord was no
longer liable to third parties for such defects.' 48  Furthermore, since
it was the tenant's duty to repair the premises after he took control,
the landlord was immune from liability to the tenant and third per-
sons alike for defects arising during the term of the lease. 49  In the
language of a leading English decision:
[I]t is well established that no duty is, at law, cast on a landlord
not to let his house in a dangerous and dilapidated condition,
and further, that if he does let it while in such a condition, he is
not thereby rendered liable in damages for injuries which may
be sustained by the tenant, his (the tenant's) servants, guests,
customers or others invited by him to enter the premises by rea-
son of this defective condition."10
B. Exceptions to the General Rule
With the shift of the tenant population from the country to the
city, the resultant trend toward multiple dwellings, and the enact-
ment of housing codes, the courts were placed under increasing pres-
sure to shift the responsibility for repairs and the liability for per-
sonal injuries or property damages to the landlord. However, in-
stead of adopting a fundamentally different theory of lessor liability,
the court responded to this pressure by creating a number of excep-
tions to the rule of caveat emptor."'
This was understandable in light of the law of landlord-tenant
relations. As long as the lease continued to be viewed as a convey-
ance, it was difficult for the courts to depart from the general rule
of immunity associated with the doctrine of caveat emptor. Thus
pair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 HARv. L. REV. 669,
669-70 (1949).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 356 (1965); Harkrider, supra note 146,
at 262-63; Noel, Landlord's Tort Liability in Tennessee, 30 TENN. L. REV. 368, 369
(1963); Schlegel, Landlord and Tenant: The Condition of the Premises, 19 CIU.-
KENT L. REV. 317, 328 (1941).
148. Harkrider, supra note 146, at 263; Schlegel, supra note 147, at 328.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 355 (1965); Harkrider, supra note 146,
at 383.
150. Cavalier v. Pope, [1906] A.C. 428, 432. The English common law regard-
ing the liability of a landlord for defective premises is discussed in J. FLEMING, THE
LAW OF TORTS 413-16 (4th ed. 1971); J. SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS 415-20 (14th ed.
1965); North, The Liability of a Landlord for Dangerous Premises, 29 CONVEY.
(n.s.) 207, 290 (1965).
151. Grimes, supra note 146, at 226; Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liabil-
ity to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 HARv. L. REV. 669, 671 (1949).
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the courts felt free to impose liability only when such action could
be harmonized with the rules governing the liability of a vendor of
real property, or when the characterization of a lease as a convey-
ance was so contrary to social and economic realities that justice re-
quired the creation of an exception to the general rule.
In the early days, when a lease was used to transfer possession
of a single-family dwelling or of property to be used for agricultural
or business purposes, the landlord typically relinquished control over
the entire premises. Such leases often bore a strong resemblance
to a conveyance of property. Nevertheless, the courts recognized
five exceptions to the general rule of nonliability. The landlord was
held liable for damages caused by undisclosed latent defects; defects
in premises leased for admission of the public; a breach of the im-
plied warranty of habitability or merchantability in a short-term lease
of furnished premises; a breach of a covenant to repair; and negli-
gent repairs. 52 With the development of multiple-unit dwellings
and office buildings, the landlord ceased to convey all his property
to the tenant, and a sixth exception was recognized for damage
caused by defects in "common areas" under the landlord's control.'
Finally, the enactment of housing codes prompted some courts to
create a seventh exception for damage caused by a violation of a
provision of such a code." Each of these seven exceptions will now
be examined in greater detail. 55
1. UNDISCLOSED LATENT DEFECTS KNOWN TO LESSOR
One of the first exceptions recognized by the common law
courts was for damage caused by a latent defect in the premises
which was known to the lessor at the time of leasing, 'but which he
failed to disclose to the lessee.' 56 This exception is completely
152. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs §§ 357-59, 362 (1965); 2 POWELL, supra
note 26, 234[2], at 332-333. Although the implied warranty of fitness in premises
under construction could provide the basis for a sixth exception, no cases have been
found imposing liability for personal injuries or property damage caused by a breach
of the warranty. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 360-61 (1965).
154. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at § 1.0611]; 2 POWELL,
supra note 26, at 233[2].
155. When a landlord has a duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition, the modern majority rule characterizes it as a "nondelegable duty," and
consequently a landlord is liable for the negligence of either an independent con-
tractor or an employee hired to make the necessary repairs. 4D L. FRUMER & M.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at § 1.01[5][a]; W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at
411-12; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 362, Comment g (1965).
156. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.02[l], at 324. The
exception was first suggested in the following passage from Robbins v. Jones, [1863]
15 C.B. (n.s.) 221, 240 (emphasis added):
A landlord who lets a house in a dangerous state is not liable to the tenant's
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compatible with the characterization of the lease as a conveyance be-
cause liability is imposed on vendors of real property under analo-
gous circumstances. 11 7  The exception is also consistent with the
doctrine of caveat emptor, since it leaves the burden on the tenant
to inspect the premises and discover any defects discernible by a rea-
sonable inspection. 5 ' The landlord is liable on the theory that non-
disclosure of known, latent defects constitutes fraud or actionable
negligence. 5 9
Originally, a majority of the courts imposed liability only when
the landlord had actual knowledge of the defect.160 Tennessee went
to the opposite extreme, imposing liability whenever the landlord
negligently failed to discover a defect.' 16 Many courts today have
adopted an intermediate position, holding the landlord liable if "he
has knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable man to suspect
that defects actually exist."'6 2  This position has been incorporated
into section 358 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
(1) A lessor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his
lessee any condition, whether natural or artificial, which in-
volves unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons on the
land, is subject to liability to the lessee and others upon the land
with the consent of the lessee or his sublessee for physical harm
caused by the condition after the lessee has taken possession, if
(a) the lessee does not know or have reason to know of
the condition or the risk involved, and
customers or guests for accidents happening during the term; for, fraud apart,
there is no law against letting a tumble-down house ....
For a discussion of the development of fraud as an exception to the caveat lessee
doctrine, permitting a tenant to defend an action for the payment of rent see text
accompanying notes 65-66 supra.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965); W. PROSSER, supra note
146, § 63, at 401.
158. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 27.16, at 1506-07; Note, Land-
lord's Liability for Defective Premises, 29 GEO. L.J. 1046, 1054 (1941).
159. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 27.16, at 1507-08; Schlegel, supra
note 147, at 329. For an extensive comparison of fraud and negligence as alternative
theories of liability and a suggestion that negligence is the better theory see Hark-
rider, supra note 146, at 270-75.
160. Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 586, § 2 (1963); Note, Landlord and Tenant: Defects
Existing at the Time of the Lease, 35 IND. L.J. 361, 361-66 (1960) (lessor must have
subjective knowledge of condition and appreciation of the risk).
161. Hines v. Wilcox, 96 Tenn. 148, 33 S.W. 914 (1896) (lessor's workmen negli-
gently failed to discover rotten timbers supporting porch when repairing it). The
rule has been praised by some commentators. See Note, Landlord's Liability for De-
fective Premises, 29 GEo. L.J. 1046, 1050 (1941); accord, 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 146, § 27.16, at 1508-09. Others have criticized it for imposing an af-
firmative duty of inspection. See Harkrider, supra note 146, at 266-67. See gener-
ally 4D L. FRUMER & M. FREDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.02[1], at 328-29; Noel,
supra note 147, at 374-81; Note, Landlord and Tenant, Defects at the Time of the
Lease, 35 IND. L.J. 361, 367-68 (1960); Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 586, § 3 (1963).
162. Harkrider, supra note 146, at 268; accord, Grimes, supra note 146, at 214;
Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 586, § 4 (1963).
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(b) the lessor knows or has reason to know of the condi-
tion, and realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has
reason to expect that the lessee will not discover the condition or
realize the risk.
(2) If the lessor actively conceals the condition, the liability
stated in Subsection (1) continues until the lessee discovers it
and has reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions
against it. Otherwise, the liability continues only until the les-
see has had reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and
to take such precautions. 163
Although the "latent defect" exception may be invoked by
either the tenant or a third person on the premises with the consent
of the tenant," a third party is barred from recovery if notice of
the defect has been given to the tenant. 6' While this is consistent
with the notion that a lease is a conveyance of property, putting the
tenant in the best position to repair a dangerous condition or to warn
third persons of its existence, it is nevertheless a rather arbitrary
limitation on liability.6 6  There is also a second limitation on this
theory of recovery: it is difficult for the plaintiff to show that the
lessor had reason to know of the defective condition without simul-
taneously establishing facts evidencing the plaintiff's contributory
fault.6 7  Therefore, although this is one of the oldest exceptions to
the general rule of nonliability, it is one of the least utilized, and
it tends to be most successful when the plaintiff is proceeding on
'the 'theory that the lessor had actual knowledge of the dangerous
condition.1 8
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 358 (1965). It has been suggested that
a higher duty should be imposed on a landlord who also constructed the buildings
on the leased premises. See Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal. 2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948);
Harkrider, supra note 146, at 276-77.
164. 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 234[3][a], at 351-52; W. PROSSER, supra note
146, § 63, at 401; Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 422, § 4 (1968); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 598,
§ 7 (1952).
165. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, at § 27.16, at 1509.
166. Id. at 1509-10:
[The rule] is sometimes justified by pointing to the relinquishment of posses-
sion and control, the impossibility of standing guard so as to warn those who
will visit during the term of the lease, and the burden on landlords of putting
premises in reasonably safe condition. Yet it is no part of the general law
of negligence to exonerate a defendant simply because the condition attributa-
ble to his negligence has passed beyond his control before it causes injury (if
the injury was foreseeable at the time and defendant still had control). Nor
is the duty of care to A generally satisfied (as a matter of law) by warning
B of a latent defect.
167. Noel, supra note 147, at 379-80. The Tennessee Supreme Court has solved
the plaintiff's dilemma in the following manner:
From the very nature of the case, the same degree of care and diligence exer-
cised by each would in many, if not all cases, enable the landlord to know
more than the tenant.
Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 560, 46 S.W. 297, 302 (1898). But see Parris v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 359 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1966).
168. 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 234[2][a], at 334.
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2. PREMISES LEASED FOR ADMISSION OF PUBLIC
The second exception was born of the tension between real
property concepts and the public's expectations regarding the condi-
tion of leased premises. Under the "latent defect" doctrine dis-
cussed in the preceding subsection, a landlord could immunize him-
self from liability to the public by notifying the tenant of the danger-
ous condition prior to the commencement of the lease.' 69 The land-
lord had no duty to warn third persons of the defect. 170  Dissatisfac-
tion with this rule of real property law led to the development of
the "public use" exception, now set forth in section 359 of the Re-
statement:
A lessor who leases land for a purpose which involves the admis-
sion of the public is subject to liability for physical harm caused
to persons who enter the land for that purpose by a condition of
the land existing when the lessee takes possession, if the lessor
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care could dis-
cover that the condition involves an unreasonable risk of harm
to such persons, and
(b) has reason to expect that the lessee will admit them
before the land is put in safe condition for their reception, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to discover or to
remedy the condition, or otherwise to protect such persons
against it. 71
Although the early cases premised the public use exception on
a nuisance theory, it is now generally agreed that negligence is the
proper theory of liability. 72  The increased responsibility of the
landlord in this situation is based "partly on the concept that the
landlord, as well as the tenant, has 'invited' the public on the prem-
ises," and partly on the notion that "where a public . . .danger is
involved, the landlord should not be allowed to shift the responsibil-
ity to a tenant, except when the tenant has expressly assumed it, and
is likely to carry out his agreement.' 17
The exception imposes a duty of reasonable care on the land-
lord, but under very limited circumstances. A minority of jurisdic-
tions restrict the doctrine to places of amusement intended for exten-
169. See note 165 supra and accompanying text.
170. See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 359 (1965). See also Annot., 17
A.L.R.3d 873 (1968); Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 422 (1968).
172. See 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.03[1], at 346-52;
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 27.16, at 1510-11; Harkrider, supra note
146, at 287-88; Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 873, § 2 (1968).
173. Noel, supra note 147, at 383; accord, Eldredge, supra note 146, at 487-88;
Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62
HARV. L. REv. 669, 671-72 (1949).
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sive public use. 174  The majority hold that the exception applies
whenever the premises are open to the public, regardless of the spe-
cific use or the number of people expected to enter at one time.175
All jurisdictions limit the landlord's liability to damages sustained on
that portion of the premises open to the public and by those persons
who enter for a reason related to the purpose for which the public
is admitted. 176
The public use exception, although noteworthy because it illus-
trates a situation in which the courts have imposed a duty of rea-
sonable care on landlords, is also significant in that it does not ap-
preciably alter the landlord-tenant relation. The exception creates
liability only for defects in existence prior to the transfer of posses-
sion and protects only members of the public-not the tenant.
3. IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY OR MERCHANTABILITY
IN FURNISHED DWELLINGS FOR A SHORT TERM
To provide a greater measure of protection to the tenant against
defects existing at the commencement of the term, a few courts have
permitted recovery for personal injury or property damage under the
implied warranty of habitability in a short-term lease of a furnished
dwelling. 177  This third exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor
originated in, and is based on the same rationale as, those cases
which held that a tenant in a furnished dwelling for a short term
could assert the uninhabitable condition of the premises as a defense
in an action by the landlord for rent. 178
Permitting recovery for personal injury or property damage
caused by a breach of the implied warranty of habitability is clearly
174. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.03121, at 354-58;
Grimes, supra note 146, at 219; Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 873, §§ 3-4 (1968).
175. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.0312], at 358-59. Typi-
cal types of premises to which the exception has been applied include amusement
parks, sports arenas, theaters, restaurants, public garages and parking spaces, hotels,
boarding houses, beauty shops and doctors' offices. 2 POWELL, supra note 26,
% 234[3][b], at 362-65; W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 403-05; Annot., 17
A.L.R.3d 873, §§ 8-19 (1968).
176. 4D L. FRuxER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at § 1.03[3], [4]; W. PROS-
SER, supra note 146, § 63, at 405; Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 873, § 6 (1968).
177. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at § 1.01[2][a]; 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 27.16, at 1515-16; Annot., 139 A.L.R. 261
(1942); Note, Landlord and Tenant: Defects Existing at the Time of the Lease, 35
IND. L.J. 361 (1960); Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Lease of Fur-
nished Premises for Short Term: Erosion of Caveat Emptor, 3 U. RxcMOND L.
REV. 322 (1969); Comment, The Increasing Tort Liability of the Landlord, 6 WIL-
LAMETrE L.J. 577 (1970). The warranty was first recognized in England. Blundell,
Liabilities of Landlord and Tenant in Respect of Non-Repair, Nuisance and Danger-
ous Premises, 5 CONVEY. (n.s.) 100, 169-71 (1941).
178. See text accompanying notes 50-60 supra,
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a minority rule. Although it has been adopted in a few states, 7 " it
has been rejected in several jurisdictions'a0 and was not incorporated
into the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Even in Massachusetts,
where the exception has been most readily accepted, 181 it has been
narrowly circumscribed. Liability is imposed only for latent defects
in fully furnished dwellings 182 leased for a short term 8 8 when the
defect was present at the commencement of the tenancy. 84 How-
ever, if the exception is applicable, the landlord will be held strictly
liable, since the action is for breach of an' implied contractual obliga-
tion. 8" Plaintiffs have been permitted to recover for damages
caused by defects of which the landlord had neither actual nor con-
structive knowledge.' 8 6  Although the question has not been ex-
plicitly resolved, the opinions suggest that the implied contractual
obligation creates a tort duty which would permit third parties to
recover for a breach of the warranty.' 87
179. E.g., Minton v. Hardinger, 438 S.W.2d 3 (Mo. App. 1968); 4D L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.01[2][a], at 268 n.1. Other jurisdictions have
recognized the doctrine, but in fact situations which did not involve personal injury
or property damage. See notes 55-60 supra.
180. 4D L. FRUMFR & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.01[2][a], at 271.
181. See Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942) holding that
a tenant could bring an affirmative action for breach of the implied warranty of hab-
itability and recover consequential damages for personal injuries.
182. Bolieu v. Traiser, 253 Mass. 346, 148 N.E. 809 (1925) (doctrine does not
apply to partially furnished house). However, if the tenant brings a few furnishings,
such as two chairs for a minor child, this will not bar recovery. Hacker v. Nitschke,
310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942).
183. Horton v. Marston, 352 Mass. 322, 225 N.E.2d 311 (1967) (court recognizes
that doctrine applies only to short term leases, but holds that 9-month lease is a lease
for a short term).
184. Chelefou v. Springfield Inst. for Sav., 297 Mass. 236, 8 N.E.2d 769 (1937)
(recovery denied for injury caused by defect arising during the term of the lease).
185. Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70 N.E.2d 418 (1946); Hacker v. Nit-
schke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942). Although strict liability is imposed,
this does not make the landlord an insurer. The plaintiff must still prove the exist-'
ence of a defect. For example, in Legere v. Asselta, 342 Mass. 178, 179, 172 N.E.2d
685, 686 (1961), the plaintiff slipped on an accumulation of ice which had formed
on the steps of a furnished bungalow due to the construction of the bungalow's roof.
The court held:
It is a matter of common knowledge that the type of roof described is one
which is frequently used in small dwellings, especially in rural areas. This
is no defect. . . . The house was fit for habitation when the plaintiff took
possession. That is the extent of the defendants' warranty. It cannot be ex-
tended to mean that nothing will happen to the lessee even if the forces of
nature operate seasonally in their usual way, such as converting water to ice.
186. Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70 N.E.2d 418 (1946) (evidence did
not permit a finding that defendant knew porch railing had rotted at both ends);
Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942) (there was no evidence
that defendant knew of defect in way angle irons were screwed to ladder which plain-
tiff used to gain access to upper berth of bed); Bolieu v. Traiser, 253 Mass. 346,
148 N.E. 809 (1925) (implied warranty of habitability imposes duty to inspect) (dic-
tum).
187. Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70 N.E.2d 418 (1946); Chelefou v.
Springfield Inst. for Say., 297 Mass. 236, 8 N.E.2d 769 (1937) (dictum).
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Some of the states which have refused to allow recovery for per-
sonal injury or property damage under an implied warranty of hab-
itability have developed an alternative theory of liability based on
the premise that a lease of a furnished apartment is a lease of both
real and personal property.' 8 In these jurisdictions, although the
courts refuse to recognize an implied warranty of habitability cover-
ing structural defects, they do recognize an implied warranty of mer-
chantability covering the furniture.'8 9  As a theory of recovery
against a landlord, the implied warranty of merchantability is not as
well-developed as the implied warranty of habitability, but an anal-
ysis of the cases suggests that the scope of the implied warranty of
merchantability is similarly limited to latent defects in furnished
dwellings leased for a short term when the defect was present in
the furnishings at the inception of the lease.' 90  It is not clear
whether the older cases were applying a standard of negligence or
strict liability. However the most recent California decision clearly
imposes strict liability.' 9 ' Thus far, only tenants have invoked the
188. For a discussion of this theory see Harkrider, supra note 146, at 283-84.
189. California and Washington have both rejected the implied warranty of hab-
itability. Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, 44 Cal. 2d 416, 282 P.2d 890 (1955); Lee v. Gi-
osso, 237 Cal. App. 2d 246, 46 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1965); Shanander v. Western Loan
& Bldg. Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 507, 229 P.2d 864 (1951); Forrester v. Hoover Hotel
& Inv. Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 226, 196 P.2d 825 (1948); Bidlake v. Youell, Inc., 51
Wash. 2d 59, 315 P.2d 644 (1957). However, in California, strict tort liability was
recently imposed on the lessor of a furnished apartment with a defective couch, the
court stating "we have before us, not a case of defective premises, but of defective
furniture." Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476
(1972). This case has potentially revitalized the previously discredited cases holding
a landlord liable for defects in personalty in a furnished apartment. Hunter v. Free-
man, 105 Cal. App. 2d 129, 233 P.2d 65 (1951) (gas heater); Charleville v. Metro-
politan Trust Co., 136 Cal. App. 349, 29 P.2d 241 (1934) (wall bed); Fisher v. Pen-
nington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931) (wall bed). Washington has also
held a landlord liable for defects in the furniture. Toole v. Franklin Inv. Co., 158
Wash. 696, 291 P. 1101 (1930) (steel folding bed).
190. Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 62, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972) (recov-
ery allowed; injury caused by defective couch; plaintiff had rented apartment approxi-
mately four months); Lee v. Giosso, 237 Cal. App. 2d 246, 46 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1965)
(recovery denied; injury caused by defective wall bed; plaintiff had rented apartment
over five years); Hunter v. Freeman, 105 Cal. App. 2d 129, 233 P.2d 65 (1951)
(plaintiff stated cause of action; injury caused by defective gas heater; plaintiff had
rented apartment 13 days); Forrester v. Hoover Hotel & Inv. Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d
226, 196 P.2d 825 (1948) (recovery denied; injury caused by defective wall bed;
plaintiff had rented apartment 14 months, and defect probably arose after commence-
ment of lease); Charleville v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 136 Cal. App. 349, 29 P.2d
241 (1934) (plaintiff stated cause of action; injury caused by defective wall bed;
plaintiff had rented apartment 3 1/2 months); Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App.
248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931) (recovery allowed; injury caused by defective wall bed; plain-
tiff had rented apartment for period of one month); Toole v. Franklin Inv. Co., 158
Wash. 696, 291 P. 1101 (1930) (new trial granted for plaintiff; injury caused by de-
fective steel folding bed; plaintiff had rented apartment 3 months).
191. Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972). Strict
liability is also clearly imposed by two cases permitting patrons to recover against
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doctrine, although there is nothing in the opinions to suggest that
third parties could not also recover. The principal impediment en-
countered by the courts in applying the rule is the necessity of dis-
tinguishing between personalty and realty, thereby raising all the
problems inherent in the law of fixtures. 192
The implied warranty of habitability and its offshoot, the im-
plied warranty of merchantability, have been adopted primarily in
those jurisdictions which require actual knowledge as a condition to
imposing liability under the "latent defect" exception.9 3 This may
help to explain both the development of the two doctrines and their
continued status as minority rules. The two doctrines are unique
in that they impose a standard of strict liability on the landlord, albeit
only under carefully circumscribed circumstances. They are designed
to protect lessees of furnished dwellings for a short term-those ten-
ants who have the least in common with the agrarian leaseholders
of the sixteenth century.
4. COVENANT TO REPAIR
The three exceptions discussed above apply only to defects in
existence at the commencement of the lease. Depending upon the
facts of the case, the remaining exceptions may encompass defects
arising after the tenant has taken possession, as well as those defects
present at the time of the lease.
The courts have been sharply divided on the question of
whether to impose liability in tort for personal injuries or property
damage caused by the breach of a landlord's covenant to repair.'
motel operators for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability in the furni-
ture of the premises. Schnitzer v. Nixon, 439 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1971); Jones v.
Keetch, 388 Mich. 164, 200 N.W.2d 227 (1972). Contra Wagner v. Coronet Hotel,
10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969).
192. Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 2 P.2d 518 (1931).
193. Daulton v. Williams, 81 Cal. App. 2d 70, 183 P.2d 325 (1947); Stumpf v.
Leland, 242 Mass. 168, 136 N.E. 399 (1922); Howard v. Washington Water Power
Co., 75 Wash. 255, 134 P. 927 (1913).
194. 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.79, at 352-53; 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 146, at § 1.05[2]; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 27.16,
at 1514; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 234[2][d], at 344-48; W. PROSSa, supra note
146, § 63, at 408-09; Button, Covenant to Repair as Evidence of Landlord's Control,
16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 319 (1967); Grimes, supra note 146, at 216-17; Harkrider, su-
pra note 146, at 392-400; Note, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises, 29 GEO.
L.J. 1046, 1056-62 (1941); Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to Persons
Injured on the Premises, 62 HARV. L. REV. 669, 672-74 (1949); Note, Personal Inju-
ries to the Tenant; The Landlord's Liability in Tort Therefor, 10 S.C.L.Q. 307, 317
(1958); Comment, Landlord & Tenant-Tort Liability of Landlord on a Covenant
to Repair, 1 WASHBURN L.J. 605, 606-09 (1962); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238, § 2
(1961); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 300, §§ 2-3 (1946). The English courts originally held
that a covenant to repair created only a contractual obligation to the tenant. Blun-
dell, supra note 177, at 163-67. Under § 4 of the Occupiers' Liability Act of 1957,
1975:19
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Originally, a majority of courts held that when a landlord breached
his covenant to repair, the tenant's only remedy was a cause of action
for contract damages. 95 This normally limited the tenant's measure
of recovery to the cost of repair or the loss of rental value of the
property, on the theory that personal injuries or property damage
were not within the contemplation of the parties at the time they
entered into the agreement. 9 ' A minority of courts, however, was
willing to impose liability in tort, thereby permitting both the tenant
and third parties to recover for personal injury or property damage
resulting from a breach of the landlord's covenant to repair.197
Today, the positions are reversed. In 1934, advocates of lia-
bility won a notable adherent in the American Law Institute, and
section 357 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts now represents
the new majority view:
A lessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
his lessee and others upon the land with the consent of the lessee
or his sublessee by a condition of disrepair existing before or
arising after the lessee has taken possession if
(a) the lessor, as such, has contracted by a convenant in
the lease or otherwise to keep the land in repair, and
(b) the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons
upon the land which the performance of the lessor's agreement
would have prevented, and
(c) the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care to perform
his contract. 198
A substantial minority of courts, however, still adheres to the
position that the breach of a covenant to repair creates no liability
in tort. The minority position is premised on the notion that tort
liability can be imposed only on the person in occupation or control
of real property. 199 Since a lease (as a conveyance) transfers the
however, an express contract to repair imposes a tort duty of reasonable care to both
the tenant and his visitors or their goods, provided they are lawfully upon the prem-
ises. Wellings, Landlords' Covenants, 28 CONVEY. (n.s.) 6, 14 (1964).
195. W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 408.
196. E.g., Jordan v. Miller, 179 N.C. 73, 75, 101 S.E. 550, 551-52 (1919) (dis-
cussing the reason for the rule); Cooper v. Roose, 151 Ohio St. 316, 321, 85 N.E.2d
545, 548 (1949); W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 408-09; Harkrider, supra note
146, at 392; Schlegel, supra note 147, at 325-26; Note, Landlord's Liability for De-
fective Premises, 29 Gno. L.J. 1046, 1058-59 (1941).
197. E.g., Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 195, 186 S.W.
87, 89 (1916); Harkrider, supra note 146, at 397-400.
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 (1965). See also 4D L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.05[2], at 463; W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63,
at 409.
199. Liability in tort is an incident to occupation or control . . . By preponder-
ant opinion, occupation and control are not reserved through an agreement
that the landlord will repair .... The tenant and no one else may keep
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exclusive right of possession to the tenant, it is normally the tenant
who has occupation and control of the premises. Under the minority
view, a contract to repair is not sufficient to transfer control back
'to the landlord.2"' Therefore, the only remedy for breach of a
covenant to repair is a contract action for damages.20 1 Such an ac-
tion can be brought only by the tenant, as third parties are not in
privity of contract with the landlord.20 ' And the tenant can recover
only those damages which were within the contemplation of the par-
ties at the time of the agreement.20 This ordinarily does not in-
clude damages for personal injury or property damage, although
where the contract is one to make specific repairs or to make repairs
directly related to the tenant's personal safety, recovery of such dam-
ages may be permitted.204
Although a covenant to repair, standing alone, is not sufficient
to establish the requisite control for the imposition of tort liability
under the minority view, such control may be established by showing
"something more than the right or liability to repair the premises."2 '
In Massachusetts, for example, tort liability will be imposed for the
breach of a covenant to "maintain the premises in a condition of
safety" under which the landlord "assumes the duty of looking after
the [premises] as to safety and retains so far as necessary to that
end the possession thereof and the right to enter upon [them] at
all times."20 6  In New York, it has become relatively easy to estab-
visitors away till the danger is abated, or adapt the warning to the need. The
landlord has at most a privilege to enter for the doing of the work, and at
times not even that if the occupant protests.
Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 290, 176 N.E. 397, 398 (1931) (action by third
party injured on leased premises against lessor who had agreed to make specific re-
pairs).
200. Id.; Moskowitz, Landlord's Retention of Power to Control Premises, 15
CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 579, 584-85 (1966); Comment, Tort Liability of a Landlord to
His Tenant, 10 DRAKE L. REV. 132, 134-35 (1961); Note, Landlord's Liability for
Defective Premises, 29 GEO. L.J. 1046, 1056-62 (1941).
201. See note 196 supra.
202. W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 409; Annot., 163 A.L.R. 300 § 2(a)
(2), (3) (1946). It has been suggested that third parties should be permitted to re-
cover against the landlord to avoid circuity of action. Schlegel, supra note 147, at
326-28.
203. Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238, § 7 (1961); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 300, § 4(b)(2)
(1946).
204. E.g., Moldenhauer v. Krynski, 62 Ill. App. 2d 382, 210 N.E.2d 809 (1965);
Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 598, 617 (1952); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 300, § 4(b)(1) (1946).
205. Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y. 287, 291, 176 N.E. 397, 399 (1931) (emphasis
added); 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.05[2], at 419-20.
206. Fiorntino v. Mason, 233 Mass. 451, 453, 124 N.E. 283, 283-84 (1919); ac-
cord, Crowe v. Bixby, 237 Mass. 249, 129 N.E. 433 (1921) (applying rule set forth
in Fiorntino). But see Jacovides v. Chaletzky, 332 Mass. 225, 124 N.E.2d 259
(1955) (refusing to apply Fiorntino rule and noting that Crowe is the only case in
which it has been applied). The distinction drawn in Massachusetts between a cove-
nant to repair and a covenant to maintain the premises in safe condition has been
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lish "something more." The New York Court of Appeals has im-
posed tort liability on one landlord who covenanted to make repairs
on notice and "retained a general supervision over the premises" for
purposes of making repairs,20 7 and on another who had a right to
enter to make repairs, notice of the defective condition, and who
actually did make the necessary repairs immediately after the acci-
dent.20 8  Thus even in the minority jurisdictions, it is possible for
the plaintiff to recover on a tort theory, but only upon a showing
of facts which demonstrate that the landlord had control over the
premises and not merely upon proof of a covenant to repair.
In the majority of jurisdictions, on the other hand, a contract
to repair is sufficient to impose tort liability on the landlord. The
contractual duty to repair creates and defines the tort duty of care.20
Both the tenant and -third parties can recover for either personal in-
jury or property damage.210 The courts have had difficulty articulat-
ing the reasons which justify this exception. Some courts have
sought to reconcile the exception with the real property doctrine that
a lease is a conveyance by theorizing that the landlord has retained
control over the premises as a result of his covenant to repair.21
This rationalization is obviously fictitious, however, for the tenant
who is in possession actually has control. 12 Other courts have
criticized for being difficult to apply. Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability
to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 HARv. L. REV. 699, 673-74 & n.40 (1949).
207. DeClara v. Barber Steamship Lines, 309 N.Y. 620, 132 N.E.2d 871 (1956).
New York's erosion of the control doctrine has been criticized by the commentators.
Greenfield, Tort Liability of Landlord Who Agreed to Repair, 17 N.Y.U. INTRA. L.
REV. 110, 115-17 (1962); Murphy & Bundy, The Erosion of Cullings v. Goetz, 8
SYRACUSE L. REV. 50 (1956); Murphy, Repairs by a Landlord and Control of Leased
Premises, 16 INS. COUNSEL J. 217 (1949); Comment, Torts-Liability of a Landlord
for Injuries to Persons on the Premises-Covenant to Repair-Effect of Repairs
Made Under Such Covenant Subsequent to an Injury Caused by Defect Repaired, 48
MICH. L. REV. 689 (1950).
208. Noble v. Marx, 298 N.Y. 106, 81 N.E.2d 40 (1948).
209. Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 405-11, 177 A. 262, 265-67 (1935); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357, comment c (1965); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d
1238, § 6 (1961); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 300, § 4(a) (1946).
210. E.g., Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959); 4D L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.05[2], at 415-16; 2 POWELL, supra note 26,
234[3][a], at 358-60; W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 409; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 357, comment c (1965); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238, § 5
(1961).
211. Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 633, 149 N.W. 489, 491 (1914),
is illustrative of this line of reasoning:
Where a landlord agrees to keep leased premises in repair, his right to enter
and have possession of the premises for such purpose is necessarily implied,
and his duties and liabilities in that regard are in some respects similar to
those of an owner and occupant.
212. Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 385, 140 A.2d 199, 202 (1958).
Harkrider, supra note 146, at 394-96; Comment, Landlord's Liability for Injuries
Caused by Defect in Premises Which He Promised but Failed to Repair, 42 TEMP.
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emphasized policy considerations, such as the tenant's justifiable reli-
ance on the landlord's covenant and the landlord's superior ability
to make repairs.2" 3 These courts have sought to avoid a conflict
with the characterization of a lease as a conveyance by emphasizing
the voluntary nature of the conduct which gives rise to the tort duty
of care. If the landlord chooses to enter into a contract to make
repairs, he cannot avoid the operation of the ordinary principles of
negligence law which impose liability in tort for breach of a contrac-
tual obligation.21 4
The contract which forms the basis for imposing tort liability
may be a covenant in the lease or one made after the tenafit has
taken possession, 21 and may be written or verbal,216 but with re-
spect to a subsequent promise to repair the courts agree that it must
be supported by consideration..2 17  To date, the courts have refused
to impose liability on the basis of a gratuitous promise to repair plus
reliance by the plaintiff, although this position has been criticized
by commentators.218 Liability will be imposed only for breach of
a contract to repair; a clause in the lease reserving the privilege to
enter and make optional repairs is not sufficient to create a duty in
tort.219
The lessor's duty under a contract to repair is to exercise rea-
L.Q. 199, 201 (1969). The American Law Institute has recognized that the lessor
retains no control over the premises, but does justify the imposition of tort liability
on the grounds that "the lessor retains a reversionary interest in the land, and so
by his contract may properly be regarded as resuming the duty and responsibility of
keeping his own premises in safe condition, to the extent of his undertaking." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357, comment b(3) (1965).
213. See, e.g., Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 288-89, 243 A.2d 395, 397
(1968); Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 634, 149 N.W. 489, 492 (1914)
(concurring opinion); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357, Comment b(2), (4)
(1965).
214. Harkrider, supra note 146, at 397-400; Comment, Landlord's Liability for In-
juries Caused by Defect in Premises Which He Promised but Failed to Repair, 42
TEMP. L.Q. 199, 201-03 (1969).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357(a) (1965).
216. 4D L. FRuMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.05[2], at 413-14.
217. E.g., Metcalf v. Chiprin, 217 Cal. App. 2d 305, 31 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1963);
4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.05[2], at 414; W. PROSSER, supra
note 146, § 63, at 410; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357, comment b(1)
(1965); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238, § 4[d] (1961).
218. Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L.
REV. 913, 918 (1951); Note, Landlord Liability for "Gratuitous" Promises to Repair,
2 CAL. W.L. REV. 126 (1966). In the first place, tort liability has been imposed
in other fact situations where the plaintiff has been injured as the result of relying
on a gratuitous promise. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 18.6, at 1045.
And secondly, since the tenant's reliance on a contract supported by consideration
is one of the reasons for imposing tort liability for breach of a covenant to repair,
it seems somewhat incongruous that reliance on a gratuitous promise should not simi-
larly support tort liability. See W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 410.
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357, comment b(1) (1965).
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sonable care. 220  The specific nature of the duty is dependent upon
the terms of the contract. If the contract is to keep the premises
in good repair, the courts have construed the undertaking as an obli-
gation to repair only within a reasonable time after the landlord has
received notice or acquired knowledge of the dangerous or defective
condition. 221  When the agreement is made before the tenant enters
into possession, the landlord has a duty to inspect the premises be-
fore transferring them to the tenant.2 22  But once the tenant has
taken possession, he is required to give the landlord notice because,
by virtue of his right to exclusive possession, he is in the best position
to discover a dangerous or defective condition.223 If, on the other
hand, the contract expressly or implicitly provides that the lessor will
not only repair the premises, but will also inspect them periodically
to determine the need for repairs, he will then be held liable for
any defects which would have been discoverable by a reasonable
inspection.224  He is still not strictly liable, however. The plaintiff
220. Asheim v. Fahey, 170 Ore. 330, 133 P.2d 246 (1943); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 357, Comments c-d (1965).
221. Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 242, 156 A.2d 252, 256 (1959); 4D L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.05[2], at 416-18; W. PROSSER, supra
note 146, § 63, at 410; Noel, supra note 147, at 373; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 357, comment d (1965); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238, § 4[c] (1961); Annot.,
163 A.L.R. 300, § 2(b)(3) (1961). This is also the rule in England. McCarrick v.
Liverpool Corp., [1947] A.C. 219 (1946); J. FLEMINa, THE LAW OF TORTS 415 (4th
ed. 1971); Blundell, supra note 177, at 166.
222. Faber v. Creswick, 31 N.J. 234, 156 A.2d 252 (1959); Mesher v. Osborne,
75 Wash. 439, 134 P. 1092 (1913); Comment, Liability of Landlord and Tenant to
Persons Injured on the Premises, 39 WASH. L. REV. 345, 354-55 (1964).
223. Sieber v. Blanc, 76 Cal. 173, 18 P. 260 (1888); McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal.
App. 2d 871, 883-885, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260, 268 (1961); Goldstein v. Great Ati. & Pac.
Tea Co., 142 So. 2d 115 (Fla. App. 1962); Comment, Landlord's Liability for Injur-
ies Caused by Defect in Premises Which He Promised but Failed to Repair, 42 TEMP.
L.Q. 199, 208-09 (1969); Comment, Liability of Landlord and Tenant to Persons
Injured on the Premises, 39 WASH. L. REV. 345, 355-56 (1964).
If the landlord has been notified of defects other than those causing plaintiff's
injury, he is liable for damage caused by defects which he could reasonably have been
expected to discover in the course of making the requested repairs. Dempsey v.
Smith, 108 Ga. App. 88, 132 S.E.2d 233 (1963); Worsham v. Palmer, 90 Ga. App.
372, 83 S.E.2d 185 (1954); Cone v. Lawbon, 61 Ga. App. 797, 7 S.E.2d 597 (1940);
Lemm v. Gould, 425 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1968). The landlord is also deemed to have
notice of any defect which is the subject of an agreement to make specific repairs.
Scibeck v. O'Connell, 131 Conn. 557, 41 A.2d 251 (1945); Michaels v. Brookchester,
Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958); Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284, 243
A.2d 395 (1968).
224. Kowinko v. Salecky, 5 Conn. Cir. 657, 260 A.2d 892 (1969) (duty of perio-
dic inspection implied by law when landlord promised to repair and retained key for
that purpose); Shockley v. Nunnally, 99 Ga. App. 385, 108 S.E.2d 743 (1959); Al-
aimo v. Du Pont, 4 Il1. App. 2d 85, 123 N.E.2d 583 (1955); Dulberger v. Radli,
105 N.J.L. 126, 143 A. 323 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928); DeClara v. Barber Steamship
Lines, 309 N.Y. 620, 132 N.E.2d 871 (1956) (duty of periodic inspection implied
from defendant's conduct); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357, comment d(1965); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238, §§ 4[cJ, 11 (1961); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 300,
315-16 (1946).
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cannot recover for latent defects which are not discoverable by a rea-
sonable inspection.22 5 The courts have indicated that "a landlord
may covenant in such stringent terms as to make himself the insurer
of the safety of the tenant,"22 but not surprisingly, no case has been
reported in which a landlord was so foolish.
It should be emphasized that the tort liability imposed for
breach of a covenant to repair is one which a landlord can easily
avoid. He can reserve the right to inspect and make optional repairs
without incurring any potential tort liability. If he does covenant
to make repairs, he can limit his tort liability by agreeing to repair
only upon notice of a defect from the tenant. This exception to the
general rule of nonliability is therefore of limited practical impor-
tance. From a scholarly perspective, however, it is fascinating. In-
stead of being held strictly liable, as in the case of a landlord who
breaches the implied warranty of habitability or merchantability in
a lease of a furnished dwelling, the landlord who contracts to make
repairs is merely required to exercise reasonable care in the per-
formance of his contractual obligation. The reason for the distinc-
tion is in part attributable to the concept of a lease as a conveyance.
Under an implied warranty of habitability or merchantability, the
landlord is liable only for those defects which were in existence at
the time of the lease. But, under a contract to repair, he can be
held liable for defects arising after the tenant has acquired posses-
sion and control of the premises. Therefore, the courts have im-
posed a lower standard of care in the latter situation.
5. NELIGENT REPAIRS
Unlike the preceding exception, which imposes liability for
nonfeasance, the negligent repairs exception premises liability on
misfeasance. If a landlord makes repairs and does so negligently,
he is liable for any resulting personal injury or property damage,
regardless of whether the repairs were made gratuitously or pursuant
to a covenant to repair.227  The courts have reconciled the imposi-
225. Asheim v. Fahey, 170 Ore. 330, 133 P.2d 246 (1943).
226. Id. at 337, 133 P.2d at 249.
227. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, .supra note 146, at § 1.0513]; 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 27.16, at 1514; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 234[21,
at 342-44; W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 410-12; Harkrider, supra note 146,
at 404-09; Grimes, supra note 146, at 216-17; Note, Landlord's Liability for Defective
Premises, 29 GEO. L.J. 1046, 1054-55 (1941); Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort
Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 HARv. L. REv. 669, 670 (1949); An-
not., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238, § 5 (1961); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 300, § 3 (1946); Annot.,
150 A.L.R. 1373 (1944). In Massachusetts, the failure to make gratuitous repairs
subjects the landlord to liability only to the tenant, and only for gross negligence.
Bergeron v. Forest, 233 Mass. 392, 124 N.E. 74 (1919); Bohlen, Landlord and Ten-
1975:19
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tion of liability pursuant to this exception with the doctrine of caveat
emptor by emphasizing that liability is imposed, not because of the
landlord-tenant relation, but because the landlord has breached his
general duty to avoid creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others
through his affirmative conduct.22
There is a split of authority regarding the circumstances under
which the landlord will be held liable. Section 362 of the Restate-
ment of Torts expresses what now appears to be the minority view:
A lessor of land who, by purporting to make repairs on the land
while it is in the possession of his lessee, or by the negligent
manner in which he makes such repairs has, as the lessee neither
knows nor should know, made the land more dangerous for use
or given it a deceptive appearance of safety, is subject to liability
for physical harm caused by the condition to the lessee ,or to
others upon the land with the consent of the lessee or subles-
see.
229
Both the courts23 and the commentators 28' have been critical of the
ant, 35 HARv. L. REV. 633 (1922); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 1373, § 2(e) (1944); Note,
Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 HARv.
L. REV. 669, 670 n.12 (1949). It has also been held that a landlord can only be
liable for gratuitous repairs made during the term of the lease, since the tenant can-
not be said to have relied on the making of a repair of which he had no knowledge.
Hutchins v. Pick, 164 So. 173 (La. App. 1935); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 1373, § 2(c)
(1944). Both of these limitations on liability are subject to the criticism that they
impose contract limitations on tort liability. If the basis for holding the landlord
liable is his act of misfeasance, it should be immaterial that the improper repairs were
done under a gratuitous undertaking, rather than a contractual agreement. Bohlen,
Landlord and Tenant, 35 HARv. L. REV. 633, 636-37 (1922).
England has also recognized liability for negligent repairs, at least if they were
made after the commencement of the lease. J. FLEMING, LAW OF TORTS 414 (4th
ed. 1971).
228. Riley v. Lissner, 160 Mass. 330, 35 N.E. 1130 (1894); 4D L. FRUMER &
M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.05[3], at 421-23; W. PROSSER, supra note 146,
§ 63, at 411; Comment, Liability of Landlord and Tenant to Persons Injured on the
Premises, 39 WASH. L. REV. 345, 358 (1964).
229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 362 (1965). Accord, Sherrard v. Lidy-
off, 108 Cal. App. 2d 325, 239 P.2d 28 (1952) (plaintiff barred from recovery by
knowledge that board used to repair stairs had split since its installation by defend-
ant); Golden v. Peters, 249 Wis. 39, 23 N.W.2d 458 (1946) (plaintiff barred from
recovery because there was no evidence that cover over heating vent gave "false ap-
pearance of security").
230. Bartlett v. Taylor, 351 Mo. 1060, 1068, 174 S.W.2d 844, 849 (1943) is one
of the most forceful criticisms of the Restatement of Torts:
The landlord, it seems to us, has all the protection needed for he is not
obligated . . . to undertake repairs-it is only when he volunteers or otherwise
undertakes to repair that the duty arises. Not only is there no apparent rea-
son for further limiting his liability . . . but these requirements in themselves
could only lead to confusion. There is the problem of what and when is the
condition "more dangerous." It is possible that the repairs may change the
physical condition of the premises for the better and yet the danger would be
greater . ...
231. W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 411.
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Restatement on the grounds that it has unduly permitted the law of
landlord-tenant to influence the law of negligence. Today, the
majority of courts take the position that the landlord's obligation is
to exercise due care under the circumstances, with none of the limi-
tations set forth in the Restatement. 23 2  It has been noted, however,
that this may merely necessitate a warning of the danger to those
on the premises. 23  Since the landlord's duty is one of reasonable
care, liability has been extended to anyone who is lawfully on the
premises. 211 Under the majority view, third persons are not barred
by the tenant's knowledge of the dangerous condition (as they would
be under the "latent defect" exception). 23 5
The negligent repairs doctrine is one of the more frequently
utilized theories of liability. The courts which refuse to impose lia-
bility for the breach of a promise to repair are often willing to hold
the landlord liable to the tenant or to third parties for making the
promised repairs in a negligent manner. In fact, virtually every
jurisdiction recognizes the exception, since it in no way conflicts with
landlord-tenant law. It is merely an application of the ordinary
principles of negligence in the context of the landlord-tenant rela-
tion.
6. PREMISES IN COMMON USE
The previous exceptions permit recovery for damages caused
by defects in the premises in the tenant's possession. At one time,
these were the only exceptions recognized by the common law, for
a landlord customarily transferred control of his entire premises to
the tenant. But a new exception arose with the construction of
multiunit dwellings and office buildings. It is said that the landlord
of such a structure retains possession of those portions of the prem-
ises reserved for the common use of the tenants, 23 6 such as ap-
232. E.g., Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Bauer v.
141-49 Cedar Lane Holding Co., 24 N.J. 139, 130 A.2d 833 (1957); 4D L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.05[3], at 428.
233. W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 411; Noel, supra note 147, at 388-89.
234. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.05[3], at 424; 2 POWELL,
supra note 26, 234[3][a], at 358; W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 410-11;
Noel, supra note 147, at 388-89; Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 422, § 7 (1968); Annot., 150
A.L.R. 1373, § 4 (1944).
235. Rossiter v. Moore, 59 Wash. 2d 722, 370 P.2d 250 (1962); Comment, Lia-
bility of Landlord and Tenant to Persons Injured on the Premises, 39 WASH. L. REV.
345, 361-62 (1964). Under the minority position, it appears that third persons
would be barred by notice to the tenant, since liability is premised on the deceptive
appearance of the premises. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 362, comment d
(1965); Harkrider, supra note 146, at 408-09.
236. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at § 1.05[4][a]; 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, at § 27.17; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, at
% 234[21[b]; W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 405-08; Grimes, supra note 146,
1975:19
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proaches leading to the leased premises, lobbies, stairs and porches
used by more than one -tenant, elevators, hallways, fire escapes, base-
ments, storage and utility rooms, yards, and swimming pools; 23 7
walls, roofs, and foundations;2 38 heating, plumbing, lighting and gas
systems; 2 9 and appliances furnished for common use, such as wash-
ing machines and dryers.24 ° Since the landlord is in possession and
control, he owes the tenants and other persons lawfully upon the
premises a duty of reasonable care in maintaining these areas. The
Restatement of Torts includes this exception:
A possessor of land who leases a part thereof and retains in his
own control any other part which the lessee is entitled to use as
appurtenant to -the part leased to him [or which is necessary to
the safe use of the leased part], is subject to liability to his lessee
and others lawfully upon the land with the consent of the lessee
or a sublessee for physical harm caused by a dangerous condi-
tion upon that part of the land retained in the lessor's control, if
the lessor by the exercise of reasonable care could have dis-
covered the condition and the unreasonable risk involved therein
and could have made the condition safe. 241
The duty to repair premises reserved for common use is placed
upon the landlord for both pragmatic and policy reasons. Practi-
cally, if it were left to the tenants to repair these areas, they would
have difficulty determining whether repairs were needed, and if so,
at 211-14; Harkrider, supra note 146, at 401-04; Noel, supra note 147, at 385-88;
Schleicher, Landlord's Control of Leased Premises, 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 151
(1962); Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the
Premises, 62 HARV. L. REV. 669, 670 (1949); Note, Personal Injuries to the Tenant:
The Landlord's Liability in Tort Therefor, 10 S.C.L.Q. 307, 315-17 (1958); Com-
ment, Liability of Landlord and Tenant to Persons Injured on the Premises, 39 WASH.
L. REV. 345, 361-64 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 360, comment d
(1965). It has been suggested that, due to the difficulty of defining "common areas,"
leases should contain a clause designating the areas which are reserved for common
use. Note, Tort Liability of a Landlord Out of Possession and Control, 9 W. RES.
L. REV. 206, 207-08 (1958). The exception has been recognized in England as well
as the United States, although the British give it a more restrictive interpretation.
J. SALMOND, LAW OF TORTS 418-20 (14th ed. 1965); Blundell, supra note 177, at
270; Grimes, supra note 146, at 211; West & Summerfield, Liability to Repair as Be-
tween Landlord and Tenant in the Absence of Express Agreement, 17 CONVEY. (n.s.)
472, 474 (1953).
237. Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 824 (1971) (swimming pool); Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 468
(1952) (exterior areas); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 444 (1952) (inside passageways); An-
not., 25 A.L.R.2d 364 (1952) (inside stairs); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 272 (1951) (ele-
vator).
238. Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 468, 576-603 (1952); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1292 (1926).
239. Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 791 (1962) (heating); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 838 (1962)
(electrical system); Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1143 (1962) (plumbing); Annot., 25
A.L.R.2d 496 (1952) (lighting).
240. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 576 (1952).
241. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 360-61 (1965) (The material in
brackets is that part of § 361 which differs from § 360).
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who should make them and how the cost should be allocated.2
From a policy standpoint, it also makes sense to place the responsi-
bility on the landlord, since he is more apt to have both the incentive
and the financial ability to make repairs.243 Moreover, this is con-
sistent with legal precedent: since the landlord is in control of these
areas, he is the one who should be held liable in tort for any personal
injuries or property damage caused by a defect in the premises.244
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, the tenant and his invitees
or licensees are treated as the landlord's business invitees while in
common areas. 245  As a result, the landlord owes them the full duty
of reasonable care.246  This means that, as to defects of which he
has actual or constructive knowledge,24 7 he must either give a warn-
ing sufficient to enable them to avoid the risk of harm or repair the
dangerous condition within a reasonable time.248 Since the tenant's
invitees or licensees are regarded as the landlord's business invitees,
a warning to the tenant will not relieve the landlord of liability to
242. Jacobs, Tort Liability of a Connecticut Landlord, 15 CONN. B.J. 315, 322
(1941).
243. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 356, comment a (1965).
244. 4D L. FRuMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.0514][a], at 435-37;
W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 405-06.
245. W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 406; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 360, comments c, f (1965); Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 422, § 6 (1968). See, e.g., Sny-
der v. I. Jay Realty Co., 30 N.J. 303, 153 A.2d 1 (1959). A business invitee is a
"person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly
connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 332(3) & comment k (1965). It should be noted that the
landlord's liability is limited by the scope of his express or implied invitation to use
the parts of the premises retained in his control. Sockett v. Gottlieb, 187 Cal. App.
2d 760, 766, 9 Cal. Rptr. 831, 834 (1960); 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra
note 146, at § 1.05[4][c]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 360, comment e
(1965). When the plaintiff is a social guest of the tenant, the landlord owes him
a greater duty of care than the tenant does. Van Der Woude v. Gatty, 107 N.J.
Super. 164, 257 A.2d 720 (1969); Taneian v. Meghrigian, 15 N.J. 267, 104 A.2d 689
(1954). Similarly, when a plaintiff is a prospective tenant, the landlord may owe
him a greater duty of care than after he becomes a tenant. Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 976
(1965).
246. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 27.17, at 1516; Grimes, supra
note 146, at 212-13; Moskowitz, Landlord's Retention of Power to Control Premises,
15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 579, 581-82 (1966); Noel, supra note 147, at 385-86; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 360, comment c (1965). In Massachusetts and
a few other jurisdictions, the courts have held that the landlord merely has a duty
to keep the areas reserved for common use in the condition they were in at the time
of the leasing. Wheeler v. Boston Housing Authority, 341 Mass. 510, 170 N.E.2d
465 (1960); McCarthy v. Isenberg Bros., Inc., 321 Mass. 170, 72 N.E.2d 422 (1947);
4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.05[4][a], at 438; 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 27.17, at 1516.
247. Inglehardt v. Mueller, 156 Wis. 609, 146 N.W. 808 (1914); 4D L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at § 1.05[4][b]; Schlegel, supra note 147, at 319.
248. 4D L. FRuMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.05[4][b], at 450-53;
W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 406-07; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
344, 360 & comment c (1965).
HeinOnline  -- 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 67 1975
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
such visitors.249 There are only two situations in which the land-
lord's duty may be restricted: he may have no obligation either to
provide illumination in common areas (although this restriction has
been removed by statute in several jurisdictions),250 or to remove
natural accumulations of snow and ice (although a majority of juris-
dictions now impose liability under such circumstances).25 1  Of
course, if the plaintiff is merely a licensee of the landlord or a tres-
passer, the landlord's duty of care will be limited,252 unless the plain-
tiff is a child who can invoke the attractive nuisance doctrine.253
This sixth exception, imposing a duty of reasonable care for de-
fective or dangerous conditions in areas reserved for common use,
is undoubtedly the one most frequently invoked against landlords of
multiunit dwellings or office buildings. The definition of a "com-
mon area" has been expanded to include most areas which possess
the potential for causing personal injury or property damage. It is
a plaintiff-oriented exception, since a warning is frequently not ade-
quate to fulfill the landlord's duty of care. Instead, he is required
to make the premises safe. If the landlord does warn the tenant
of the dangerous condition, this will not bar the tenant's licensees
or invitees from recovering, for the landlord owes them a direct duty
of care as his business invitees. Finally, it is an exception which
the courts universally recognize because it in no way conflicts with
landlord-tenant law.
7. STATUTORY DUTY TO REPAIR
The first six exceptions discussed above represent the judici-
ary's response to the harshness of the common law doctrine of caveat
lessee. But the judiciary was not the only branch of government
to react to the problems created by adherence to an agrarian doctrine
249. W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 63, at 408; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 360, comment a (1965).
250. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at § 1.0514][e]; 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 27.17, at 1517; W. PROSSER, supra note 146,
§ 63, at 407; Comment, Liability of Landlord for Personal Injury Due to Inadequate
or Lack of Lighting in Common Areas, 5 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 148 (1967); Annot.,
25 A.L.R.2d 496 (1952). There is no clear rationale for this common law rule, and
because it is particularly inappropriate as applied to common passageways in multi-
unit dwellings, statutes have been enacted imposing a special duty to supply lighting
in such housing. Id. at H§ 6-8. See text accompanying notes 280-83 infra.
251. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FiEDMAN, supra note 146, at § 1.05[4][d]; 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 27.17, at 1517; W. PROSSER, supra note 146,
§ 63, at 407; Comment, Landlord's Duty to Remove Snow and Ice, 24 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 319 (1967); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 387 (1973).
252. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.05[4][a], at 440-41;
Noel, supra note 147, at 387-88.
253. Schlegel, supra note 147, at 331; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339,
343B (1965); Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 1127 (1968).
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in an urban setting. Legislatures in several states also responded
by enacting the housing codes discussed earlier in this article. Un-
like the courts, whose exceptions could almost always be reconciled
with the common law notion that a lease is a conveyance, the legisla-
tures shifted the responsibility for making repairs from the tenant
to the landlord without regard for whether the tenant had control
of the premises. The legislatures created criminal254 and civil 25 5
sanctions for violations of the housing codes. But in no state did
the legislature create a cause of action for personal injury or property
damage resulting from a statutory violation. Consequently, injured
plaintiffs turned to the courts to create a seventh exception to caveat
lessee based on the widely accepted principle that a! statute may
establish the standard of conduct in a negligence action. 25 0
a. Criminal statutes
Housing codes imposing criminal sanctions have been enacted
in several jurisdictions. 7 Altz v. Lieberson25 s was the first case to
consider whether a landlord's violation of such legislation should give
rise to tort liability. New York's Tenement House Law, which was
applicable to all dwellings designed for three or more families, pro-
vided that "every tenement house and all parts thereof shall be kept
in good repair. "259 The plaintiff, a tenant in the defendant's apart-
ment house, was injured by a ceiling which fell after the defendant
had been notified of the defect and had had a reasonable time to
make repairs. The defendant contended that he was not liable be-
254. See notes 120-30 supra and accompanying text.
255. See notes 131-45 supra and accompanying text.
256. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, at § 17.6; W. PROSSER, supra note
146, at § 36; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 99 285(b), 286-288B (1965);
Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914).
257. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE H9 17921-22 (West Supp. 1974) (all
apartment housings and dwellings must comply with the Uniform Housing Code un-
less otherwise provided by law); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-343 (1969) (each
building used as a tenement, lodging, or boarding house and all parts thereof must
be kept in good repair); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 144, § 66 (1958) (every tene-
ment house and all parts thereof shall be kept in good repair); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 5.2843 (1969) (every dwelling and all the parts thereof including plumbing, heat-
ing, ventilating and electrical wiring shall be kept in good repair); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 55:13A-7 (Supp. 1974) (regulations of state-wide application will be promulgated
to assure that multiple dwellings will be maintained in such manner as to protect the
health, safety and welfare of the occupants and the public generally); N.Y. MuLT.
DWELL. LAW § 78 (McKinney 1946) (every multiple dwelling and every part thereof
shall be kept in good repair); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3781.06 (Baldwin 1971) (any
building which may be used as a multiple dwelling shall be so maintained as to be
safe and sanitary for its intended use and occupancy); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 25025
(1957) (every tenement house and every part thereof shall be kept in good repair).
258. 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
259. Id. at 18, 134 N.E. at 704.
1975:19
HeinOnline  -- 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 69 1975
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
cause a landlord owed no common law duty to keep the premises
under the tenant's control in good repair. The court upheld the ver-
dict for the plaintiff on the ground that the "command of the statute"
had "changed the ancient rule" of caveat lessee. 260  The statute was
said to give rise to tort liability for the following reasons:
The Legislature must have known that unless repairs in the
rooms of the poor were made by the landlord, they would not be
made by any one. The duty imposed became commensurate
with the need. The right to seek redress is not limited to the
city or its officers. The right extends to all whom there was a
purpose to protect. 26'
A large number of jurisdictions have followed New York's lead,
holding that the violation of a housing code is negligence per se or
evidence of negligence.262 The impact of these decisions has been
to enhance the enforcement of housing codes. In fact, most of the
reported cases construing the housing codes have arisen in this con-
text, for only in such cases has there been enough at stake to warrant
an appeal.26 a
Some jurisdictions, on the other hand, have refused to impose
tort liability for a violation of a housing code. Several reasons have
been given for this judicial reluctance to recognize the seventh ex-
ception. A few courts have adhered to the classic argument that
it would be contrary to legislative intent to construe a penal statute
as creating a new civil cause of action because the legislature could
easily have enacted a private remedy had it intended to create
one.26 4 Other courts, in a closely related argument, have asserted
260. Id.
261. Id. at 19, 134 N.E. at 704.
262. E.g., Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir.
1960); McCoy v. Coral Hills Associates, Inc., 264 A.2d 896 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970);
McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961); Rietze v. Wil-
liams, 458 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1970) (violation of plumbing code); Annis v. Britton,
232 Mich. 291, 205 N.W. 128 (1925); Daniels v. Brunton, 9 N.J. Super. 294, 76
A.2d 73 (1950); Thomas v. Housing Authority, 71 Wash. 2d 69, 426 P.2d 836
(1967); 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 3.78, at 348-49; 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN,
supra note 146, at §§ 1.06[1], [2][a]; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146,
§ 27.16, at 1515; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, at 233[2][a]; Feuerstein & Shestack,
Landlord and Tenant-The Statutory Duty to Repair, 45 ILL. L. REv. 205, 208-10
(1950); Harkrider, supra note 146, at 383-89; Note, Landlord v. Tenant: An Ap-
praisal of the Habitability and Repair Problem, 22 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 739, 745-
48 (1971); Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the
Premises, 62 HARv. L. REv. 669, 674-75 (1949); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 704, § 2
(1951). In one jurisdiction, it has been held that a housing code does not impose
civil liability but does place a landlord on constructive notice of defects within areas
under his control. Eggers v. Wright, 143 Ind. App. 141, 240 N.E.2d 79 (1968).
263. Feuerstein & Shestack, supra note 262, at 209-10; Grad, New Sanctions and
Remedies in Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URBAN LAWYER 577, 587-88 (1971).
264. E.g., Johnson v. Carter, 218 Iowa 587, 255 N.W. 864 (1934); Richmond v.
Warren Institution for Say., 307 Mass. 483, 30 N.E.2d 407 (1940).
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that the legislature did not intend to abolish the fundamental com-
mon law doctrine of caveat lessee through the enactment of a crim-
inal statute.265  But the one factor that has most significantly influ-
enced those courts which reject the seventh exception is a reluctance
to depart from the old adage that tort liability follows control and
occupation of the premises. As one court recently put it:
[1]f the statute were the standard of care by which owners of
buildings were judged regardless of whether the area complained
of was within the owner's control, the result would be either an
unfair burden on the landlord (requiring him to maintain an
area he could not enter), or an invasion of the domain of the
tenant in his leased premises.2 66
Courts may feel compelled to take this position because the housing
codes, while shifting the duty to repair, have not altered the basic
notion that a lease is a conveyance. This explanation is certainly
supported by those decisions which recognize the violation of a hous-
ing code as negligence per se when the defect appears in an area
under the landlord's control, but not when it shows up in a portion
of the premises in the tenant's possession.267
In the jurisdictions that do impose tort liability for the violation
of a housing code, it is generally agreed that the code creates a duty
of care that extends beyond the tenant to anyone lawfully on the
premises.268  However, there is a division of opinion regarding the
265. E.g., Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624, 169 A. 912 (1933); Palmigiani v.
D'Argenio, 234 Mass. 434, 125 N.E. 592 (1920); Corey v. Losse, 297 S.W. 32, 33
(Mo. 1927); Clarke v. Kerchner, 11 N.C. App. 454, 181 S.E.2d 787 (1971).
266. Clarke v. Kerchner, 11 N.C. App. 454, 463, 181 S.E.2d 787, 793 (1971);
accord, Tair v. Rock Inv. Co., 139 Ohio St. 629, 41 N.E.2d 867 (1942). Ohio has
even refused to hold a landlord liable for a housing code violation when he had the
right to enter to make weekly inspections. Branham v. Fordyce, 103 Ohio App. 379,
145 N.E.2d 471 (1957).
267. Compare Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624, 169 A. 912 (1933) (no tort
liability for violation of housing code; defect in ceiling of apartment; code does not
apply to "separate apartments" in building), with Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn.
92, 256 A.2d 246 (1969) (tort liability for violation of housing code; defect in out-
side stairway leading to plaintiff's apartment; evidence supported finding that land-
lord retained control of stairway). Compare Palmigiani v. D'Argenio, 234 Mass.
434, 125 N.E. 592 (1920) (no tort liability for violation of housing code; defect in
stairs under tenant's control; code does not "do away with fundamental law" of caveat
lessee), with Dolan v. Suffolk Franklin Sav. Bank, 355 Mass. 665, 246 N.E.2d 798
(1969) (tort liability for violation of housing code; defect in fire sprinkler system;
housing code may be evidence of negligence as to defect in area which is not part
of the common premises, but under the landlord's control).
New Jersey has explicitly rejected the above distinction between areas under the
landlord's and the tenant's control, as well as the distinction between fixtures and
personalty, in Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 386-87, 140 A.2d 199, 203
(1958).
268. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.06[1], at 510-11; 2 Pow-
ELL, supra note 26, 234[3][a], at 360-61. In Gould v. DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826
HeinOnline  -- 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 71 1975
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
type of statute that will give rise to tort liability.269 In most jurisdic-
tions, liability can be premised on a statute imposing a general duty
to keep the premises in good repair. But in some jurisdictions, the
courts insist upon proof that the defendant violated either a statute
creating a specific duty of care270 or a safe place statute. 271  For ex-
(D.C. Cir. 1964), recovery was even permitted by a plainti'ff who was "technically"
a trespasser.
269. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.06[1], at 509.
270. Compare McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961)
(tort liability can be imposed for violation of specific regulation governing installa-
tion and maintenance of handrails) and Ewing v. Balan, 168 Cal. App. 2d 619, 336
P.2d 561 (1959) (tort liability imposed for violation of specific regulation requiring
maintenance of gas water heater in good repair), with Gustin v. Williams, 255 Cal.
App. 2d 929, 62 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1967) (no tort liability imposed for violation of
general regulation requiring a landlord to maintain all parts of his building in a "safe
and sanitary condition"); Comment, Landlord and Tenant: Repairing the Duty to
Repair, 11 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 298, 304-06 (1971). Compare Endicott v. St. Re-
gis Inv. Co., 443 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1969) (violation of specific regulation governing
installation of handrails would have given rise to tort liability had plaintiff estab-
lished proximate cause) and Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco Co., 115 S.W.2d 219
(Mo. App. 1938) (tort liability can be imposed for violation of specific regulation
requiring lighting), with Corey v. Losse, 297 S.W. 32 (Mo. 1927) (no tort liability
imposed for violation of general regulation requiring maintenance of premises in good
repair).
271. Compare Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267
(1966) (tort liability can be imposed for violation of safe place statute requiring two
escape exits from a work area) with Gustin v. Williams, 255 Cal. App. 2d 929, 62
Cal. Rptr. 838 (1967).
Wisconsin is one of the few jurisdictions to hold that a "public building," as that
term is used in a safe place statute, encompasses multiunit residential dwellings. Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 101.01(2)(g)(h), 101.11(1) (1971). See generally 4D L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, at § 1.06[3][a]; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, at
233[2][c]; Harkrider, supra note 146, at 390; Wilcox, Wisconsin Safe Place Statute,
32 Wis. B. BULL. 7, 9-11 (Oct. 1959); Comment, The Wisconsin Safe Place Statute,
1939 Wis. L. REv. 314, 326. It has been held that the statute imposes a higher duty
than that of ordinary care, but does not make the defendant an insurer. Gross v.
Denow, 61 Wis. 2d 40, 212 N.W.2d 2 (1973); accord, Merkeley v. Schramm, 31 Wis.
2d 134, 142 N.W.2d 173 (1966). Consequently, a landlord must have actual or con-
structive notice of any condition in violation of the statute. Sheehan v. 535 North
Water St., 268 Wis. 325, 67 N.W.2d 273 (1954); Boyle, Safe Place Law Updated,
41 Wis. B. BULL. 48, 53-54 (Aug. 1968). He is liable to tenants or frequenters, but
not to trespassers. McNally v. Goodenough, 5 Wis. 2d 293, 92 N.W.2d 890 (1958);
Grossenbach v. Devonshire Realty Co., 218 Wis. 633, 261 N.W. 742 (1935). As
to those portions of a public building which are used or held out to be used by ten-
ants in common, the owner has a duty to maintain such areas in a safe condition,
regardless of whether less than three tenants actually use them. Lealiou v. Quatsoe,
15 Wis. 2d 128, 112 N.W.2d 193 (1961); Zeininger v. Preble, 173 Wis. 243, 180
N.W. 844 (1921). This is consistent with the common law rule that a landlord owes
a duty of reasonable care with respect to premises used in common by two or more
tenants. On the other hand, as to those portions of the building which are not held
out for use in common by two or more tenants, the landlord is liable for any struc-
tural defect, but has no duty to maintain the premises in safe condition during the
term of the lease. Frion v. Coren, 13 Wis. 2d 300, 108 N.W.2d 563 (1961); Bewley
v. Kipp, 202 Wis. 411, 233 N.W. 71 (1930). This, again, is consistent with the com-
mon law notion that a landlord has no duty to repair the premises under the tenant's
control. It should be noted, however, that when the landlord has reserved the right
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ample, if the plaintiff has sustained lead poisoning as the result of
ingesting flakes of lead paint, some jurisdictions will impose tort lia-
bility under a statute that requires the landlord to keep the premises
in good repair.272  Others will deny liability unless there is a specific
statute2 73 or administrative regulation274 proscribing the use of lead
paint or requiring the landlord to take precautionary measures with
respect to old layers of such paint. 27- It may well be, of course,
that this particular division of opinion is more apparent than real.
Imposing tort liability for the violation of a statute defining a specific
duty of care may simply be a stepping stone toward imposing lia-
bility for the violation of a statute creating a general duty to repair.
to "enter, examine, alter and repair" the demised premises, the statute does impose
a duty to maintain them in a safe condition, since it is the lack of a right to enter
a leased building which excuses the owner from complying with the statute. Sheehan
v. 535 North Water St., 268 Wis. 325, 67 N.W.2d 273 (1954). It should also be
noted that "structural defects" can occur in fixtures, but not in personalty. The stat-
ute therefore has been held inapplicable to defects in appliances or furniture. Gokey
v. Electric Household Util. Corp., 241 Wis. 385, 6 N.W.2d 189 (1942) (washing ma-
chine).
272. Acosta v. Irdank Realty Corp., 38 Misc. 2d 859, 238 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sup. Ct.
1963); cf. Garcia v. Freeland Realty, Inc., 63 Misc. 2d 937, 314 N.Y.S.2d 215
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970) (tenant permitted to recover the cost of replastering and
painting walls which had originally been -covered with lead paint on theory that ten-
ant had prevented the commission of an actionable tort).
273. E.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 4831 (Supp. 1974); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25880-81 (West Supp. 1974).
274. E.g., 24 C.F.R. §§ 35.1-.24 (1974).
275. Compare Kolojeski v. John Deisher, Inc., 429 Pa. 191, 239 A.2d 329 (1968)
(landlord not liable for lead paint poisoning in the absence of a statute regulating
the use of lead paint) with City-Wide Coalition Against Childhood Lead Poisoning
v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 356 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (action to en-
join HUD from selling or transferring title to residential dwellings until it complied
with local regulations requiring the removal of lead paint from all surfaces). See
also City of Philadelphia v. Page, 363 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (third-party
action by homeowners whose house was in violation of Philadelphia Housing Code
against seller (HUD), homeowners recovered costs of removing lead paint). If there
is no applicable statute imposing a general duty to repair or a specific duty to remove
lead paint, liability will be denied unless the plaintiff can bring himself within one
of the six common law exceptions. Compare Graham v. Wisenburn, 39 App. Div.
2d 334, 334 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1972) (tenant's request for preliminary injunction requiring
landlord to delead premises denied where multiple dwelling laws were inapplicable be-
cause tenant lived in one-family residence) with Caroline v. Reicher, 267 Md. 125,
304 A.2d 831 (1973) (plaintiff permitted to go to jury on theory that landlord
breached covenant to repair) and Weaver v. Arthur A. Schneider Realty Co., 381
S.W.2d 866 (Mo. 1964) (plaintiff sought to recover for lead paint in common area,
but recovery denied because landlord neither knew nor had reason to expect that
small children would be in the hallway unattended). For a general discussion of the
lead paint poisoning problem see Fisher, Lead Poisoning in Children, An Old Prob-
lem is Getting New Attention, 27 J. HOUSING 71-75 (1970); Greer, Lead Paint Poi-
soning-Municipal, State and Federal Approaches, 1974 URBAN L. ANN. 247; Mosko-
vitz & Bales, A New Threat-Lead Poisoning of Slum Children, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE L.
REV. 92 (1969); Note, Lead Paint Poisoning: Legal Remedies and Preventive Ac-
tions, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBLEMS 325 (1970); Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1268
(1972).
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Another issue on which there is some disagreement is the need
for the landlord to have notice of a defect as a prerequisite to im-
posing tort liability. Housing codes typically make no provision for
such notice, and strict liability is the standard in criminal proceed-
ings. However, in Altz v. Lieberson,2 " the court expressed its
opinion that "before a right of action will accrue in favor of the ten-
ant, there must be notice, actual or constructive, of the defect to be
repaired. 2 78  This dictum has been almost universally followed.2 70
But in Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco Co.,280 the court imposed tort
liability for the landlord's violation of a statute requiring him to keep
lights in the common halls and stairways "constantly burning from
twilight in the evening until daylight in the morning of each and
every day," although the landlord had neither actual nor construc-
tive notice that the light at the head of the stairway down which the
plaintiff fell was not burning at the time of the accident.
Of course Monsour can easily be distinguished from Altz. In
Monsour, the plaintiff relied on a statute creating a specific and ab-
solute duty to keep lights "constantly burning"; in Altz, the plaintiff
alleged the violation of a general duty to keep the premises in "good
repair." This distinction was in fact made by the Monsour court,281
and it is underscored by Yoder v. Greenwald.21 2 In Yoder, the de-
fendant allegedly violated a statute requiring that public lodg-
ing be properly lighted. In reversing a judgment for the defendant
and remanding the case for a new trial, the Yoder court expressed
its opinion that "the statute as applied to apartment buildings does
not impose upon the landlord strict liability in tort . . . but im-
poses a particular statutory standard of reasonable care . .. "283
A synthesis of Altz, Monsour, and Yoder would suggest that the
courts will waive the notice requirement in a tort action based on
a housing code violation only if the statute is a specific regulation
that clearly imposes an absolute duty of care, and not if it is merely
a general or specific regulation requiring that the premises be kept
in good repair.
Why are the courts so reluctant to impose strict liability for the
276. E.g., City of Chicago v. Hadesman, 17 I1i. App. 2d 150, 149 N.E.2d 425
(1958). See text accompanying note 108 supra.
277. 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
278. Id. at 18, 134 N.E. at 704.
279. E.g., Annis v. Britton, 232 Mich. 291, 205 N.W. 128 (1925); 4D L. FRUMER
& M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.06[2][a], at 516-17; 2 POWELL, supra note 26,
233[2][a], at 312-13; Feuerstein & Shestack, supra note 262, at 211-15; Annot., 17
A.L.R.2d 704, § 6 (1951); Weber v. Robro Realty Co., 53 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1945).
280. 115 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ap. 1938).
281. Id. at 223.
282. 246 So. 2d 148 (Fla. App. 1971).
283. Id. at 150.
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violation of a housing code? First, as noted by the court in Monsour,
most housing code provisions can be construed as creating no more
than a duty of ordinary care.28 But secondly, and more important,
to hold the landlord strictly liable for defects in the premises under
the tenant's control would violate the concept of a lease as a convey-
ance.285 This second reason for refusing to impose strict liability
surfaces in the cases dealing with the question of constructive notice.
It is generally agreed that tort liability may be based on constructive
notice of statutory violations in common areas under the landlord's
control or in the exterior portions of the demised premises which
the landlord can inspect without entering. 2 6 In such situations, the
landlord will be deemed to have constructive notice of a defect if
the plaintiff proves that the landlord had a reasonable opportunity
to discover and remedy the defect. But when the statutory violation
appears in interior portions of the premises not under the landlord's
control, the courts have found themselves in a quandry. Occasion-
ally, constructive notice has been based on complaints from prior
tenants or on the landlord's knowledge of similar defects (either in
other apartments or in the apartment where the accident oc-
curred). 2 17 , In a growing number of jurisdictions, the courts have re-
quired the landlord to inspect heating, sanitary, water supply, or
lighting systems on the theory that they are actually under the land-
lord's control. 288  And in a few jurisdictions, constructive notice has
been found where the landlord had a contractual right to enter, in-
spect, and repair, coupled with evidence that the landlord had suf-
ficient time to discover and remedy the defect.28 9 But in only one
reported case, Benjamin v. Kimble,290 has a court grappled with the
question of whether to impose a similar duty to inspect in the ab-
sence of such a contractual right. The plaintiff in Benjamin, a ten-
284. 115 S.W.2d at 223.
285. For example, in Tair v. Rock Inv. Co., 139 Ohio St. 629, 631-32, 4 N.E.2d
867, 868 (1942), the court refused to impose tort liability on the basis of a statute
which required the defendant to keep a common stairway in good repair because the
statute, as interpreted by the trial court, "imposed absolute liability rather than the
requirement of ordinary care," and furthermore, it did "not distinguish between de-
mised premises and those used in common," which meant that "the civil liability of
a landlord would be the same irrespective of whether possession and control of the
premises were retained by him."
286. E.g., McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961);
Annis v. Britton, 232 Mich. 291, 205 N.W. 128 (1925).
287. Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Morningstar v. Strich, 326 Mich. 541, 40 N.W.2d 719 (1950); Thomas v. Housing
Authority, 71 Wash. 2d 69, 426 P.2d 836 (1967); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 704, § 6
(1951).
288. E.g., Daniels v. Brunton, 9 N.J. Super. 294, 76 A.2d 73 (1950).
289. E.g., Tkach v. Montefiore Hosp. for Chronic Diseases, 289 N.Y. 387, 46
N.E.2d 333 (1943).
290. 43 Misc. 2d 497, 251 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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ant in a multiple dwelling apartment, was injured in a fall of several
stories when a defective and loosened window frame pulled away
from the wall as she stood at the window hanging clothes on an out-
side line attached to the frame. In dismissing the plaintiff's com-
plaint, the court reasoned that
[a]s the landlord has ithe obligation under section 78 of the
Multiple Dwelling Law -to see that all parts of the dwelling are
kept in good repair, including those not in his control, it should
reasonably follow that he has the duty to make an inspection to
see whether he is conforming with the law and should therefore
seek the tenant's permission to make the inspection where he
does not have the right to enter the apartment by virtue of lease
.. . provisions.
However, such duty only requires inspections at reason-
able intervals .... 291
The court held that the three months for which the landlord had
owned the premises did not constitute a "reasonable interval" suffi-
cient to impute constructive knowledge of the defect.
Until such time as other courts are willing to infer a right of
entry from the enactment of a housing code requiring the landlord
to keep all parts of -the demised premises in good repair, plaintiffs
will find it difficult to recover under the seventh exception for any
damage caused by a latent defect in the premises under the tenant's
control, for a right of entry, whether express or implied, is a prereq-
uisite to imposing liability on the basis of constructive notice. Yet
as long as a lease is regarded as a conveyance of real property, it
is unlikely that an implied right of entry will be widely recognized.
Tort liability premised on the violation of a housing code is one
of the more popular theories in those jurisdictions which recognize
it. It is a cause of action which can be brought by tenants and third
parties alike. The standard of care is established by the legislature.
Frequently it is a higher duty than that created by a contract to re-
pair, and often it is more specific than the general duty of reason-
able care imposed by the courts. It is possible to construe the viola-
tion of a housing code as imposing strict liability in tort, but due to
the notion that a lease is a conveyance, the courts have required
the plaintiff to prove that the landlord had actual or constructive
knowledge of the statutory violation. As a result, the action sounds
in negligence, except in those rare cases that impose strict liability
in tort for the violation of a statute specifically imposing an absolute
duty of care.
291. id. at 499, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 710-11.
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b. Civil statutes
A second type of housing statute that has the potential for es-
tablishing the standard of conduct in a tort action is "repair and
deduct" legislation. 292  California's statute,298 which has been the
model for the other jurisdictions that have enacted such legisla-
tion,294 provides that the "lessor of a building intended for the occu-
pation of human beings must. . . put it into a condition fit for such
occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which
render it untenantable. ' '295  The tenant must notify the landlord
of any dilapidations which ought to be repaired, and if the landlord
fails to act within a reasonable time, the tenant may repair the
premises and deduct his expenses from the rent or vacate the
premises. 2°6 The statute does not expressly preclude the recovery
of damages for personal injuries or property damage, but in Gately
v. Campbell,2 97 where the plaintiff-tenant sought tort recovery under
the statute, the court denied relief, holding that "the only conse-
quence of a breach of the landlord's obligation is that the tenant may
either vacate the premises or expend one month's rent for re-
"5298pairs.
California's restrictive interpretation of this legislation has been
followed in every other jurisdiction which has considered the ques-
tion.299  It should be emphasized, however, that these courts do not
preclude the plaintiff from bringing a tort action under housing legis-
lation imposing criminal sanctions. 00 They merely refuse to expand
upon the civil remedies expressly set forth in their repair and deduct
statutes.
Repair and deduct legislation is the only type of civil housing
292. See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
293. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West 1954 & Supp. 1974).
294. See MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 42-201 & 42-202 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 47-16-12 & 47-16-13 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 31-32 (1971); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 43-32-8 & 43-32-9 (1967). Wisconsin has enacted a stat-
ute allocating the duty to repair between the landlord and the tenant (in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary) which appears to be a modification of the Califor-
nia-type repair and deduct statute. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (Supp. 1974).
295. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1941 (West 1954).
296. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1974).
297. 124 Cal. 520, 57 P. 567 (1899).
298. Id. at 523, 57 P. at 568.
299. Dier v. Mueller, 53 Mont. 288, 163 P. 466 (1917); Newman v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 77 N.D. 466, 43 N.W.2d 411 (1950); Ewing v. Cadwell, 121 Okla. 115,
247 P. 665 (1925); 1 ALP, supra note 22, § 378, at 348-49; Feuerstein & Shestack,
supra note 262, at 207-08; Harkrider, supra note 146, at 383-84; Note, Landlord v.
Tenant: An Appraisal of the Habitability and Repair Problem, 22 CASE W. RES. L.
R v. 739 (1971); Note, Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured
on the Premises, 62 HARv. L. REV. 669, 674-75 (1949).
300. McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961).
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statute that imposes a broader standard of care than that set forth
in the typical housing code. The other types of civil statutes dis-
cussed earlier 801 simply impose civil sanctions for noncompliance
with the standards of criminal housing legislation. Nevertheless, the
enactment of such civil statutes may be significant to the personal
injury lawyer. In a jurisdiction that has refused to recognize the vio-
lation of a housing code as negligence per se or evidence of negli-
gence, it could be argued that the courts should reconsider their posi-
tion based on the enactment of legislation imposing civil sanctions.
Such legislation evidences a policy favoring the noncriminal enforce-
ment of housing codes, and there are few private remedies as effec-
tive as a tort action for personal injury or property damage.
C. Defenses
If the plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case in a tort
action against a landlord, the defendant may be able to assert one
of the following affirmative defenses: governmental immunity, ex-
press assumption of risk, implied assumption of risk, or contributory
negligence. Although any landlord is potentially subject to liability
under one of the seven exceptions to caveat lessee, the applicability
of the affirmative defenses may vary somewhat, depending upon
whether the defendant is a public or private landlord. This distinc-
tion will be emphasized whenever relevant throughout the following
discussion.
1. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
When a plaintiff brings an action for damages caused by a de-
fect in premises leased from a public housing authority, °2 the first
301. See notes 131-45 supra and accompanying text.
302. Public housing originated with the Housing Act of 1937 "to remedy the un-
safe and insanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe and san-
itary dwellings for families of low income, in rural or urban communities, that are
injurious to the health, safety and morals of the citizens of the Nation." Ch. 896,
§ 1, 50 Stat. 888 (1937), as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). The program con-
tinues to be administered in much the same fashion as originally set forth in the 1937
Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1401 et. seq. (1970); Special Project, Public Housing, 22
VAND. L. REv. 875, 902 (1969). The Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) is in charge of public housing at the federal level. Id. at 901-02.
States must pass enabling legislation authorizing the creation of local housing author-
ities, and by the mid-1960's, virtually every state had enacted such legislation. L.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 110, at 107. The local governing body then creates a local
housing authority, supervised by a board of commissioners and administered by an
executive director with a permanent staff. Aaron, Low-Rent Public Housing, in
HOUSING THE POOR 195 (D. Reeb & J. Kirk eds. 1973); Special Project, Public
Housing, 22 VAND. L. REv. 875, 902 (1969). The housing authority selects a site,
contracts for the construction of new housing, and manages the project once construc-
tion has been completed, subject to federal guidelines, directives, and supervision. Id.
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question to be resolved is whether the defendant can assert the de-
fense of governmental immunity.308  Most housing projects are
owned by local public corporations.80 4 In the absence of legislation
to the contrary, such corporations are entitled to governmental im-
munity in the same manner as any other local governmental entity. 0
But almost invariably there is specific legislation supporting plain-
tiff's argument that the local housing authority should not be im-
mune. In a few jurisdictions, statutes have been enacted making a
local housing authority liable in tort in the same manner as a private
corporation.30  In most jurisdictions, however, there is merely legis-
lation providing that a public housing authority may sue and be
sued. 07 The courts are divided regarding the impact of such legis-
lation on traditional notions of governmental immunity: 0 8 many
courts have held that such legislation waives the housing authority's
preexisting immunity, 09 but a substantial minority have held that
at 903-05; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 110, at 119-26. The federal government is em-
powered to grant five kinds of financial assistance: 1) preconstruction loans; 2) an-
nual contributions to cover the acquisition and construction costs of the project; 3)
annual contributions to cover those maintenance and operating expenses which can-
not be met out of the federally-regulated rent; 4) exemption from federal income
taxes; and 5) additional payments made on behalf of elderly, disabled and handi-
capped tenants, families displaced by such federal actions as urban renewal, and un-
usually large and especially poor families. Aaron, supra, at 195-96. In June, 1970,
2.5 million people lived in 800,000 federally supported units. Id. at 192. Public
housing has provided low-income tenants with better and cheaper accommodations
than private housing. Friedman, Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54
CAL. L. REV. 642, 643 (1966). However, it has not assured them of "decent, safe
and sanitary dwellings," for slumlordism exists in public housing just as it does in
the private sector. Id. at 643-44; Schoshinski, Public Landlords and Tenants: A Sur-
vey of the Developing Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 399, 401-02; Note, Remedies for Ten-
ants in Substandard Public Housing, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 561 (1968). The federal
government has set no specific standards for the maintenance of public housing.
Schoshinski, supra, at 402. Instead, the model enabling legislation provides: "All
projects shall be subject to the . . . sanitary and building laws, ordinances and regu-
lations applicable to the locality in which the project is situated." Id. at n.13, citing
HOUSING ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, DRAFT ENABLING ACT § 15 (1965).
303. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, at H§ 29.1-.15; W. PROSSER, supra
note 146, at § 131.
304. See note 302 supra.
305. 5A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTION, DEFENSES,
DAMAGES § 1.02, at 152 (1966). For a description of municipal governmental im-
munity see 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, at §§ 29.5-.6; W. PROSSER, supra
note 146, § 131, at 977-84.
306. E.g., Ryan v. Housing Authority, 322 Mass. 299, 77 N.E.2d 399 (1948);
Schultz v. Ruiz, 281 Minn. 281, 161 N.W.2d 537 (1968).
307. E.g., Knowles v. Housing Authority, 212 Ga. 729, 95 S.E.2d 659 (1956).
308. 5A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 305, at § 1.02, at 152-53; Annot.,
61 A.L.R.2d 1246, § 2 (1958).
309. E.g., Housing Authority v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557, 14 So. 2d 527 (1943); Zins
v. Justus, 211 Minn. 1, 299 N.W. 685 (1941); Mayer v. Housing Authority, 84 N.J.
Super. 411, 202 A.2d 439 (1964); Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 70 N.J. Super.
245, 175 A.2d 433 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291
(1962).
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such legislation alone is not sufficient to eliminate governmental im-
munity as a defense. 10 In these latter jurisdictions, it must first be
determined whether the housing authority was performing a govern-
mental or proprietary function. If proprietary, ;the housing authority
is subject to suit under the statute authorizing it to sue or be sued.81
If governmental, it is immune from tort liability. 12
The preceding discussion has assumed the recognition of gov-
ernmental immunity as a defense. Since the enactment of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act in 1946,818 however, a number of jurisdictions
have abrogated the immunity,a14 and most of these have enacted
state tort claims acts modeled after the federal act.8"5 Public hous-
ing authorities are typically subject to suit under such legislation.31
Liability can be avoided by proving that the housing authority was
performing a "discretionary function,"' 1 7 but, as a general rule, the
310. E.g., Muses v. Housing Authority, 83 Cal. App. 2d 489, 189 P.2d 305
(1948); Knowles v. Housing Authority, 212 Ga. 729, 95 S.E.2d 659 (1956);
Wickman v. Housing Authority, 196 Ore. 100, 247 P.2d 630 (1952).
311. Harper v. Vallejo Housing Authority, 104 Cal. App. 2d 621, 232 P.2d 262
(1951); Knowles v. Housing Authority, 212 Ga. 729, 95 S.E.2d 659 (1956); Hill
v. Housing Authority, 373 Pa. 92, 95 A.2d 519 (1953).
312. Wickman v. Housing Authority, 196 Ore. 100, 247 P.2d 630 (1952). See
also Bass v. City of New York, 38 App. Div. 2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1972).
313. The Act provides that the United States shall be held vicariously liable for
the:
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
314. W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 131, at 984-87.
315. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 29.11 (Supp. 1968); W.
PROSSER, supra note 146, § 131, at 987.
316. E.g., Tyhurst v. Housing Authority, 213 Cal. App. 2d 715, 29 Cal. Rptr. 239
(1963).
In the relatively few instances when the housing project is owned by the federal
government, it has been held that the United States is subject to suit under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act. United States v. Dooley, 231 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1955); Mary-
land v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1949); Schetter v.
Housing Authority, 132 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Pa. 1955) (United States held property
under lease from private owner); Toth v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ohio
1952); 5A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 1.01 at 152; Annot., 61
A.L.R.2d 1246, § 2 (1958). For a general discussion of the Federal Tort Claims
Act see 4 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PERSONAL INJURY: AcIONS, DEFENSES,
DAMAGES 143-304 (1967).
The United States has sought to avoid liability under the Act by "leasing" fed-
erally owned housing projects to managing agents and then asserting that these mana-
gers are "independent contractors." Not surprisingly, the courts have refused to ac-
cept the government's characterization of the relationship. Guided by the "actualities
of the relationship," the courts have held that such managing agents are "instrumen-
talities of the United States" whose purpose is to effectuate federal housing policies.
Schetter v. Housing Authority, 132 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Pa. 1955); Toth v. United
States, 107 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
317. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). E.g., Bass v. City of New York, 38 App. Div.
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functions of a housing authority are ministerial.3 18
2. EXPRESS ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The second potential defense--express assumption of risk 19-
is available to both public and private landlords, although the courts
may be less inclined to recognize the defense when the defendant
is a public housing authority. 20 Typically, the defense is based
upon a written clause in a standard form lease which exculpates the
landlord from liability for any personal injury or property damage
sustained by the tenant (or persons on the premises with the consent
of the tenant) as a result of the negligence of the landlord or his
agents or employees. 21 It is, of course, also possible to base the
defense upon a verbal agreement or a written exculpatory clause
which has been negotiated through arm's-length bargaining. 2
In contexts other than landlord-tenant relations, 32 3 the courts
have often voided exculpatory clauses on the grounds that it would
be against public policy to enforce them or that there is something
in the social relationship of the parties militating against upholding
the agreement. 24 As a general rule, however, these traditional
grounds for voiding exculpatory clauses have not been applied to
2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1972) (The court characterizes the provision of police
protection as the performance of a "governmental function," but since governmental
immunity has been abolished in New York, the case in fact illustrates the perform-
ance of a "discretionary function."); W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 131, at 986.318. E.g., Maryland v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2d 414, 419 (4th
Cir. 1949) (housing authority had "absolute duty" to keep common areas in good
repair).
319. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRiEDMAN, supra note 146, at § 4.04; 2 F. HARPER &
F. JAMES, supra note 146, at § 21.6; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, at 234[4]; W. PROS-
SER, supra note 146, § 68, at 442-45; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B
(1965).
320. See text accompanying note 340 infra.
321. Note, The Form 50 Lease: Judicial Treatment of an Adhesion Contract,
111 U. PA. L. REV. 1197 (1963); Note, Exculpatory Clauses in Standard Form
Leases: A Need for Direct Judicial Action, 28 U. PiTr. L. REV. 85 (1966); Com-
ment, A Flexible Approach to the Problem of Exculpatory Clauses in the Standard
Form Lease, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 520.
322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B, comment a (1965).
323. Courts have voided exculpatory clauses in contracts between an employer and
employee and in contracts between one who performs a public service (e.g., common
carrier, innkeeper, professional bailee, public utility) and a member of the public. 2
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 21.6, at 1185-86; W. PROSSER, supra note
146, § 68, at 442-44; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B, comments e-g
(1965). It has been argued that contracts between lessors and lessees should be
subject to the same rules as those between bailors and professional bailees. Arens-
berg, Limitations by Bailees and by Landlords of Liability for Negligent Acts, 51
DIcK. L. REV. 36 (1946).
324. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 415 Ill. 453, 461-62, 114 N.E.2d 721, 725
(1953); Note, Exculpatory Clauses in Leases of Realty in Pennsylvania, 15 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 493 (1954).
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leases because a lease is viewed as an agreement relating exclu-
sively to private affairs of the parties concerned, and not as a matter
of public interest. 32 Thus most courts hold that exculpatory clauses
in leases are valid and enforceable, at least when the action is
'brought by the tenant.126  In so holding, they resolve the conflict
between "freedom of contract" and the "desirability of preserving
those legal rights and duties arising by operation of [tort] law" in
favor of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of contract.32
Although the courts have not usually voided exculpatory clauses
in leases, they have often construed them strictly in order to soften
the impact of the general rule.128  Some courts have also held that
a landlord cannot avoid liability for "active" (as opposed to "pas-
325. Queen Ins. Co. of America v. Kaiser, 27 Wis. 2d 571, 575, 135 N.W.2d 247,
249 (1965).
326. 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1472, at 600-01 (1962); 4D L. FRUMER & M.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 4.04, at 551-53; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 234[4],
at 368-69; Rehberg, Exculpatory Clauses in Leases, 15 GA. B.J. 389 (1953); Annot.,
49 A.L.R.3d 321 §§ 3-4 (1973); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 654 (1933).
327. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 415 Ill. 453, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953); accord,
Middleton v. Lomaskin, 266 So. 2d 678 (Fla. App. 1972); O'Callaghan v. Waller
& Beckwith Realty Co., 15 I11. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1958); Eastern Ave. Corp.
v. Hughes, 228 Md. 477, 180 A.2d 486 (1962); Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor
Advertising Co., 258 N.Y. 489, 180 N.E. 245 (1932); Queen Ins. Co. of America
v. Kaiser, 27 Wis. 2d 571, 135 N.W.2d 247 (1965). Illinois, Maryland, and New
York subsequently enacted statutes voiding exculpatory clauses in leases of real prop-
erty, thereby overturning the general rule enunciated in the above cases. See notes
333-35 infra and accompanying text.
In an excellent comment on standard form leases, it is noted that the courts
which adhere to the freedom of contract principle have "failed to perceive that doc-
trine's inapplicability to the standard form lease situation." Comment, A Flexible
Approach to the Problem of Exculpatory Clauses in the Standard Form Lease, 1972
Wis. L. REv. 520, 524.
328. E.g., Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Worthington v. Parker, I1
Daly 545 (N.Y.C.P. 1885). 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 4.04,
at 553; 2 POWELL, supra note 26, 234[4], at 369; Hehberg, supra note 326, at 391;
Note, Exculpatory Clauses in Standard Form Leases: A Need for Direct Judicial
Action, 28 U. PT-r. L. REv. 85, 89-94 (1966).
Many courts are reluctant to enforce general, as opposed to specific, exculpatory
clauses. Note, Exculpatory Clauses and Landlord's Liability for Negligence, 15
TEMp. L.Q. 427 (1941). Others refuse to uphold exculpatory clauses which do not
include an express reference to the landlord's "negligence." Comment, A Flexible
Approach to the Problem of Exculpatory Clauses in the Standard Form Lease, 1972
Wis. L. REV. 520, 524-25 n.30.
It has been suggested that, in reality, the courts apply tort principles in constru-
ing exculpatory clauses, enforcing them only if the tenant had knowledge of the haz-
ard and authority to make the needed repairs. Note, Exculpatory Provisions in
Leases: A Multi-Factor Analysis of Pennsylvania Supreme Court Decisions, 40
TEMP. L.Q. 195 (1967). In recent years, there has certainly been a trend toward
construing exculpatory clauses to cover only that portion of the premises within the
tenant's control. This is consistent with the tort theory that a landlord owes the ten-
ant a duty to keep the common areas in good repair. E.g., Hollander v. Wilson Es-
tate Co., 214 Cal. 582, 7 P.2d 177 (1932); Feigenbaum v. Brink, 66 Wash. 2d 125,
401 P.2d 642 (1965).
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sive") negligence,8 29 and most have ruled that exculpatory clauses
are ineffective as to fraudulent, 3 0 reckless, or intentional miscon-
duct.331  In addition, third parties, including the minor children of
the tenant, are normally not barred by such clauses because they are
not parties to the contract.83 2
In recent years, there has been a movement away from the tra-
ditional position by both legislatures and courts. Legislatures in a
few states have enacted statutes which declare that exculpatory
clauses in leases of real property are "void as against public pol-
icy. '333  In some states,3 34 these statutes apply to the entire leased
premises, and in others,"3 " they apply only to those portions of the
premises under the landlord's control. These statutes have
prompted a reexamination of the general rule by courts in other
jurisdictions.
New Hampshire is the only jurisdiction whose judiciary has
categorically refused to enforce exculpatory provisions, 36 but in the
other jurisdictions which have considered the question, the courts
have begun to recognize that, in certain circumstances, the landlord-
329. E.g., Barkett v. Brucato, 122 Cal. App. 2d 264, 264 P.2d 978 (1953); Butt
v. Bertola, 110 Cal. App. 2d 128, 242 P.2d 32 (1952); Kuzmiac v. Brookchester, Inc.,
33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (1955); Queen Ins. Co. of America v. Kaiser, 27
Wis. 2d 571, 135 N.W.2d 247 (1965); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 321, § 5b n.6 (1973).
4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 4.04, at 556; Note, Exculpatory
Clauses in Standard Form Leases: A Need for Direct Judicial Action, 28 U. PIrrT.
L. REV. 85, 87 (1966); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 321, § 5b n.6 (1973); Annot., 40 A.L.R.
3d 795, § 4 (1971).
330. E.g., Myron W. McIntyre, Ltd. v. Chanler Holding Corp., 172 Misc. 917,
16 N.Y.S.2d 642 (1939), aff'd mem., 259 App. Div. 710, 19 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1940);
Mazza, Exculpatory Clauses in Leases, 8 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 538 (1959).
331. 2 POWELL, supra note 26, T 234[4], at 370; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 496B, comment d (1965).
332. E.g., Schetter v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 931 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Harper
v. Vallejo Housing Authority, 104 Cal. App. 2d 621, 232 P.2d 262 (1951).
333. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 91 (1973); Byrum, The Exculpatory Clause in
Leases: Public Policy and the Impact of Insurance, 50 CI. B. RECORD 95 (1968);
Rehberg, supra note 326, at 396-400 (1953); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 321, §§ 7-8
(1973). California has enacted the following statute:
All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt any-
one from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or
property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are
against the policy of the law.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1668 (West 1973). Although the statute appears to categorically
void all exculpatory clauses, it has been strictly construed to void only those clauses
which are in violation of statutes or against the public interest. Tunkl v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); Annot.,
49 A.L.R.3d 321, § 11 (1973).
334. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 91 (1973); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-321 (Mc-
Kinney 1964).
335. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-211 (1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
186, § 15 (1958).
336. Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 268, 18 A.2d 377, 379 (1941).
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tenant relationship is a matter of "public interest." 37  The first cases
to depart from the general rule were ones in which the plaintiff
sought to recover on the theory that a violation of the housing code
constituted negligence per se.335 Several courts followed a Pennsyl-
vania case in holding that, even if exculpatory clauses are generally
valid,
[t]he situation becomes an entirely different one in the eye of the
law when the legislation in question is, as here, a police measure
obviously intended for the protection of human life; in such
event public policy does not permit an individual to waive the
protection which the statute is designed to afford him.33 9
A second departure from the general rule came in cases involving
exculpatory clauses in public housing leases. In several such cases,
the courts refused to allow the defense, reasoning that since public
'housing was provided only to those who were unable to obtain safe
and sanitary housing elsewhere, the situation presented "a classic ex-
ample of unequal bargaining power. ' 340  In a third line of depar-
ture, some courts began to look beyond declarations of legislative
policy to the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the lease.
If it was apparent that the parties were in an unequal bargaining
position, as in situations where there was a severe housing shortage,
the courts began to express a willingness to void exculpatory clauses
on a case-by-case basis.3 41
337. 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146, § 4.04, at 553-57; Annot.,
49 A.L.R.3d 321, §§ 5-6 (1973).
338. E.g., Tenants Council of Tiber Island--Carrollsburg Square v. De Franceaux,
305 F. Supp. 560 (D.D.C. 1969); Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 267 (1966); Hanna v. Lederman, 223 Cal. App. 2d 786, 36 Cal. Rptr. 150
(1963); Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 256 A.2d 246 (1969); Feldman v. Stein
Bldg. & Lumber Co., 6 Mich. App. 180, 148 N.W.2d 544 (1967); Boyd v. Smith,
372 Pa. 306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953).
339. Boyd v. Smith, 372 Pa. 306, 310, 94 A.2d 44, 46 (1953).
340. Thomas v. Housing Authority, 71 Wash. 2d 69, 79, 426 P.2d 836, 842
(1967); Housing Authority v. Morris, 244 Ala. 557, 14 So. 2d 527 (1943); Texas
v. Housing Authority, 495 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1973); Note, Landlord-Tenant-Excul-
patory Clauses-Public Housing Authority's Use of Exculpatory Clause in Lease
Agreement is Not Contrary to Public Policy, 4 ST. MARY'S L. REV. 432 (1972); Note,
Landlord-Tenant-Exculpatory Clauses: Exculpation Contrary to Public Policy
where Landlord is Public Housing Authority, 44 WAsH. L. Rev. 498 (1969). Contra
Manius v. Housing Authority, 350 Pa. 512, 39 A.2d 614 (1944). In 1970, HUD
ordered that exculpatory clauses be deleted from public housing leases. Indritz, The
Tenants' Rights Movement, 1 N.M.L. REV. 1, 111-12 & nn. 469-70 (1971).
341. Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305, 306 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (Dictum: "The acute
housing shortage in and near the District of Columbia gives the landlord so great
a bargaining advantage over the tenant that such an exemption might well be held
invalid on grounds of public policy."); Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super.
575, 111 A.2d 425 (1955) (residential lease; defective condition in common area;judicial notice of housing shortage); McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash.
2d 443, 486 P.2d 1093 (1971) (residential lease; defective condition in common area;
landlord had "affirmative duty" to maintain common area in a reasonably safe condi-
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Today, there is considerable support for the position that a resi-
dential lease is not purely a matter of private interest governed by
freedom of contract principles. 342  An exculpatory clause in a resi-
dential lease may so affect the public interest 4 ' that it will be held
void as against public policy, particularly if the jurisdiction has en-
acted a housing code, if there is a housing shortage, or if the clause
appears in a standard form lease used by a large number of land-
lords in a given geographical area. 4 4  On the other hand, the courts
have been reluctant to void exculpatory clauses in commercial
leases under the "public interest" doctrine. 34 5  The relevant cri-
terion, however, should be not whether a lease is residential or com-
mercial, but whether the parties to the lease are in an equal bargain-
ing position. 346  Because the Uniform Commercial Code's doctrine
tion); Note, High-Rise Apartment Leases as Adhesion Contracts, 22 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 560 (1973); Note, McCutcheon v. United Homes Corporation, Landlord-Tenant
Exculpatory Clauses: Unenforceable as Against Public Policy, 7 WILLAMETrE L.J.
516 (1971). In McCutcheon, the court declined to comment on "[w]hether a land-
lord and tenant may specifically enter into a bargain for an exculpatory clause in
a residential rental lease on the basis of a reduced rental payment .... ." 79 Wash.
2d at 450 n.5, 486 P.2d at 1097 n.5. A New Jersey court has refused to enforce
an exculpatory clause in a lease which "contained a novel provision in which the
landlord recited that it had no public liability insurance and if the tenant desired to
eliminate the exculpatory clause, written notice thereof should be given the landlord,
in which event the rent would be increased $2 a month" because the landlord was
"in an eminently superior bargaining position." Cardona v. Eden Realty Co., 118
N.J. Super. 381, 383, 288 A.2d 34, 35-36 (1972).
342. Rehberg, supra note 326, at 402-04; Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent
Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519, 552-58 (1966); Note, Exculpatory
Clauses in Standard Form Leases: A Need for Direct Judicial Action, 28 U. PITT.
L. REV. 85 (1966).
343. For a set of guidelines to be used in determining whether an exculpatory
clause affects the public interest see Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d
92, 98-101, 383 P.2d 441, 445-446, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37-38 (1963) (exculpatory
clause in "Conditions of Admission" to nonprofit, charitable hospital held void).
344. See cases cited in notes 338 & 341 supra. Both the Model Residential Land-
lord-Tenant Code and the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act prohibit the
inclusion of exculpatory clauses in residential leases. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LAND-
LORD-TENANT CODE § 2-406 (Tent. Draft 1969); UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD
AND TENANT ACT § 1.403 (a)(4).
345. E.g., Mayfair Fabrics v. Henley, 48 N.J. 483, 226 A.2d 602 (1967); Swiss-
craft Novelty Co., Inc. v. Alad Realty Corp., 113 N.J. Super. 416, 274 A.2d 59
(1971) (property damage). In some jurisdictions, the courts have expressly limited
the holdings of cases voiding exculpatory clauses to residential leases. E.g., Feldman
v. Stein Bldg. & Lumber Co., 6 Mich. App. 180, 148 N.W.2d 544 (1967); McCutch-
eon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 448 n.2, 486 P.2d 1093, 1096 n.2
(1971) (court reserves judgment on clause in commercial lease exculpating landlord
from liability for property damage). Since the parties to a commercial lease may
provide for the purchase of insurance to cover property damage, the courts are least
apt to void exculpatory clauses pertaining to such losses. See Byrum, The Exculpa-
tory Clause in Leases: Public Policy and the Impact of Insurance, 50 Cn. B. REC.
95 (1968).
346. E.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971)
(exculpatory clause in gas station lease held void).
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of unconscionability has been used successfully to void exculpatory
clauses in commercial leases where the parties were not in an equal
bargaining position,84 7 it has been suggested that this doctrine would
provide a more "flexible and viable approach to the law of exculpa-
tion in the landlord-tenant situation.8 48
3. IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The defenses of implied assumption of risk and contributory
negligence will be discussed together because the courts frequently
fail to distinguish between the two in determining whether to hold
a landlord liable for damages caused by a defect in the premises.
In the majority of jurisdictions, both defenses are available in a negli-
gence action and the successful assertion of either defense will bar
recovery by the plaintiff. 4 9  However, in the increasing number of
jurisdictions where the comparative negligence doctrine has been
adopted by statute or judicial decision, 50 contributory negligence
does not bar recovery, but merely reduces the amount of damages
awarded. 3 1  The adoption of comparative negligence by some states
has also triggered the reexamination, by both those and other states,
of assumption of risk as a separate defense.85 2  As a result, several
jurisdictions have abolished implied assumption of risk on the
grounds that it serves no useful function.358
347. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302. Section 2-302 was applied by anal-
ogy to void the exculpatory clause in Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458,
276 N.E.2d 144 (1971). Commentators have also urged the extension of section 2-
302 to leases of real property. Cramer, Extension of the Uniform Commercial
Code's Unconscionable Contract Provision to Exculpatory Lease Clauses, 5 AM. Bus.
L.J. 287 (1967); Note, 6 IND. L. REV. 108 (1972).
348. Comment, A Flexible Approach to the Problem of Exculpatory Clauses in
the Standard Form Lease, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 520, 529. The unconscionability doc-
trine has been applied to residential leases by § 1.303 of the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act.
349. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, at §§ 21.1-22.3; W. PROSSER, supra
note 146, at §§ 65, 68; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 463-78, 496A, 496C-
496G (1965).
350. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974); W. PROSSER, supra note
146, at § 67. As of April, 1974, comparative negligence had replaced contributory
negligence in at least twenty-six states (Arkansas, Connecticut, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Is-
land, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming)
and Puerto Rico. V. SCHWARTZ, supra, § 1.1, at 13 (citations are given to all of
the statutes and the Florida Supreme Court judicial decision adopting comparative
negligence).
351. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 2.1 (1974).
352. id. at § 9.1.
353. In these jurisdictions, it is said that if the plaintiff has knowledge of the risk
and reasonably assumes it, the defendant either owes the plaintiff no duty of care
or has not breached the duty owed. If the plaintiff has knowledge of the risk .an
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In those jurisdictions which do recognize implied assumption of
risk as a defense, it has been used successfully to defeat tort actions
brought against landlords, and it is therefore necessary to discuss this
defense briefly. A distinction will be made here between "primary"
and "secondary" assumption of risk. In its primary sense, assump-
tion of risk "is an alternative expression for the proposition that [the]
defendant was not negligent, i.e., either owed no duty or did not
breach the duty owed. '8 54  In its secondary sense, assumption of risk
refers to the affirmative defense which may be established by prov-
ing that the plaintiff voluntarily 355' and unreasonably 58 encountered
a known and appreciated risk.357
unreasonably encounters it, the plaintiff is contributorily negligent. Therefore, the
defense of assumption of risk merely serves to confuse the jury. E.g., Tiller v. At-
lantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943) (FELA abolishes assumption of risk);
Hale v. O'Neill, 492 P.2d 101 (Alas. 1971); Frelick v. Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n,
51 Del. 568, 150 A.2d 17 (1959); Huckabee v. Bell & Howell, Inc., 47 II1. 2d 153,
265 N.E.2d 134 (1970); Rosenau v. Estherville, 199 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1972);
Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586 (Ky. App. 1967); FeIgner v. Anderson, 375 Mich.
23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965); Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826
(1971) (court retains terminology of implied assumption of risk, but holds that it
reduces amount of damages, rather than barring plaintiff's recovery, under compara-
tive negligence statute); Bolduc v. Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641 (1962); Mc-
Grath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 271, 196 A.2d 238 (1963); Meistrich v.
Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959); Williamson v.
Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1971); Ritter v. Beals, 225 Ore. 504, 358 P.2d
1080 (1961); Feigenbaum v. Brink, 66 Wash. 2d 125, 401 P.2d 642 (1965) (action
by tenant against landlord); Gilson v. Drees Bros., 19 Wis. 2d 252, 120 N.W.2d 63
(1963); McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d
14 (1962); Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963); Annot., 82
A.L.R.2d 1218 (1962).
Furthermore, in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, assumption of risk may
bar the plaintiff from recovering for conduct which would only have reduced the
amount of damages awarded had it been characterized as contributory negligence.
See, e.g., Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971). Implied
assumption of risk has been a popular topic in legal literature, with many commenta-
tors urging the abolition of the defense for the reasons stated above. Anderson, The
Defense of Assumption of Risk Under Comparative Negligence, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J.
678 (1973); Edgar, Voluntary Assumption of Risk in Texas Revisited-A Plea for
Its Abolition, 26 S.W.L.J. 849 (1972); Greenhill, Assumed Risk, 20 S.W.L.J. 1
(1966); James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185
(1968); James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952); Keeton, Assumption
of Products Risks, 19 S.W.L.J. 61 (1965); Smith, The Last Days of Assumption of
the Risk, 5 GONZAGA L. REV. 190 (1970); Symposium: Assumption of Risk, 22 LA.
L. REV. 1 (1961); Note, Assumption of Risk Bites the Dust in Idaho-Almost, 6
IDAHO L. REv. 119 (1969); Note, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk-
The Case for Merger, 56 MINN. L. REv. 47 (1971); Comment, Distinctions Between
Assumption of Risk and Contributory Negligence, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91
(1966).
354. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 49, 155 A.2d 90,
93 (1959).
355. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965).
356. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 53, 155 A.2d 90,
95 (1959); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, § 21.1, at 1162.
357. The difference between the Restatement of Tort's definition and Harper and
HeinOnline  -- 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 87 1975
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
In actions against a landlord, assumption of risk in its primary
sense serves as an alternate means of expressing the doctrine of
caveat lessee. If the landlord owes no duty of care or merely owes
a duty to warn the plaintiff of a defective condition in the premises,
when the plaintiff knows of the defective condition, it can be said
either that the landlord has satisfied his duty of care or that the plain-
tiff has assumed the risk of the defective condition.358  As the doc-
trine of caveat lessee has gradually been eroded by exceptions re-
quiring the landlord to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe
condition, the courts have begun to talk in terms of eliminating the
defense of implied assumption of risk in its primary sense. Thus,
for example, the defense has been "abolished" (or "not recog-
nized") in actions based on the breach of a covenant to repair, 5 9
the failure to maintain premises in common use in a reasonably safe
condition, 60 and the violation of a statutory duty to repair.3 6'
Secondary assumption of risk and contributory negligence are
still recognized as defenses in any action against a landlord based
on negligence 62 (as opposed to strict liability). 863 Therefore, sec-
James' definition of secondary assumption of risk is clearly explained in James, As-
sumption fo Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 186-92 (1968).
358. E.g., Cummings v. Prater, 95 Ariz. 20, 386 P.2d 27 (1963); 2 F. HARPER
& F. JAMES, supra note 146, at § 21.1. Dean Page Keeton has written three articles
on the doctrine of assumption of risk in landowner cases. Keeton, Assumption of
Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REV. 108 (1961); Keeton, Personal Injuries Re-
sulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 629 (1952); Keeton,
Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 20 TEx. L. REv. 562 (1942).
359. E.g., Sanderson v. Berkshire-Hathaway, Inc., 245 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1971);
Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 A. 262 (1935); Harvey v. Seale, 362 S.W.2d
310 (Tex. 1962); Mesher v. Osborne, 75 Wash. 439, 134 P. 1092 (1913). Contra,
Reams v. Taylor, 31 Utah 288, 87 P. 1089 (1906). Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238, §
8 (1961); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 300, § 4(c) (1946); Annot., 8 A.L.R. 765, § 2(c)
(1920).
360. E.g., Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941); Feigenbaum v.
Brink, 66 Wash. 2d 125, 401 P.2d 642 (1965).
361. E.g., Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Morris v. Oney,
217 Cal. App. 2d 864, 32 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1963); Ewing v. Balan, 168 Cal. App. 2d
619, 336 P.2d 561 (1959); Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 256 A.2d 246 (1969);
L'Heureux v. Hurley, 117 Conn. 347, 168 A. 8 (1933); Lapp v. Rodgers, 265 Ore.
586, 510 P.2d 551 (1973); Kelenic v. Berndt, 185 Wis. 240, 201 N.W. 250 (1924).
Contra, Yoder v. Greenwald, 246 So. 2d 148 (Fla. App. 1971). Feuerstein & Shes-
tack, supra note 262, at 215 n.62; Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 704, § 8 (1951).
362. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, at § 21.1; James, Assumption of
Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 185-86 (1968); Malone, Con-
tributory Negligence in the Landowner Cases, 29 MINN. L. REv. 61 (1945).
363. The implied warranty of habitability or merchantability appears to be a strict
liability action. This means that secondary assumption of risk or advertent contribu-
tory negligence should be a defense to such an action, but inadvertent contributory
negligence should not. However, no court has yet passed on the question. Com-
ment, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Lease of Furnished Premises for Short
Term: Erosion of Caveat Emptor, 3 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 322, 325 (1969); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS H 466, 484 (1965).
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ondary assumption of risk and contributory negligence are defenses
to actions alleging a failure to disclose latent defects known to the
lessor, 36 4 a failure to put premises leased for admission -to the public
in reasonably safe condition, 6 5 breach of a covenant to repair,3 66
negligent repairs, 367 a failure to maintain premises in common use
in a reasonably safe condition,368 and a violation of a statutory duty
to repair.36 9 The stated rationale for the distinction between pri-
mary and secondary assumption of risk as defenses to, an action based
on violation of a statutory duty to repair is that the former is analo-
gous to express assumption of risk, and it is against public policy to
permit a person to waive his statutory rights. 7 ° Secondary assump-
tion of risk, on the other hand, is equivalent to contributory negli-
gence, and it is not inconsistent with public policy to expect a per-
son to exercise reasonable care for 'his own safety, unless the stat-
ute in question was clearly enacted "to protect the plaintiff against
-his inability to protect himself. ''3 71  Housing codes have not been
364. E.g., Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 375 P.2d 304, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456
(1962); Noel, supra note 147, at 374, 379-80; Note, Landlord and Tenant: Defects
Existing at the Time of the Lease, 35 IND. L.J. 361, 365-66 (1960). However, one
recent case held that there was no contributory negligence as a matter of law where
the plaintiff had no actual knowledge of the defect. Jackson v. Wyant, 265 Ore. 19,
506 P.2d 693 (1973).
365. E.g., Austin v. Buettner, 211 Md. 61, 124 A.2d 793 (1956).
366. E.g., Dean v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 A. 262 (1935); Sacks v. Pleas-
ant, 253 Md. 40, 251 A.2d 858 (1969); Maday v. New Jersey Title Guar. & Tr. Co.,
127 N.J.L. 426, 23 A.2d 178 (1941); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238, § 8 (1961); Annot.,
163 A.L.R. 300, § 4(c) (1946); Annot., 8 A.L.R. 765, § 2(c) (1920).
367. E.g., Stoeppelman v. Hays-Fendler Constr. Co., 437 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. App.
1968); Conner v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963).
368. Dinnan v. Jozwiakows-ki, 156 Conn. 432, 242 A.2d 747 (1968); McCullagh
v. Fortune, 76 N.D. 669, 38 N.W.2d 771 (1949). However, in two recent cases,
it was held as a matter of law that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. Di
Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1962); Conroy
v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 234 A.2d 415 (1967).
369. Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Ewing v. Balan, 168 Cal. App. 2d 619, 336 P.2d 561 (1959); L'Heureux v. Hurley,
117 Conn. 347, 168 A. 8 (1933); Yoder v. Greenwald, 246 So. 2d 148 (Fla. App.
1971); Muckler v. Buchl, 276 Minn. 490, 150 N.W.2d 689 (1967); Monsour v. Ex-
celsior Tobacco Co., 115 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. App. 1938); Eckert v. Reichardt, 243
N.Y. 72, 152 N.E. 469 (1926); Lapp v. C.W. Rodgers, 265 Ore. 586, 510 P.2d 551
(1973); Umnus v. Wisconsin Public Service Corp., 260 Wis. 433, 51 N.W.2d 42
(1952); Washburn v. Skogg, 204 Wis. 29, 233 N.W. 764 (1930); Feuerstein & Shes-
tack, supra note 262, at 215-17; Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 704, § 8 (1951).
370. Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 430-31, 218 P.2d 17, 30-31
(1950); Mason v. Case, 220 Cal. App. 2d 170, 177-78, 33 Cal. Rptr. 710, 714-15
(1963); Ewing v. Balan, 168 Cal. App. 2d 619, 336 P.2d 561 (1959).
371. Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 431, 218 P.2d 17, 31 (1950);
Mula v. Meyer, 132 Cal. App. 2d 279, 282 P.2d 107 (1955). For an example of
a statute which was enacted "to protect the plaintiff against his inability to protect
himself," see Boyles v. Hamilton, 235 Cal. App. 2d 492, 45 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1965)
(child labor statute bars assumption of risk and contributory negligence as defenses).
For a suggestion that the policy behind a safety statute may prompt a court to rule
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characterized as this type of protective legislation, and consequently,
both secondary assumption of risk and contributory negligence may
bar recovery against a landlord in an action based on the violation
of a statutory duty to repair.172
Although secondary assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence are almost always potentially available to a landlord, 73 they
rarely preclude the plaintiff 'from getting to the jury. There is a
noticeable trend toward holding that both defenses present questions
of fact,3 74 even when the plaintiff has encountered an obvious or
known defect.17' The courts are particularly lenient in those cases
in which the plaintiff demonstrates that he has no reasonable alterna-
tive to using the defective premises.8 76  Only when the plaintiff
could not reasonably have relied on the landlord to make the needed
repairs have the courts barred the plaintiff from recovering as a mat-
ter of law.8 77
as a matter of law that the plaintiff did not assume the risk in the secondary sense
of the term, see Fonseca v. Orange County, 28 Cal. App. 3d 361, 104 Cal. Rptr.
566 (1972). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 65, at 425; § 68, at 453-
54; Feuerstein & Shestack, supra note 262, at 217-20; Prosser, Contributory Negli-
gence as Defense to Violation of Statute, 32 MINN. L. REV. 105 (1948).
372. E.g., Richardson v. Fountain, 154 So. 2d 709 (Fla. App. 1963); Feuerstein
& Shestack, supra note 262, at 218-19.
373. The plaintiff can preclude the defendant from asserting contributory negli-
gence as a defense by alleging that the defendant acted recklessly, but normally the
evidence will not support such an allegation. E.g., Daulton v. Williams, 81 Cal. App.
2d 70, 183 P.2d 325 (1947); Mendenhall v. Siegel, 1 Wash. App. 263, 462 P.2d 245
(1969); W. PROSSER, supra note 146, at § 65, at 426; Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 795, §
8 (1971).
In some jurisdictions, it has been held that the tenant has a duty to make minor
repairs (particularly if there is a "repair and deduct" statute) and a failure to do
so bars recovery. E.g., Sherrard v. Lidyoff, 108 Cal. App. 2d 325, 239 P.2d 28
(1951); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1238, § 9 (1961); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 300, § 4(d)
(1946). However, the trend is to permit the tenant to rely on the landlord's promise
or legal duty to repair. E.g., Ewing v. Balan, 168 Cal. App. 2d 619, 336 P.2d 561
(1959) (tenant's failure to utilize remedy under repair and deduct statute does not
bar recovery); Sacks v. Pleasant, 253 Md. 40, 251 A.2d 858 (1969) (plaintiff's finan-
cial ability must be considered in determining whether plaintiff has duty to make mi-
nor repairs).
374. E.g., Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir.
1960); Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950); Dean
v. Hershowitz, 119 Conn. 398, 177 A. 262 (1935); L'Heureux v. Hurley, 117 Conn.
347, 168 A. 8 (1933); Ensor v. Ortman, 243 Md. 81, 220 A.2d 82 (1966); Monsour
v. Excelsior Tobacco Co., 115 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. App. 1938); Eckert v. Reichardt,
243 N.Y. 72, 152 N.E. 469 (1926); 4D L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 146,
at § 4.03.
375. Shattuck v. St. Francis Hotel & Apartments, 7 Cal. 2d 358, 60 P.2d 855
(1936); Douglass v. 95 Pearl St. Corp., 157 Conn. 73, 245 A.2d 129 (1968); Sacks
v. Pleasant, 253 Md. 40, 251 A.2d 858 (1969); Spencer v. Bartfield, 334 Mass. 667,
138 N.E.2d 129 (1956); Lebovics v. Howie, 307 Mich. 326, 11 N.W.2d 906 (1943);
Conner v. Farmer & Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963).
376. Muckler v. Buchl, 276 Minn. 490, 150 N.W. 2d 689 (1967); Papakalos v.
Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941).
377. E.g., Stoops v. Carlisle-Pennell Lumber Co., 127 Wash. 82, 219 P. 876
(1923).
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D. Summary
The preceding discussion demonstrates the significant impact
that the common law of landlord-tenant relations has had on the tort
liability of a landlord. The doctrine of caveat lessee is reflected in
the general rule that a landlord is immune from tort liability. The
notion -that a lease is a conveyance of property has restricted and in-
fluenced the development of the exceptions to the general rule of
immunity. On the other hand, the courts have not been insensitive
to the increased urbanization of the tenant population, the resultant
trend toward short-term leases and multiple dwellings, and the en-
actment of housing codes. These phenomena have given rise to
several of the exceptions to a landlord's immunity-the implied war-
ranty of habitability in short-term leases of furnished premises, the
"common areas" exception, and the imposition of tort liability for
the violation of a housing code provision. They have also prompted
the courts to make it more difficult for a landlord to successfully as-
sert an affirmative defense, particularly if the defendant is a public
housing authority. Thus the current law governing a landlord's tort
liability is a tribute to the flexibiltiy of the judiciary in responding
to social and economic realities by creating exceptions to an out-
moded legal principle, caveat lessee. The question to be addressed
in the remainder of this article is whether such legal fictions are still
necessary, or whether recent developments in the law of landlord-
tenant relations have set the stage for abolishing a landlord's im-
munity from tort liability and imposing a duty of reasonable care.
III. LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONS:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Development of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
The common law principles governing the landlord-tenant rela-
tion,178 which evolved in an agrarian setting, continued to be applied
without modification to urban leases of commercial and residential
property in the industrialized society of the twentieth century. The
resulting dissonance prompted Justice Holmes to observe that "the
law as to leases is not a matter of logic in vacuo; it is a matter of
history that has not forgotten Lord Coke. '3 79 It was not until the
1960's, however, that the judiciary finally undertook a full scale re-
examination and reformulation of the common law principles govern-
378. See sections I.A.-C. supra.
379. Gardiner v. Butler, 245 U.S. 603, 605 (1918) (dictum). See text accom-
panying note 42 supra.
1975:19
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ing the landlord-tenant relation. 80 There were numerous factors
creating a climate conducive to change, the most important of which
was the transformation in the nature of a lease. While the charac-
terization of the rights created by a lease had once moved from status
to contract to property, there was now a movement back to con-
tract.3 8' Residential tenants did not regard a lease as a conveyance
of land; it was an obligation to provide a dwelling space and essential
services. 82 A commercial lease was no longer a simple conveyance
of real estate; it was a complex document containing numerous ex-
press covenants regulating the landlord-tenant relationship. 8  Other
factors producing a climate receptive to change included the de-
velopment of legal services for the poor, the existence of a severe
housing shortage, the organization of tenants' unions, and an atmos-
phere of increased judicial activism. 84 The final catalyst for change
was the publication of several scholarly pieces calling for the recogni-
tion of a lease as a contract consisting of mutually dependent cove-
nants, including an implied warranty of habitability in a lease of resi-
dential premises. 885
380. Developments in Contemporary Landlord-Tenant Law: An Annotated
Bibliography, 26 VAI'D. L. REV. 689 (1973).
381. Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to Con-
tract and Back in 900 Years? 9 KANSAS L. REV. 369, 377 (1961); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY 6 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
382. Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54
GEO. L.J. 519, 535-6 (1966).
383. Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract (Damages for
Anticipatory Breach and Interdependency of Covenants), 16 Tnx. L. REv. 45, 72-73
(1938).
384. Donahue, Change in the American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37 MODERN
L. REV. 242, 245-46 (1974).
385. Garrity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46 J.
URBAN L. 695 (1969); Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279
(1960); Levine, The Warranty of Habitability, 2 CONN. L. REV. 61 (1969); Loeb,
The Low Income Tenant in California: A Study in Frustration, 21 HASTINGS L.J.
287 (1970); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation
of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969); Schier,
Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two Approaches, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 670 (1966); Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for
Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1966); Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The
Need for Change, 44 DENVER L.J. 387 (1967).
Sax and Hiestand proposed an alternative remedy for the tenant living in sub-
standard housing: an action for damages against the landlord for committing the in-
tentional tort of slumlordism (a derivative of the tort action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress). Sax & Hiestand, Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV.
869 (1967). This new tort was immediately subjected to sharp criticism, prompting
its proponents to write a brief response in its defense. Blum & Dunham, Slumlordism
as a Tort-A Dissenting View, 66 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1968); Sax, Slumlordism as
a Tort-A Brief Response, 66 MICH. L. REV. 445 (1968). One of the commentators
who favored the implied warranty of habitability compared the implied warranty with
the tort of slumlordism, and concluded that the courts would probably adopt the im-
plied warranty of habitability, because it is more consistent with traditional principles
HeinOnline  -- 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 92 1975
1975:19 Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises
The scholars did not lack precedent for their recommendations.
The civil law countries have always regarded a lease as a contract 8
composed of mutually dependent covenants. S7  The civil codes
have created an implied warranty of habitability in the lease of
premises for occupation by human beings 88 enforceable by such
of property and contract law. Levine, The Warranty of Habitability, 2 CONN. L.
REV. 61 (1969). In the light of hindsight, it is evident that this prediction was cor-
rect. Very few courts have considered the tort of slumlordism, and most have re-
jected it. E.g., Golden v. Gray, 68 Misc. 2d 679, 327 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
But see Comment, The Intentional Infliction of Emotional Harm: The Tort of Slum-
lordism in New York, 38 ALB. L. REV. 826 (1974). The principal problems with
the tort of slumlordism are that (1) it requires proof of the elements of a cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, while the implied warranty of
habitability requires no more than proof of negligence; and (2) the tenant's only rem-
edy is an action for damages (or possibly an injunction), while the implied warranty
offers the tenant the full panoply of contract remedies. Although the tort of slum-
lordism does not appear to be a viable remedy for recovering the economic and psy-
chic losses associated with living in substandard housing, it has spawned proposals
that landlords be held strictly liable for personal injuries (including psychic harm)
caused by defects which constitute violations of a housing code. Falick, A Tort Rem-
edy for the Slum Tenant, 58 ILL. B.J. 204 (1969); Comment, Housing Codes and
a Tort of Slumlordism, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 522 (1971).
386. Cohn, Some Comparative Aspects of the Law of Landlord and Tenant, 11
MODERN L. REv. 377 (1948).
387. 3 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 895-921A (rev.
ed. 1936).
388. For example, the following provisions of the French Civil Code impose an
implied warranty of habitability:
The lessor is obligated, by the nature of the contract, and without any
special provision being required:
2. To maintain the property in such condition that it will be fit for the
use for which it has been leased ....
C. Civ. art. 1719 (64e ed. Petits Codes Palloz 1965).
The lessor is required to deliver the property in good repair in all re-
spects.
He must make all necessary repairs during the term of the lease, except
those incumbent on the lessee.
Id. art. 1720. The German Civil Code also imposes an implied warranty of hab-
itability:
The lessor is obliged to turn over the rental property to the lessee in a
condition fit for the contractual use and to preserve it in that condition during
the term of the lease.
BGB § 536 (C.H. Beck, Munich, 1974).
(1) If the rental property at the time of delivery has a defect which de-
stroys or diminishes its fitness for the contractual use, or if such defect arises
during the term of the lease, the lessee is released from payment of the rent
during the time for which fitness is destroyed; during the time for which fit-
ness is diminished, he is only obliged to pay a part of the rent, to be com-
puted according to §§ 472, 473. An insignificant decrease of fitness for use
is to be disregarded.
(2) Subparagraph (1) is also applicable when a warranted quality does
not exist, or when it ceases to exist later. In case of a lease of real property,
warranty of a certain size is to be deemed the equivalent of a warranty of
quality.
(3) With respect to the lease of a dwelling, a stipulation which changes
these provisions to the detriment of the lessee is null and void.
Id. at § 537.
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contract remedies as damages, rescission, and rent abatement. 8 9 In
England, where the characterization of the lease as a conveyance of
property and the doctrines of caveat emptor and independent cove-
nants originated, Parliament has enacted legislation imposing an im-
plied warranty of fitness for human habitation in leases of residential
dwellings to the poor. 9 0 And by the 1960's, courts in the United
States had moved toward recognizing the mutual dependence of
covenants in a lease by developing the doctrine of constructive evic-
tion.39' A few American courts had even gone so far as to hold
-that a commercial lease was a contract, with the tenant's obligation
to pay rent dependent upon the landlord's performance of covenants
essential to the purpose of the lease (e.g., a covenant not to lease
to a competing business). 9 2 Of course these decisions were outside
the mainstream of the common law, and were generally inapplicable
to the residential tenant."93 The strongest precedent for applying
contract principles to residential leases was provided by those cases
recognizing an implied warranty of habitability in a lease of a fur-
nished dwelling for a short term3 94 or an implied warranty of fitness
in a lease of premises under construction.895
389. For a discussion of the remedial provisions of the German Civil Code and
a suggestion that the United States adopt a statutory scheme of landlord-tenant rela-
tions patterned after that developed in the civil law countries, see Lipsky & Neumann,
Landlord-Tenant Law in the United States and West Germany-A Comparison of
Legal Approaches, 44 TUL. L. REV. 36 (1969).
390. Housing Act 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, ch. 65, §§ 32-33; Housing Act 1957, 5
& 6 Eliz. 2, c. 56 § 6(2). The English courts have severely limited the scope of
these statutory warranties through a process of strict judicial construction of the leg-
islation creating them. Reynolds, Statutory Covenants of Fitness and Repair: Social
Legislation and the Judges, 37 MODERN L. REV. 377 (1974).
391. 3A A. CORRIN, CONTRACTs § 686, at 242-43 (rev. ed. 1960); Hicks, The
Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443, 460-64 (1972)
(hereinafter cited as Hicks); Rapacz, Theories of Defense When Tenants Abandon
the Premises Because of the Condition Thereof, 4 DE PAUL L. REV. 173, 179-80
(1955); Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. REV. 24 (1970).
See section I.C.2. supra.
392. E.g., Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132
P.2d 457 (1942); University Club v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914);
Jackson v. Pepper Gasoline Co., 280 Ky. 226, 133 S.W.2d 91 (1939); Brady v. Brady,
140 Md. 403, 117 A. 882 (1922); Stifter v. Hartman, 225 Mich. 101, 195 N.W. 673
(1923); Hiatt Inv. Co. v. Buehler, 225 Mo. App. 151, 16 S.W.2d 219 (1929). These
cases are discussed at length in two recent law review articles. Hicks, supra note
391, at 454-60; Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. REV. 24
(1970).
393. In a few cases, the courts talked in terms of applying contract principles to
residential leases, but each of the cases involved the breach of an essential express
covenant and the tenant had vacated, making constructive eviction an alternative rem-
edy. Berman v. Shelby, 93 Ark. 472, 125 S.W. 124 (1910); Stevenson Stanoyevich
Fund v. Steinacher, 125 N.J.L. 326, 15 A.2d 772 (1940); Higgins v. Whiting, 102
N.J.L. 279, 131 A. 879 (1926).
394. See text accompanying notes 50-60 supra.
395. See text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
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The initial assaults on the fundamental tenets of landlord-
tenant law in the 1960's were rather timid. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court spearheaded the attack with its landmark case, Pines v. Pers-
sion. 96 In Pines, the plaintiffs (college students) had entered into
a one-year lease of a furnished house. When they moved in, the
house was filthy and lacked student furnishings. The plaintiffs at-
tempted to clean the house themselves, but soon became discour-
aged. Upon advice of counsel, they requested the city to inspect
the house, and several building code violations were found. Plain-
tiffs then vacated the premises and brought an action to recover their
deposit on the lease and the value of their labor. The court awarded
them this amount, less the reasonable rental value of the premises
for the period of actual occupancy, on the theory that there had been
a breach of an "implied warranty of habitability in the lease." ' In
language suggesting a bold departure from the common law, the
court said that it was abolishing caveat emptor in favor of an implied
warranty of habitability so as to further the legislative policy ex-
pressed in the safe place statute and the building code,398 and that
the tenant's covenant to pay rent and the landlord's covenant to pro-
vide a habitable dwelling were mutually dependent. 9 9 Given the
facts of the case, however, it is questionable whether the decision
represents a significant break with the past. The court could have
reached the same result by expanding the implied warranty of habit-
ability in the lease of a furnished dwelling for a short term so that
it would encompass a lease for a period of one year, and by invoking
the common law remedies of constructive eviction, damages, and
restitution. Indeed, in Posnanski v. Hood,400 the Wisconsin court
implicitly gave just such a restrictive interpretation to Pines v. Pers-
sion.401
396. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). In a 1952 dissenting opinion
which was to forecast future developments in the law of landlord-tenant relations,
Judge Bazelon had called for the creation of an implied warranty of habitability in
leases of furnished dwellings. Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir.
1952) (dissenting opinion).
397. 14 Wis. 2d at 594, 111 N.W.2d at 412.
398. Id. at 595-96, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13.
399. Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413.
400. 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970). In Posnanski, the landlord of an
unfurnished apartment brought an action for rent, and the tenant sought to defend
on the grounds that violations of the Milwaukee Housing Code had developed during
the term of the lease. The court refused to recognize the defense. Contrary to the
language in Pines (indeed, without reference to Pines), the court held that neither
the legislature nor the common council of Milwaukee intended that the housing code
be an implied covenant mutually dependent with a tenant's covenant to pay rent be-
cause this would sanction rent withholding, which would circumvent administrative
enforcement of the housing code. Id. at 178-83, 174 N.W.2d at 531-33.
401. Posnanski has been criticized by commentators. E.g., Comment, Wisconsin
Housing Codes not an Implied Part of a Lease, 1972 URBAN L. ANN. 245, 248-49.
1975:19
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The next pair of cases decided in the 1960's, Buckner v. Azu-
lai40 2 and Reste Realty Corp v. Cooper,4 °3 were like Pines v. Pers-
sion in that they presaged a major advancement of the law of land-
lord-tenant relations within the old common law framework. In
both cases, it was held that there had been a breach of the implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment resulting in a constructive eviction.40 4
In dictum, however, the Buckner court suggested that it would
recognize an implied warranty of habitability in leases of furnished
or unfurnished residential dwellings,40 5 and the Reste court indicated
readiness to recognize an implied warranty of fitness against latent
defects in leases of commercial premises. 40  These two cases set
the stage for the subsequent adoption of the implied warranty of
habitability (or fitness) by more than fourteen jurisdictions, includ-
ing California and New Jersey, between 1969 and 1974.407
Prior to Posnanski, in a case citing Pines v. Perssion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
had recognized an implied warranty in a commercial lease that the premises were
fit for their intended purpose when the tenant took possession. Earl Millikin, Inc.
v. Allen, 21 Wis. 2d 497, 124 N.W.2d 65 (1963). Subsequent to Posnanski, the Wis-
consin legislature enacted legislation allocating responsibility for major repairs to the
landlord, and for minor repairs to the tenant. Wis. STAT. § 704.07 (1971).
402. 251 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967).
403. 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
404. 251 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 1014, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 807; 53 N.J. at 456-60,
251 A.2d at 274-77.
405. 251 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 1014-15, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 807-08.
406. 53 N.J. at 453-54, 251 A.2d at 272-74.
407. In the following jurisdictions, the judiciary has recognized the implied war-
ranty of habitability, although in some instances the court of last resort has not yet
considered the question. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704 (1974); Hall v. Municipal Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 641, 517 P.2d 1185, 111 Cal. Rptr.
721 (1974); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Ques-
enbury v. Patrick, CCH POVERTY L. REP. 15,803 (El Paso County Ct., Colo.
1972); Givens v. Gray, CCH PovEaTY L. REP. 15,412 (Ga. App. 1972); Lemle
v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii
473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Il1. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d
208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Authority
v. Hemingway, - Mass. -, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d
65 (Mo. App. 1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Marini
v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J.
444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268
A.2d 556 (1970); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Morbeth Re-
alty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1973); Amanuensis, Ltd.
v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1971); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Misc. 25,
62 Ohio Op. 2d 227, 289 N.E.2d 919 (1972); Derr v. Cangemi, 43 U.S.L.W. 2020
Phil. Ct. C.P. July 16, 1974); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160
(1973); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 646 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 167-
217 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). In Michigan and Minnesota, the legislature has en-
acted a statutory implied warranty of habitability, and the judiciary has held that this
statutory covenant is interdependent with, rather than independent of, the covenant to
pay rent. Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); Fritz v. War-
then, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973). For a listing of statutes in other juris-
dictions which create an implied warranty of habitability, see the Statutory Note to
Chapter Five of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 167-73 (Tent. Draft No.
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There is now a distinct trend in the United States toward char-
acterizing a lease as a contract containing an implied warranty of
habitability (or fitness) which is interdependent with the covenant
to pay rent and enforceable by contract remedies.40 8 The remainder
1, 1973). The publication of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,
which creates an implied warranty of habitability in all residential leases, will prob-
ably stimulate additional legislative activity in this area. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2.104; see note 140 supra.
A few jurisdictions have refused to recognize the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity. Pointer v. American Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Ind. 1969) (Indiana law);
Thomas v. Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 294 A.2d 321 (1972) (Connecticut has a statute
requiring that leased premises be maintained in "tenantable" condition, but the court
held that there had been no violation of the statute and refused to recognize an im-
plied warranty of habitability). Cameran v. Calhoun-Smith Dist. Co., 442 S.W.2d
815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (refuses to recognize an implied warranty of fitness in
a commercial lease). The United States Supreme Court has refused to invalidate
Oregon's Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute, stating:
The Constitution has not federalized the substantive law of landlord-tenant re-
lations, however, and we see nothing to forbid Oregon from treating the un-
dertakings of the tenant and those of the landlord as independent rather than
dependent covenants.
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 68 (1972). See Comment, Lindsey v. Normet, A
Supreme Court Refusal to Federalize Oregon's Landlord-Tenant Procedure, 1973 UR-
BAN L. ANN. 309.
In a closely related development, some jurisdictions have held that a lease is a
contract, and that a landlord's violation of a housing code voids the lease, thereby
entitling the tenant to vacate the premises and recover rent paid in excess of the rea-
sonable rental value. William J. Davis, Inc. v. Slade, 271 A.2d 412 (D.C. Ct. App.
1970); Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Longe-
necker v. Hardin, 30 I11. App. 2d 468, 264 N.E.2d 878 (1970); Hicks, supra note
391, at 470-81; Indritz, supra note 132, at 1; Schoshinski, Remedies for the Indigent
Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519, 537-38 (1966); Note, Leases and
the Illegal Contract Theory-ludicial Reinforcement of the Housing Code, 56 GEo.
L.J. 920 (1968); Note, Landlord and Tenant: Lease Agreement Void as an Illegal
Contract when Dwelling is in Violation of Local Housing Code at Time of Letting,
30 U. Prrr. L. REV. 134 (1968). This theory has been held to be inapplicable to
defects arising during the term of the lease; only the implied warranty of habitability
offers protection against such defects. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 661 (1972); Riley v. Nelson, 256 S.C. 545, 183 S.E.2d 328 (1971); Posnanski
v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).
408. There is a vast volume of literature analyzing the cases which have imposed
an implied warranty of habitability. ABA Committee on Leases, Trends in Land-
lord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 550
(1971); Daniels, supra note 127; Donahue, Changes in the American Law of Land-
lord and Tenant, 37 MoD. L. REv. 242 (1974); Hicks, supra note 391; Jaeger, War-
ranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use, 16 RUTGERS L. REV. 493 (1962);
Line, Implied Warranties of Habitability and Fitness for Intended Use in Urban Resi-
dential Leases, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 161 (1974); Moskovitz, Rent Withholding and
the Implied Warranty of Habitability--Some New Breakthroughs, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 49 (1970); Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U.L. REv. 24
(1970); Comment, Balancing the California Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 9 CAL.
W.L. REV. 326 (1973); Note, Landlord v. Tenant: An Appraisal of the Habitability
and Repair Problem, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 739 (1971); Note, Judicial Expansion
of Tenants' Private Law Rights: Implied Warranties of Habitability and Safety in
Residential Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 489 (1971); Comment, Landlord and
Tenant-Implied Warranty of Habitability-Demise of the Traditional Doctrine of
Caveat Emptor, 20 DE PAUL L. REV. 955 (1971); Note, Landlord and Tenant-New
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of this section will summarize the reasons given by the courts
for following this trend, discuss the scope of the implied war-
ranty of habitability (or fitness), and identify the remedies which
have been recognized for its enforcement.
B. The Rationale Behind the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Courts adopting the implied warranty of habitability have em-
phasized that the factual assumptions underlying the original com-
mon law of landlord-tenant relations have long ceased to exist. The
tenant is no longer principally interested in the land itself; he now
seeks a place to live:
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek "shelter"
today, they seek a well-known package of goods and services-
a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also
adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing fa-
cilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation and proper
maintenance. 40 9
Nor does the modem tenant have much in common with the "jack-
of-all-trades" farmer who had the skill, incentive, and financial re-
sources to make the necessary repairs of his relatively simple dwell-
ing. The modem tenant has a "single specialized skill unrelated to
maintenance work," lives in a complex building (often without ac-
cess to or control over the facilities in need of repair), lacks the fi-
nancial wherewithal to make more than minor repairs, and is highly
mobile, giving him little incentive to make even those repairs which
are within his means.410
Just as the courts adopting the implied warranty of habitability
have noted that the factual assumptions underlying the common law
are now appropriate only to the pages of a history book, so they have
noted the serious erosion of the legal doctrines forming the founda-
Remedies for Old Problems, 76 DICK. L. REV. 580 (1972); Comment, Implied War-
ranty of Habitability: An Incipient Trend in the Law of Landlord-Tenant?, 40 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 123 (1971); Comment, Tenant Protection in Iowa-Mease v. Fox and
the implied Warranty of Habitability, 58 IOWA L. REV. 656 (1973); Comment, Rent
Mitigation for Housing Code Violations, 56 IOWA L. REv. 460 (1970); Note, Private
Enforcement of Municipal Housing Regulations, 54 IOWA L. REv. 580 (1966); Note,
Landlord and Tenant-Recent Erosions of Caveat Emptor in the Leasing of Residen-
tial Housing, 49 N.C.L. REv. 175 (1970); Comment, Landlord-Tenant Legislation:
Revising an Old Common Law Relationship, 2 PACIFIC L.J. 259 (1971); Note, The
Plight of the Indigent Tenant in Massachusetts: An Attempt by the Law to Provide
Relief, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 106 (1973); Comment, The Landlord's Common-Law
Duty to Repair: Some Recent Innovations, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 997 (1971);
Comment, Landlord-Tenant Reform-Implied Warranty of Habitability: Effects and
Effectiveness of Remedies for its Breach, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 749 (1974).
409. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
410. Id. at 1077-79; Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 624-25, 517 P.2d 1168,
1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (1974); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App.
1973).
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tion of the common law of landlord-tenantrelations. For example,
the lease was once regarded as a conveyance of property, but the
courts have begun to recognize the contractual nature of the con-
temporary lease agreement.411 Similarly, caveat emptor originally
precluded the imposition of a duty to repair or maintain on the land-
lord, but exceptions (such as the implied warranty of habitability in
a short term lease of furnished premises) have been carved out,412
and caveat emptor has been completely overthrown by the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness in the law governing com-
mercial sales transactions.418 Finally, although lease covenants were
traditionally regarded as independent (largely for historical rea-
sons), this notion has been partially undermined by the doctrine of
constructive eviction.414 In light of these developments, the courts
adopting the implied warranty of habitability have concluded that
much of the common law of landlord-tenant relations, like the factual
assumptions upon which it was erected, should be relegated to
history books.
Three additional factors have prompted a reexamination of
landlord-tenant law and have shaped the countours of the resulting
implied warranty of habitability or fitness. First of all, legislative
dissatisfaction with the common law doctrine of caveat emptor has
been clearly shown by the widespread enactment of housing
codes.41 5 Secondly, urbanization and population growth have pro-
duced a shortage of low-cost housing which has created a disparity
in the bargaining power between landlords and residential ten-
ants.416 Standardized form leases have become contracts of ad-
411. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 624, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172-73, 11 Cal. Rptr.
704, 708-09 (1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Berzito
v. Gambino, 67 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973). See notes 391-92 supra and accom-
panying text.
412. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 624, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172-73, 111 Cal. Rptr.
Rptr. 704, 710 n.11 (1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 47 (1969);
Mease v. Fox, - Iowa -, 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972). See section I.B. & I1.B.. supra.
413. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-77, 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 626, 517 P.2d 1168, 1174, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 710 (1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470, (1969);
Mease v. Fox, - Iowa -, 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §§ 2-314-315 and text accompanying notes 656-59 infra.
414. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 n.38 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 626 n.10, 517 P.2d 1168, 1078 n.38,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 710 n.10 (1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d
470 (1969). See section I.C.2. supra.
415. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 (D.C. CIr. 1970);
Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704, 711 (1974); Mease v. Fox, - Iowa -, 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972); Boston Hous-
ing Authority v. Hemming, - Mass. -, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1972).
416. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
1975:19
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hesion, offered to residential tenants on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.41 7
Under these circumstances, the common law assumption that a ten-
ant can bargain for an express warranty of habitability or fitness has
become totally unrealistic. Finally, the characterization of a lease
as a "package of goods and services" has prompted several courts
to apply products liability principles to the landlord-tenant relation
by analogy. Like the consumer, the modern urban tenant relies on
the landlord's implied representation that the premises are fit for
human habitation."" Like the commercial businessman, the land-
lord has the "greater opportunity, incentive and capacity to inspect
and maintain the condition of the building."4 19  Moreover, if the
landlord is in the business of leasing, he is in a better position to
distribute the cost of maintaining the premises.420 These similarities
between the merchant-consumer transaction and the landlord-
tenant relation have prompted the courts to conclude that there
should be an implied warranty of habitability in the lease of real
property, just as there is an implied warranty of merchantability in
the sale or lease of personal property, and just as there is an implied
warranty of habitability in the sale of real property.421
C. The Scope of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Although there is a clearly identifiable trend toward recogni-
tion of an implied warranty of habitability in leases of real property,
the courts are not in complete accord regarding the scope of the war-
ranty. It is generally agreed that the warranty should be implied
in both long422 and short 423 term leases, regardless of whether they
Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 625, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704, 709 (1974); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); Kline v.
Burns, -N.H. -, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
417. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 625, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704, 709 (1974).
418. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Mease v. Fox, - Iowa -, 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d
65 (Mo. App. 1973).
419. Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 711 (1974).
420. Hicks, supra note 391, at 485-86; Note, Contract Principles and Leases of
Realty, 50 B.U.L. REv. 24, 37 (1970); Comment, Landlord and Tenant-Implied
Warranty of Habitability-Demise of the Traditional Doctrine of Caveat Emptor, 20
DE PAUL L. REV. 955, 980-83 (1971).
421. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-77 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Green v. Superior Ot., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 626, 517 P.2d 1168, 1174, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704, 710 (1974).
422. E.g., Gillette v. Anderson, 4 Ill. App. 3d 838, 282 N.E.2d 149 (1972) (16-
month lease); Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J. Super. 338, 291 A.2d 580 (1972)
(2 -year lease).
423. E.g., King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973) (month-to-month
lease); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973) (one-week lease).
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are written424 or oral.4 25' There is also a consensus that the warranty
imposes a duty on the landlord to put the premises in habitable con-
dition at the inception of the lease and to maintain the premises in
such condition for the duration of the lease. 26 To be actionable,
it is agreed that the defective condition must affect either the ten-
ant's dwelling or the common areas used by the tenant.4 27  There
is no unanamity of opinion, however, regarding the standard to be
applied in determining whether the warranty has been breached.
1. STANDARD OF HABITABILITY
When discussing the standard of habitability, it is useful to dis-
tinguish between those cases which have founded the implied war-
ranty of habitability on the legislative enactment of housing codes
and those which have relied on public policy considerations or prod-
ucts liability analogies.4 21 In those jurisdictions which have based
the warranty on provisions of a housing code, the standard of habit-
ability is set by statute.42 9 Not every violation of a housing code
is a breach of the implied warranty: only "substantial" violations are
actionable.480 However, very little guidance has been offered to the
trier of fact in distinguishing between a "substantial" and "de mini-
mis" violation.4"'
When the implied warranty is based on public policy considera-
tions, the standard of habitability is set by the judiciary and is even
424. E.g., Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass.
1972) (written lease).
425. E.g., Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973) (oral lease).
Several courts have explicitly stated that the warranty is implied in both written and
oral leases. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 n.29 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972).
426. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 637, 517 P.2d 1168, 1182, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 718 (1974); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972); Boston
Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1972); Kline v.
Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130,
144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970).
427. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.62 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
428. See text accompanying notes 418-21 supra. Throughout the remainder of
this article, the cases relying on public policy considerations or products liability
analogies will be referred to as "cases relying on public policy considerations."
429. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972); King
v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo. App. 1973); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65
Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1971).
430. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.63 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972).
431. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 372, 280 N.E.2d 208, 221-22
(1972) (dissenting opinion). For example of the difference between "substantial"
and "de minimis" violations, see note 436 infra.
1975:19
HeinOnline  -- 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 101 1975
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
more nebulous.43 2 A typical warranty is that the premises are
"habitable and fit for living."4 3  Once again, only "substantial" or
"material" breaches are actionable.4"4 The following factors have
been identified as being relevant to a determination of the issue of
materiality: (1) the nature and seriousness of the deficiency or de-
fect; (2) the effect of the defect on the habitability, safety, or sanita-
tion of the premises; (3) the length of time for which the defect
has been in existence; (4) the age of the structure; and (5) the
amount of the rent.43 5 Some courts have summarized the above cri-
teria by stating that the judicial standard of habitability does not re-
quire the landlord to ensure that the premises are in perfect or aes-
thetically pleasing condition, but it does require that "bare living
requirements" must be maintained.486
The legislative standard of habitability has the advantage of
greater certainty, but lacks the flexibility of the judicial standard.
For example, under the legislative standard, if a detailed housing
code does not proscribe an allegedly defective condition, that con-
dition is not actionable. There are no such arbitrary restrictions on
the definition of what is "uninhabitable" under the judicial stand-
ard.43 7 On the other hand, if the code simply requires the landlord
to keep the premises "in good repair," there is little difference be-
tween the specificity of the two standards. 4 8  If more jurisdictions
were to enact comprehensive, statewide housing legislation, 4 9 the
legislative standard would be the more uniform, but at the moment
432. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Lund v. MacArthur,
51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d
248, 252 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970).
433. E.g., Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971).
434. Id.
435. Id.; Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973). Accord,
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796-97 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Authority v.
Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843-44 (Mass. 1972).
436. In Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 482-83, 268 A.2d
556, 559 (1970), the court illustrates the distinction between "bare living require-
ments" and "amenities":
[]n a modern society one cannot be expected to live in a multi-storied apart-
ment building without heat, hot water, garbage disposal or elevator service.
Failure to supply such things is a breach of the implied covenant of habita-
bility. Malfunction of venetian blinds, water leaks, wall cracks, lack of
painting, at least of the magnitude presented here, go to what may be called
"amenities." Living with lack of painting, water leaks and defective venetian
blinds may be unpleasant, aesthetically unsatisfying, but does not come within
the category of uninhabitability.
Accord, Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, -, 517 P.2d 1168, 1182, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 718 (1974); Steinberg v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d'32, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973).
437. See Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 844 n.16,
851-52 (Mass. 1972) (majority and dissenting opinions).
438. See section I.D.1. and note 257 supra.
439. See Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 711 (1974).
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most housing codes are municipal ordinances.440 This means that
the legislative standard varies with the language of the local ordi-
nance. Moreover, no protection is offered to tenants who live in
communities that have not enacted, a housing code. On balance,
then, the judicial standard would appear to offer the greatest protec-
tion to the tenant, even though it is the less certain.
2. TYPE OF LEASE
Just as there is a split of authority regarding the standard of
habitability, so there is a division of opinion as to whether the im-
plied warranty should be restricted to residential leases or extended
to commercial leases.44' If the warranty is founded on the legisla-
tive enactment of a housing code,442 it will be restricted to leases
of residential premises.443 Depending upon the scope of the hous-
ing code, the warranty will be confined to multiple dwellings44 4 or
will extend to all residential dwellings." 5 If, on the other hand, the
warranty is based on public policy considerations, it should cover all
residential leases 446 and it might well extend to commercial leases.
Indeed, the products liability analogy invites such an extension. 47
There are very few cases, however, which have recognized an im-
plied warranty in commercial leases. 448  The principal support for
this extension of the implied warranty comes from the Restatement
(Second) of Property, which has recognized an implied warranty of
fitness or suitability in all leases, with a restriction on the range of
remedies available to the commercial tenant. 49 Should the courts
follow the Restatement's lead, it can be anticipated that the legal
principles governing the implied warranty in commercial leases will
be somewhat different from those developed for residential leases.
440. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
441. Comment, Tenant Protection in lowa-Mease v. Fox and the Implied War-
ranty of Habitability, 58 IowA L. REV. 656, 676 (1973); Note, Commercial versus
Residential Leases: A New Double Standard? 35 U. PIrr. L. REV. 901 (1974).
442. See cases cited in note 429 supra.
443. E.g., Interstate Restaurants, Inc. v. Halsa Corp., 309 A.2d 108 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1973).
444. E.g., Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 II. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217
(1972); Graham v. Wisenberg, 39 App. Div. 2d 334, 334 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1972).
445. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
446. E.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 431-32, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970).
447. See text accompanying notes 418-21 supra.
448. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Earl Milli-
ken, Inc. v. Allen, 21 Wis. 2d 497, 124 N.W.2d 651 (1963). Contra, Interstate Res-
taurants, Inc. v. Halsa Corp., 309 A.2d 108 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973); Kruvant v. Sun-
rise Market, Inc., 112 N.J. Super. 509, 271 A.2d 741 (1970).
449. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1 & Comment b & Reporter's
Note 2 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
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For example, the standard of tenantability will necessarily be a ju-
dicial (not a legislative) standard, and the courts will probably be
more willing to permit a commercial tenant to waive or modify the
terms of the implied warranty, particularly when the parties to the
lease are in an equal bargaining position.450 The courts will also
have to find a label to describe the warranty. They could retain
the term "implied warranty of habitability" for residential leases and
adopt a new term to describe the warranty implied in commercial
leases. In the alternative, they could follow the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Property and adopt a single label-implied warranty of ten-
antability, suitability, or fitness-which would be broad enough to
cover the warranty implied in both types of leases. 451
3. NOTICE REQUIREMENT
As a general rule, the landlord must have notice of the al-
legedly defective condition and a reasonable time in which to correct
it before the tenant can successfully assert a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability.452 Neither the nature nor the rationale of
the notice requirement has been fully articulated by the courts, al-
though the Restatement (Second) of Property has attempted to fill
the gaps in the reported decisions.45'3 With respect to defects pres-
ent at the time of the lease, the notice requirement is waived if the
landlord knew or should have known of the defective condition, but
if a reasonable inspection would not have disclosed the defect, notice
is required.454 As for defects arising after the transfer of possession,
notice is a prerequisite unless the landlord had actual knowledge
of the defect.455 In either case, if public authorities have notified
the landlord of a housing code violation or if another tenant has in-
formed the landlord of a defective condition, the tenant has no duty
450. Id. at § 5.1, Comment b & Reporter's Note 2.
451. Id. at § 5.1.
452. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1972);
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Boston Housing Authority v. Hem-
ingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 844 (Mass. 1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 76
(Mo. App. 1973); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 146, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970).
453. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1, Comment e; § 5.2, Comment
h; § 5.3, Comment g; § 5.4, Comment g (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
454. E.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF PROPERTY § 5.1, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
455. E.g., Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 483-84, 268 A.2d
556, 560 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.4, Comment g (tent.
draft No. 1, 1973). Although the issue has not been addressed by either the Restate-
ment or the courts, it would seem that the notice requirement ought to be waived
when a landlord "should have known" of a defect in an area under his control, such
as an area reserved for the tenants' common use. See notes 603-05 infra and accom-
panying text.
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to give a second warning.456 And if the tenant makes reasonable,
but unsuccessful, attempts to contact the landlord, the notice require-
ment is satisfied.457
The notice requirement reflects an unwillingness to hold the
landlord strictly liable. Although the courts have not expressly
stated that the tenant must prove "fault" in order to establish a
breach of the implied warranty, the Restatement clearly indicates
that a landlord cannot be held liable for a defect of which he neither
knew nor should have known. 5 With respect to defects present
at the time of the transfer of possession, this requirement of proof
of fault distinguishes the implied warranty of habitability from its
commercial analogue, the implied warranty of merchantability. 49
No reasons have been given for granting the landlord greater protec-
tion against the imposition of liability than the merchant, and in fact
one court has suggested that the landlord should be held strictly
liable for any defects in existence at the beginning of the lease.46 °
With regard to defects arising after the transfer of possession, it is
this author's hypothesis that the notice requirement reflects the con-
tinuing vitality of the notion that a lease is a conveyance of property.
As a result, the landlord can be held liable only for defects of which
he had actual knowledge, and this knowledge must of necessity be
obtained either from the tenant or from some other party with access
to the tenant's premises. 46' Once the tenant takes possession, the
landlord is deemed to have no right of entry, and therefore no duty
to inspect. Given the assumption that a lease is a conveyance of
property, the notice requirement makes sense. But the implied war-
ranty of habitability is premised on the assumption that a lease is a
contract. If a lease is a contract containing an implied duty to re-
pair, then it would seem that the courts could also infer the concomi-
tant right to enter for purposes of making periodic inspections.462
Their failure to do so suggests that they wish to preserve the tenant's
exclusive right to possession, a right which dates back to the period
456. E.g., Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 844 & n.17
(Mass. 1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.4, Comment g (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1973).
457. E.g., Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 146, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970).
458. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1, Comment e (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1973).
459. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316.
460. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 844 n.18 (Mass.
1972).
461. See notes 455-56 supra and accompanying text.
462. See Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting opinion). Eliminating the notice requirement would not'necessitate the
imposition of strict liability. The courts could require the tenant to prove that the
defect would have been detected by a reasonable inspection in order to establish a
breach of the implied warranty.
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when a lease was first characterized as a conveyance of property. 4683
D. Defenses to the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Assuming that the notice requirement has been satisfied, there
are two defenses that the landlord can assert in an action for breach
of the implied warranty of habitability. First of all, the tenant is
barred from relief if the defect resulted from the tenant's unusual,
abnormal, or malicious use of the premises.46 4  Secondly, the tenant
cannot successfully assert a breach of the implied warranty of habit-
ability if the warranty has been waived or disclaimed. The first de-
fense requires no discussion. The second has produced a division
of opinion which once again can best be analyzed by distinguishing
those jurisdictions that base the implied warranty of habitability upon
the enactment of housing codes from those that premise it upon judi-
cial public policy considerations. When the warranty is based upon
the provisions of a housing code, the courts have not permitted the
tenant to waive or disclaim it.465  This is consistent with general
principles of both tort, and contract law.466
On the other hand, when the warranty is premised on judicial
notions of public policy, the courts have normally held that the war-
ranty may be waived or disclaimed.46 ' This means that a tenant who
takes possession of leased premises with obvious defects468 or con-
.tinues to remain in possession of the premises after discovering and
giving the landlord an opportunity to repair latent defects469 has
waived the right to claim that such defects breach the implied war-
ranty of habitability. To mitigate the potential harshness of this
rule, the courts have held that there is no waiver if the landlord has
promised to make repairs,470 if the tenant's mobility is restricted by
a housing shortage,4 7 1 or if the defect constitutes a violation of a
housing code. 472  A tenant may also avoid a disclaimer of the implied
463. See section I.A.3. supra.
464. E.g., Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971); Berzito
v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 470, 306 A.2d 17, 22 (1973).
465. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
466. See text accompanying notes 338-39 supra.
467. E.g., Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Burns, 111
N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971).'
468. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1, Comment d; § 5.3, Comments
b, c, d (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
469. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.3, Comment e; § 5.4, Comment
e (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
470. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.3, Comment d (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1973).
471. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 466, 308 A.2d 17, 19 (1973).
472. E.g., Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass.
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warranty of habitability if the disclaimer is unconscionable 473 or
drawn so broadly as to cover housing code violations.4 74  Recently
it has been suggested that a distinction should be drawn between
residential and commercial leases, so that any disclaimer of the im-
plied warranty of habitability by a residential tenant could be pro-
hibited, while a disclaimer by a commercial tenant could be en-
forced, provided it were freely and fairly negotiated.47 5
The preceding discussion of the scope of the implied warranty
of habitability has assumed that the courts base the warranty either
on the provisions of a housing code or on public policy considera-
tions. In some of the more recent decisions, the courts have at-
tempted to combine the strengths of the above two lines of cases
by adopting an implied warranty of habitability based on public
policy considerations, and then holding that the housing code either
sets a minimum standard of habitability or is a factor in determining
whether there has been a breach of the warranty. 7 6 Under these
more recent decisions, the standard for determining whether the
warranty has been breached has the certainty and precision of the
legislative standard, while preserving the flexibility of the judicial
standard. The warranty need not be confined to those types of resi-
dential premises covered by the housing code. It can be expanded
to cover all types of residential leases as well as commercial leases.
The waiver or disclaimer of such a warranty can be prohibited inso-
far as the alleged defect constitutes a violation of a housing code,
but can be enforced in all other circumstances unless unconscion-
able. It can be anticipated that these decisions will have a signifi-
cant influence in shaping the future scope of the implied warranty
1972); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, -, 515 P.2d 160, 164-65 (1973); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.3, Comment c (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
473. E.g., Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 625, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173-74
n.9, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709-10 n.9 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 5.5 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). For a more precise definition of an "unconscion-
able" agreement, see UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 1-311 (Tent. Draft No.
3, 1974).
474. E.g., Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass.
1972).
475. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 1.403 (a) (1) (b). See
notes 343-44 supra and accompanying text. This distinction has been made in Ger-
many. See note 388 supra.
476. Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 637-38, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 719 (1974); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972); Bos-
ton Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 844 n.16 (Mass. 1972);
Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 462 n.2, 196 N.W.2d 850, 852 n.2 (1972); Fritz
v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 56 n.2, 213 N.W.2d 339, 341 n.2 (1973); Berzito v. Gambino,
63 N.J. 460, 470, 308 A.2d 17, 22 (1973); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc.
2d 996, -, 343 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410 (1973); Derr v. Cangeni, 43 U.S.L.W. 2020 (Phil.
Ct. C.P. July 16, 1974); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, -, 515 P.2d 160, 166
(1973).
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of habitability.477
E. Remedies Under the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Those courts which have adopted the implied warranty of habit-
ability have had to confront the question of whether the warranty
is independent of the tenant's covenant to pay rent. There is noth-
ing to preclude a court from adhering to the common law doctrine
of independent covenants. 478  However, the implied warranty of
habitability is based upon the assumption that a lease is a contract
to provide space and services, while the doctrine of independent
covenants is associated with the common law's conception of the
lease as a conveyance of an interest in real estate. Consequently,
if a court were to hold that the implied warranty of habitability and
the tenant's obligatiaon to pay rent were independent covenants, it
would have created a union of two legal doctrines based on funda-
mentally different conceptual assumptions as to the nature of a
lease. 79 It would also have created a right without a realistic rem-
edy, for it is virtually meaningless to tell a tenant that he has a right
to a habitable dwelling, but that he must move out or continue to
make rental payments and sue the landlord for damages in the event
that the premises become uninhabitable. 80 In recognition of the
incompatability of the two doctrines, most courts have held that the
tenant's covenant to pay rent and the landlord's express or implied
covenant to maintain the premises in a habitable condition are mu-
,tually dependent. 48' A few courts have held that the interdepend-
ency of the covenants is a question of fact to be determined by the
intent of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the negotia-
tion of the lease.48 2
At common law, the only remedies available to the tenant were
damages and termination of liability for rent under constructive evic-
tion. 8 Statutes in some jurisdictions augmented these remedies by
477. They have already had a significant impact. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LAND-
LORD AND TENANT AcT §§ 2.104(a), (b); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY
§ 5.1, Comment f (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
478. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 68 (1972). See note 407 supra.
479. Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 841, 843 (Mass.
1972).
480. Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 634-35, 517 P.2d 1168, 1180-81, 111
Cal.'Rptr. 704, 716 (1974); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d
831, 841-42 (Mass. 1972); Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 467-68, 308 A.2d 17,
21 (1973).
481. E.g., Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 635, 517 P.2d 1168, 1181, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 717 (1974); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d
831, 841 (Mass. 1972).
482. E.g., Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 145-46, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970). But
see Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 467-68, 308 A.2d 17, 21 (1973).
483. See section I.C. supra.
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recognizing the tenant's right to repair and deduct oi withhold (or
suspend) rental payments until the premises had been brought into
compliance with the provisions of the housing code.4 4 The modem
characterization of a lease as a contract consisting of mutually de-
pendent covenants has prompted many courts to recognize the ten-
ant's right to assert the full panoply of contract remedies against the
landlord.485 This has had a dramatic impact on the law of landlord-
tenant relations, particularly insofar as it has enabled the tenant to
remain in possession of the premises and still seek the elimination
of uninhabitable conditions. 86
Rescission (or termination) of the lease is the first of the con-
tract remedies that can be asserted for breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability. 48 7  As with the doctrine of constructive evic-
tion, the tenant must vacate the premises in order to utilize this
remedy,4 s8 but it is easier to prove a breach of the implied warranty
of habitability than to establish a "substantial interference with the
tenant's use and enjoyment of the premises. ' 48 9  A second remedy,
compensatory damages, is available regardless of whether the tenant
vacates the premises or remains in possession.490  The tenant is en-
titled to recover the loss in value of the premises as a result of the
landlord's breach of the implied warranty, plus incidental and conse-
quential damages.491 In recognition of the difficulty that the tenant
may have proving the precise amount of the loss under the tradi-
tional rules of valuation, a few courts have authorized the computa-
tion of damages in terms of a percentage of the tenant's rent.49 2
If the tenant decides to remain in possession, he may bring an
action for specific performance of the implied warranty of habit-
484. See section I.D.3. supra.
485. E.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, -, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969);
Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971).
486. Daniels, supra note 127, at 924. To enable tenants to assert their contract
remedies effectively, courts and legislatures in several jurisdictions have prohibited
retaliatory evictions. See note 144 supra.
487. E.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 9.1 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1974).
488. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 9.1 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1974).
489. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
490. E.g., Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass.
1972); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Berzito v. Gambino, 63
N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Blumberg & Robbins, Retroactive Rent Abatement:
A Landmark Tenant Remedy, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 323 (1973).
491. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 9.2 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1974)
(comprehensive discussion of measure of damages). The loss in value may be meas-
ured in various ways, depending upon the circumstances of the case. See Mease v.
Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972).
492. Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 639 n.24, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183 n.2 4 ,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 719 n.24 (1974); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super.
477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343
N.Y.S.2d 406 (1973).
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ability, but this is a remedy that is rarely invoked.498 If he is in
possession of premises that are partially uninhabitable, he may seek
reformation of the lease to cover only the habitable portion of the
premises.49 4 However, perhaps because it is more appropriate to
commercial than to residential leases, this is a remedy that has been
invoked as infrequently as the doctrine of specific performance.
The final contract remedy available to the tenant in possession, a
remedy which has revolutionized the law of landlord-tenant rela-
tions, is rent abatement. 495  It is premised on the mutual depen-
dency of the implied warranty of habitability and the covenant to
pay rent. It permits the tenant to obtain a declaratory judgment re-
ducing the amount of rent due under the lease in direct proportion
to the amount by which the value of the leased premises has been
reduced as a result of the landlord's breach of the implied warranty
of habitability. 4 9 It is more commonly invoked, however, by with-
holding rental payments and asserting the breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability as a defense in the landlord's action to evict or
summarily dispossess the tenant.4 97 In such cases, if the trier of fact
finds that the entire rental obligation has been extinguished by the
landlord's total breach of the warranty, judgment will be entered for
the tenant. On the other hand, if the trier of fact determines that
the tenant's rental obligation has been only partially abated, the ten-
ant will be given an opportunity to pay the amount of rent due and
owing. If the tenant fails to pay this amount, a judgment for pos-
session will be entered in favor of the landlord.498
In addition to the contract remedies described above, some
courts have also recognized the self-help remedy of rent applica-
tion,499 which is virtually identical to the statutory "repair and de-
493. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.61 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (dictum).
494. E.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 436, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969) (dic-
turn); Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Need for Change, 44 DENVER
L.J. 387, 396 (1967).
495. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 10.1 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1974).
496. E.g., Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 10.1, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1974).497. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
498. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
A judge can utilize procedural safeguards, such as a requirement that the tenant pay
withheld rent into court or into an escrow account during the pendency of a summary
dispossess proceeding, in order to protect a landlord against spurious claims and the
hardship inherent in any significant delay. Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616,
636-37, 517 P.2d 1168, 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 718 (1974); Fritz v. Warthen, 298
Minn. 54, 60-61, 213 N.W.2d 339, 343 (1973).
499. E.g., Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 10.2 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1974); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1369
(1971).
HeinOnline  -- 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 110 1975
Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises
duct" remedy. 00 If the tenant requests the landlord to make re-
pairs, and the landlord fails to act within a reasonable period of time,
the tenant may make the repairs and deduct the reasonable costs
incurred from the rent. This remedy has the advantage of assuring
that the premises are restored to a habitable condition, but it is ef-
fective only for making minor repairs, as the value of the repairs
cannot exceed the amount of rent due under the lease.50 1
F. Summary
The trend toward characterization of a lease as a contract con-
taining an implied warranty of habitability which is mutually depend-
ent with the covenant to pay rent has had a profound impact on the
law of landlord-tenant relations. The landlord, no longer able to in-
voke caveat lessee, is now subject to a duty to maintain the premises
in good repair. In many jurisdictions, this duty arises even in the
absence of a housing code. If the landlord fails to fulfill his duty,
the tenant has available not only the civil sanctions designed to
coerce compliance with the housing code, but the full panoply of
contract remedies for breach of the implied warranty, including res-
cission, damages, and rent abatement. One might well ask whether
the law of landlord-tenant is now weighted too heavily in favor of
the tenant. Indeed, some commentators have criticized the develop-
ment of the implied warranty of habitability on the grounds that it
will cause landlords to raise rents or abandon rental properties,
thereby aggravating the shortage of low-income housing. 02 Empiri-
cal studies have demonstrated that their fears are not altogether un-
founded.503 Nevertheless, there has been a steady increase in the
500. See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
501. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 10.2, Comment c (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1974).
502. Donahue, Change in the American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37 MOD.
L. REV. 242, 260-62 (1974); Note, Landlord v. Tenant: An Appraisal of the Habit-
ability and Repair Problem, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 739, 774-77 (1971); Comment,
Rent Mitigation for Housing Code Violations, 56 IOWA L. REv. 460, 470 (1970).
503. E.g., G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT (1973); G.
STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD (1966). The literature analyzing the eco-
nomic impact of imposing a duty to repair on landlords has focused on the effect of
fully enforcing housing codes. It has generally been predicted that full enforcement
would lead to the abandonment of buildings which could not be brought into compli-
ance and increased rents for those that could. Bross, Law Reform Man Meets the
Slumlord: Interactions of New Remedies and Old Buildings in Housing Code En-
forcement, 3 URBAN LAWYER 609 (1971); Burke, Redrafting Municipal Housing
Codes, 48 J. URBAN L. 933, 935-36 (1971); Grigsby, Economic Aspects of Housing
Code Enforcement, 3 URBAN LAWYER 533 (1971); Hartman, Kessler & LeGates, Mu-
nicipal Housing Code Enforcement and Low-Income Tenants, A.I.P.J. 90, 91-95
(1974). But see Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the
Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80
YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman
1975:19
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number of jurisdictions adopting the implied warranty, 50 4 making it
realistic to predict that it will soon become the majority rule. This
suggests that the courts are willing to risk a certain amount of eco-
nomic dislocation in an effort to -attain the ultimate objective of a
habitable dwelling for every tenant. 05
IV. LANDLORD'S LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE
PREMISES: NEGLIGENCE
A landlord's immunity from tort liability at common law was
premised on the characterization of a lease as a conveyance of prop-
erty and the related doctrine of caveat emptor.506 Although recent
developments in the law of landlord-tenant relations have seriously
undermined these basic principles '50 7 to date only one court that has
characterized a lease as a contract containing an implied warranty
of habitability has subsequently abrogated the landlord's common
law immunity from tort liability.50 8  In Sargent v. Ross,50 9 a four-
Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement'and the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 1175 (1973);
Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and Redistribution Policy: A Reply to Professor
Komesar, 82 YALE L.J. 1194 (1973). For a comprehensive examination of the prob-
lem of abandoned housing stock, see Nachbauer, Empty Houses: Abandoned Resi-
dential Dwellings in the Inner City, 17 How. L.J. 2 (1972); Note, Building Aban-
donment in New York City, 16 N.Y.L.F. 798 (1970). Tenant condominiums and
urban homesteading are among the more creative suggestions for restoring abandoned
buildings. Schreiberg, Abandoned Buildings: Tenant Condominiums and Com-
munity Redevelopment, 2 URBAN LAWYER 186 (1970); Comment, From Plows to Pli-
ers-Urban Homesteading in America, 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 273 (1974).
The courts have not been insensitive to the potential economic impact of en-
forcing the implied warranty of habitability. See Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J.
Super. 338, 343, 291 A.2d 580, 583 (1972).
504. See cases cited in note 407 supra.
505. It will take more than the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability
to improve the nation's rental properties. A combination of several factors will be
required, including new and more flexible housing codes, more effective public and
private enforcement of the codes, and adequate public and private financing. GRAD,
supra note 107, at 149-53: Inner-City Housing and Private Enterprise (F. Case ed.
1972); R. MUTH, CInES AND HOUSING 115-35, 307-35 (1969); BUILDING THE AMERI-
CAN CITY, supra note 109, at 295-307; Burke, Redrafting Municipal Housing Codes,
48 J. URBAN L. 933 (1971); Hartman, Kessler & LeGates, Municipal Housing Code
Enforcement and Low-Income Tenants, A.I.P.J. 90, 91, 95-100 (1974); Indritz, supra
note 132, at 115-26; Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HA v. L.
REV. 801, 849-60 (1965).
506. See section II. supra.
507. See section III. supra.
508. Sargent v. Ross, 13 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). At least one other
court that has recognized the implied warranty of habitability has indicated a willing-
ness to reevaluate the common law immunity. DiMarzo v. S. & P. Realty Corp.,
366 N.E.2d 432, 434 (Mass. 1974). And the adoption of the implied warranty of
habitability was cited as a factor influencing the court's decision to impose tort liabil-
ity on a landlord in another jurisdiction. Clark v. O'Conner, 435 F.2d 104, 112
(D.C. Cir. 1970). But see Williams v. Auerbach, 285 A.2d 701, 703 (D.C. App.
1972). Finally, in Presson v. Mountain States Properties, Inc., 18 Ariz. App. 176,
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year-old child fell to her death over the side of an outdoor stairway
while under the care of her baby-sitter, a tenant in a second-story
apartment. There was no apparent cause for the fall except for evi-
dence that the stairs were dangerously steep and the railing was in-
sufficient to prevent the fall. 510  The child's mother brought a
wrongful death action against the landlord for negligent construction
and maintenance of the stairway, and the jury returned a verdict for
the mother.51" ' The defendant appealed on the grounds that she
owed no duty of care to the deceased child because the case did
not come within any of the exceptions to the general rule of landlord
immunity."1 2 The plaintiff contended that the landlord was subject
to liability on two alternative theories: that the stairway was an area
of "common use" over which the landlord retained control,5"3 and
that the case fell within the "negligent repairs" exception. 51 4  The
New Hampshire court realized that it could either "strain the con-
trol test to the limits and find control in the landlord ' 515 or "broaden
the [negligent repairs] exception to include the negligent construc-
tion of improvements to the premises." 516  It chose instead to re-
178, 501 P.2d 17, 19 (1972), the court noted the decisions from other jurisdictions
adopting the implied warranty of habitability and held: "In residential short-term
lease situations, we believe the duty of due care is owed to a tenant throughout the
lease period to maintain premises free from 'unreasonably dangerous' instrumentali-
ties that could potentially cause injury." This decision does not impose a duty of
reasonable care on all landlords; it is limited to circumstances reminiscent of the im-
plied warranty of habitability in short-term leases of furnished dwellings. See section
II.B.3. supra.
509. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). Several student notes have discussed
this landmark decision. 59 CORNELL L. REV. 1161 (1974); 7 CREIOHTON L. REV.
694 (1974); 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 647 (1974); 1974 DUKE L.J. 175; 35 OHIO ST.
L.J. 212 (1974); 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1305 (1974); 5 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 887
(1974); 43 U. CINN. L. REV. 218 (1974).
510. 113 N.H. at -, 308 A.2d at 529-30. The defendant lived in a ground-floor
apartment in the building and had added the outside stairway approximately eight
years prior to the accident. Id.
511. Id. The mother also brought suit against the tenant for negligent supervi-
sion, but the jury returned a verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff chose not
to appeal. Id.
512. Id. at-, 308 A.2d at 530.
513. See section II.B.6. supra.
514. See section II.B.5. supra.
515. 113 N.H. at -, 308 A.2d at 532. The court cited Gibson v. Hoppman, 108
Conn. 401, 143 A. 635 (1928), in which the plaintiff, the adult daughter of the de-
fendant's tenants, fell while descending an interior stairway that served only her par-,
ents' apartment. The court held that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of rea-
sonable care because "the stairway formed no part of the tenement rented to the
plaintiff's parents, but was retained by the defendant landlords within their exclusive
control." Gibson v. Hoppman, 108 Conn. 401, 407, 143 A. 635, 637 (1928).
516. 113 N.H. at -, 308 A.2d at 533. The court's sole authority for broadening
the negligent repairs exception to cover the landlord's construction of the outdoor
stairway was a passage from Bohlen, Landlord and Tenant, 35 HARV. L. REV. 633,
648 (1922), in which the author suggested that no distinction should be made be-
tween "repairs" and "alterations" made during the term of the lease.
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verse the general rule of nonliability. 17 It noted that by recognizing
the implied warranty of habitability in an earlier case,"" s it had re-
moved caveat emptor from landlord-tenant law, and that in so doing,
it had "discarded the very legal foundation and justification for the
landlord's immunity in tort. .. ."' The court brought "the other
half of landlord-tenant law" up to date by imposing on landlords a
duty to "exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an unrea-
sonable risk of harm. '5 2 0  It is this author's thesis that other jurisdic-
tions should follow New Hampshire's lead. The policy considera-
tions and legal precedents that support the imposition of a duty of
reasonable care will be discussed in this section, followed by an anal-
ysis of the issues that would arise in the litigation of a negligence
action against a landlord.
A. The Case for Negligence Liability
Any jurisdiction that has adopted the implied warranty of habit-
ability has necessarily recognized that a lease is a contract (not a
conveyance of real property) and has imposed a duty on the landlord
to maintain the premises in good repair throughout the term of the
lease. " " In such jurisdictions, the modern law of landlord-tenant
relations stands in direct conflict with the landlord's common law im-
munity from tort liability.522 A tenant can withhold rent for the
landlord's failure to repair the premises, yet cannot recover for per-
sonal injuries or property damage sustained as a result of the land-
lord's failure to make those same repairs unless one of the seven
common law exceptions to the general rule of nonliability523 happens
to apply. For example, if the tenant discovers that her bathroom
floor has begun to weaken as a result of dry rot and notifies the land-
lord of this defective condition, she may withhold rental payments
in the event that the landlord fails to make the requested repairs.5 24
However, if she falls through the weakened floorboards, 2 5 she will
have no right to recover against the landlord for her personal injuries
unless the dangerous condition constitutes a violation of a housing
517. 113 N.H. at -, 308 A.2d at 533.
518. Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
519. 113 N.H. at-, 308 A.2d at 534.
520. Id. at -, 308 A.2d at 534.
521. See section III. supra.
522. See section II.A. supra.
523. See section II.B. supra.
524. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972) (plaintiff
obtained a declaratory judgment authorizing rent withholding for breach of the im-
plied warranty of habitability under the facts stated in the text).
525. In Hinson v. Delis, the plaintiff sustained personal injuries in the manner
described in the text, but did not seek to recover compensatory damages.
HeinOnline  -- 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 114 1975
Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises
code and the jurisdiction imposes tort liability for the violation of a
criminal statute. 62
If a jurisdicton has based its adoption of the implied warranty
of habitability on legislative enactment of a housing code, 527 it should
at least permit recovery for personal injuries or property damage on
the theory that the violation of a housing code provision is negligence
per se or evidence of negligence.52 Any prior refusal to impose
tort liability under this theory5 29 should be reconsidered. The clas-
sic argument that it would be contrary to legislative intent to construe
a penal statute as creating a new civil cause of action580 would no
longer be persuasive because the implied warranty of habitability
creates precisely such a cause of action for a tenant who has sus-
tained economic loss as the result of a landlord's violation of a hous-
ing code. Although it might well be desirable as a matter of policy,
judicial consistency would not require the imposition of a broader
duty of reasonable care on the landlord, for the landlord's duty to
repair under the implied warranty of habitability would be limited
to the requirements prescribed by the housing code. 51 In those
jurisdictions that have based the implied warranty of habitability on
public policy considerations, 5 2 imposing tort liability for a landlord's
violation of a housing code will not suffice to bring the law of torts
up to date because a landlord's duty to repair under the warranty
is not prescribed by the provisions of the code. Instead, it will be
necessary to impose a duty of reasonable care, as the court did in
Sargent v. Ross.5 "
526. See section II.B.7. supra.
527. See notes 429-31 supra and accompanying text.
528. See section II.B.7. supra.
529. See notes 264-66 supra and accompanying text.
530. See cases cited note 264 supra.
531. See cases cited notes 265-66 supra.
532. See notes 432-36 supra and accompanying text.
533. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). It would also be possible to develop
a "contract theory" of liability by permitting recovery of "consequential damages"
for personal injury or property damage arising out of a landlord's breach of the im-
plied warranty of habitability. E.g., Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment
Corp., 439 F.2d 447, 481-82, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (tenant permitted to recover for
personal injuries sustained as result of criminal assault in common hallway of resi-
dential apartment building on both tort and contract theories). However, since the
implied warranty of habitability can be breached only by the commission of a negli-
gent act (see notes 458-63 supra and accompanying text), and since a court might
recognize one or more of the contract limitations on liability (i.e., privity, notice,
and disclaimer), there would be no advantage to imposing liability on a contract the-
ory. Note, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 1161, 1167-69 n.43 (1974); Note, 2 FORDHAM UR-
BAN L.J. 647, 654-56, 659-60 (1974); see Note, 35 Omo ST. L.J. 212, 219-22 (1974).
For a description of the contract limitations on liability, see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §§ 2-318 (Alternative A) (privity); 2-607(3)(a) (notice); 2-719(3) (dis-
claimer). The contract theory of recovery is discussed and compared with the tort
theory in several student comments. Comment, Landlord's Liability for Criminal
1975:19
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1. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The policy considerations that dictated the adoption of the im-
plied warranty of habitability in the first place also dictate the
imposition of a duty to use reasonable care.5 84 There is nothing un-
just about holding a landlord to a duty of reasonable care, for liability
will be based on proof of fault, and it is the landlord who has the
"greater opportunity, incentive and capacity to inspect and maintain
the condition of the building." 585  The deterrent effect of the im-
plied warranty of habitability will be enhanced if the penalty for a
landlord's failure to maintain the premises in good repair is liability
not only for the tenant's economic loss, but for consequent personal
injury and property damage as well. The compensatory function
of tort law will be advanced by holding a landlord liable for a failure
to exercise due care, and landlords as a class will typically be in a
position to distribute the risk of loss by purchasing liability insurance
(or acting as self-insurers) with funds derived from tenants' rental
payments. It might be argued that imposing negligence liability on
landlords will result in increased rents or the abandonment of rental
properties, thereby reducing the amount of housing available to low-
income tenants.588 However, this is a risk inherent in the adoption
of the implied warranty of habitability, 8 7 and it would not be appre-
ciably increased by recognizing tort liability for a failure to use rea-
sonable care. In the first place, a landlord's immunity from tort lia-
bility is currently riddled with so many exceptions that most land-
lords already carry some form of liability insurance.58 8 Imposing a
Acts Committed Against his Tenants, 7 CAL. W.L. REV. 197 (1970); Comment, The
Landlord's Emerging Responsibility for Tenant Security, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 275
(1971); Note, Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from Criminal Acts of Third Par-
ties: The View from 1500 Massachusetts Ave., 59 GEo. L. REV. 1153 (1971); Com-
ment, Landlord-Tenant Law: Landlord Held Negligent for Criminal Assault by
Third Party Intruder on Tenant, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (1971); Comment, Landlord
has Duty to Take Reasonable Precautions to Protect his Tenants Against the Crimi-
nal Acts of Third Parties, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 943 (1970).
534. See text accompanying notes 409-21 supra.
535. See cases cited in note 417 supra.
536. Note, 1974 DUKE L.J. 175, 192; Note, 35 Omo ST. L.J. 228 (1974); Note,
5 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 887, 890 (1974).
537. See notes 502-05 supra and accompanying text.
538. There are three types of insurance policies which a landlord may purchase.
Owners', landlords', and tenants' liability insurance coverage offers protection against
liability for "bodily injury or property damage . . . caused by an occurrence, and aris-
ing out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the insured premises and all opera-
tions necessary or incidental thereto ....... OWNERS', LANDLORDS' AND TENANTS'
LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE PART, THnE HARTFORD INSURANCE GROUP, HARTFORD,
CONNECTICUT. Special multi-peril insurance coverage is a "package policy" consist-
ing of owners', landlords', and tenants' liability insurance, fire insurance, and fringe
coverage to protect against other types of specified perils. Comprehensive general
liability insurance obligates the insurer to "pay on behalf of the insured all sums
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duty of reasonable care would merely increase the premiums
slightly. 539  Secondly, if the courts do not impose a duty of reason-
able care, it can be anticipated that the adoption of the implied war-
ranty of habitability will cause such an expansion of the exceptions
to the general rule of nonliability540 that landlords seeking full pro-
tection will want to insure against the commission of virtually all
negligent acts anyway. As a matter of policy, then, a jurisdiction
that has adopted the implied warranty of habitability ought to hold
a landlord to a standard of reasonable care.
2. LEGAL PRECEDENT
The establishment of liability for a landlord's negligence is also
supported by legal precedent. Abolishing a landlord's immunity
from tort liability would be consistent with the trend toward abroga-
tion of the immunities enjoyed by other classes of defendants, such
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damage because of (a)
bodily injury or (b) property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an
occurrence . . . " and is thus not limited to damage arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of real property. COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE COVERAGE PART, THE HARTFORD INSURANCE GROUP, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT.
Because none of the above types of insurance is 'sold exclusively to landlords,
it is impossible to ascertain the total number of landlords who presently carry liabil-
ity insurance. However, in 1971 (the latest policy year for which statistics are avail-
able), landlords of apartments, tenements, and boarding or rooming houses (as op-
posed to commercial premises) purchased owners', landlords', and tenants' liability
insurance to cover 1,768,170,698 square feet of property.
This footnote is based on conversations and correspondence with Mr. Graham
Boyd and Mr. Arthur Curley of the Insurance Services Office, 160 Water Street, New
York, N.Y. 10038.
539. It is impossible to predict with precision the impact which the imposition of
a duty of reasonable care will have on liability insurance premiums for landlords.
Premium rates are normally based on actual loss experience, and there is roughly a
three-year time lag in collecting and reporting actual loss data. Thus the 1974 rates
(the most recent rates) for owners', landlords', and tenants' liability insurance cover-
age are based on the losses sustained as a result of accidents occurring during the
1971 policy year. For a random sample of 1974 rates, see note 662 infra. Since
New Hampshire had not imposed a duty of reasonable care on landlords as of 1971,
its 1974 rates do not reflect the impact of Sargent v. Ross, 13 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d
528 (1973). Although it would have been possible to estimate the impact of Sargent
v. Ross in establishing New Hampshire's 1974 rates, such action was not taken, sug-
gesting that only a slight increase in premiums is anticipated as a result of the judi-
cial decision. Even when the actual loss data for the 1973 and 1974 policy years
is accumulated in New Hampshire, it will be impossible to determine the impact of
Sargent v. Ross, because there are many factors which influence the number of claims
filed and the amount paid out on settled or adjudicated claims in any given policy
year, including the natural variation in frequency of occurrence, a pattern of larger
jury awards, inflation or recession, and claims consciousness. This footnote is based
on conversations and correspondence with Mr. Graham Boyd and Mr. Arthur Curley
of the Insurance Services Office, 160 Water Street, New York, N.Y., 10038.
540. E.g., Clarke v. O'Connor, 435 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (expansion of
"common area" exception). See Chrysler Corp. v. M. Present Co., Inc., 491 F.2d
320 (1974) (expansion of "public purpose" exception).
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as governmental entities, 1' charitable organizations,542 family mem-
bers548 and landowners or occupiers. 5" imilarly, it would be con-
sistent with those products liability decisions imposing a duty of rea-
sonable care on manufacturers 45 and distributors 540 of new products,
vendors of used products, 547 repairers548 and lessors549 of personal
property, and building contractors 5 0 or builder-vendors 551 of real
property.
As a matter of fact, these two lines of cases removing some of
the more arbitrary, historical limitations on tort liability may become
directly applicable to a landlord once a jurisdiction has adopted the
implied warranty of habitability. If a lease is a contract, rather than
a conveyance of real property, there is no reason to accord a landlord
a vendor's immunity from tort liability.5 52  Unlike the vendor, who
has permanently parted with possession of his property, the landlord
has a continuing contractual duty to maintain the leased premises in
habitable condition which gives him a sufficient reversionary interest
541. E.g., Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).
See cases cited in W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 131, at 984-86.
542. E.g., President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 U.S. App.
D.C. 123, 130 F.2d 810 (1942). See cases cited in W. PROSSER, supra note 146,
at § 133.
543. E.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). See cases
cited in W. PROSSER, supra note 146, at § 122.
544. E.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968). See cases cited note 552 infra and in W. PROSSER, supra note 146, at §
62.
545. E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965). See cases cited in 1 L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.03 [1] (1973); 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 146, at § 28.3-.14; W. PROSSER, supra note 146, at § 96.
546. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 401-02 (1965). See cases cited
in 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 18.01-.03 [2] (1974); 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, at § 28.29.
547. E.g., Gaidry Motors v. Brannon, 268 S.W.2d 627 (Ky. 1954); Pokrajac v.
Wade Motors, 266 Wis. 398, 63 N.W.2d 720 (1954) (disclaimer barred recovery).
See cases cited in 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18.03 [3]
(1974).
548. E.g., Sutton v. Chevron Oil Co., 85 N.M. 679, 515 P.2d 1283 (1973). See
cases cited in 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.03 [3] (1973).
549. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 408 (1965). See cases cited in
1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.03 [4] (1973).
550. E.g., Hanna v. Fletcher, 231 F.2d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 989 (1956). See cases cited in 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY § 5.03 [2] (1973); Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 865 (1958); Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d
191 (1950).
551. E.g., Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958). See
cases cited in 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.03 [5] [b]
(1973); Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383, § 3 (1969).
552. E.g., Anderson v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 54 Ill. 2d 504, 301
N.E.2d 296 (1973); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 372-73 (1965). See cases
cited in 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.03 [5] [a] (1973);
Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1027, § 3 (1973). Contra, Philadelphia v. Page, 363 F. Supp.
148 (E.D. Pa. 1973), 373 F. Supp. 453 (s.D. Pg. 1974) (vendor-recon itioner).
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in the property to support an analogy between the landlord and a
landowner.55 3  Consequently, if a jurisdiction has abrogated the tort
immunity of landowners and occupiers, imposing a broad duty of rea-
sonable care, 54 it can be argued that this duty should be extended
to landlords.
The above argument has been advanced successfully in Califor-
nia, where the immunity of landowners and occupiers was first over-
thrown.55 In Brennan v. Cockrell Inv., Inc., 56 the plaintiff-tenant
was injured when a handrail broke, causing him to fall off the back
stairs of a house he had rented from the defendant-owner. The jury,
instructed that the landlord was immune from liability unless he
553. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357, Comment 3 (1965).
554. California was the first jurisdiction to abrogate the immunity of landowners
and occupiers. Rowland v. Christian,. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97 (1968); accord, Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 496 P.2d 1276,
101 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1972); Martin v. Barclay Dist. Co., 13 Cal. App. 3d 828, 91
Cal. Rptr. 817 (1970); Nevarez v. Thriftimart, 7 Cal. App. 3d 799, 87 Cal. Rptr.
50 (1970); Fitch v. LeBeau, 1 Cal. App. 3d 320, 81 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1969); Beau-
champ v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 20, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1969); Carl-
son v. Ross, 271 Cal. App. 2d 29, 76 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1969).
Several jurisdictions have followed California's lead. Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest.,
Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Mile High
Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Pickard v. City & Cty.
of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Rosenau v. Estherville, 199 N.W.
2d 125 (Iowa 1972); Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority, 308 N.E.2d 467 (Mass.
1974); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973); Peterson v. Balach, 294
Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972); Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 508 (1970); Contra, Wood
v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973); Hessler v. Cole, 7 Il1. App. 3d 902, 289 N.E.2d
204 (1972); Werth v. Ashley Realty Co., 199 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1972); Benedict
v. Podwats, 109 N.J. Super. 402, 263 A.2d 486 (1970), aff'd, Benedict v. Podwats,
57 N.J. 219, 271 A.2d 417 (1970) (per curiam); Buchholz v. Steitz, 463 S.W.2d 451(Tex. Civ. App. 1971). In Terpstra v. Soiltest, 63 Wis. 2d 585, 218 N.W.2d 129(1974), the court refused to consider whether to follow Rowland because the issue
was raised for the first time on appeal. In England, the immunity of landowners
and occupiers has been abolished by statute. The Occupiers' Liability Act 1957, 5
& 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31.
There is a wealth of scholarly literature on this subject. E.g., Hughes, Duties
to Trespassers: A Comparative Survey and Revaluation, 68 YALE L.J. 633 (1959);
Lansing, The Liability of Land Occupiers for Negligence to Persons on the Land,
I WILLAMET-rE L.J. 314 (1960); Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of In-
vitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REV. 182, 359 (1953); Comment, Torts-
Abrogation 'of Common-Law Entrant Classes of Trespasser, Licensee and Invitee,
25 VAND. L. REV. 623 (1972).
555. Brennan v. Cockrell Inv., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr.
122 (1973); accord, Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 183, 496 P.2d
1276, 1284, 101 Cal. Rptr. 908, 913 (1972) (dictum); Minoletti v. Sabini, 27 Cal.
App. 3d 321, 103 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1972); Merzerker v. Texaco Oil Co., 266 Cal. App.
2d 380, 72 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1968). See also Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority, 308
N.E.2d 467 (Mass. 1974) (action by "discovered trespasser" for injuries sustained
when he became trapped in an elevator under the landlord's control). The Califor-
nia cases imposing a duty of reasonable care on the landlord are particularly signifi-
cant because they were decided before the California Supreme Court had adopted the
implied warranty of habitability in Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d
1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
556. 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973).
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failed to warn the tenant of unsafe conditions about which he had
actual knowledge at the time of the lease, returned a verdict for the
defendant. 5 7  The appellate court reversed, holding that the jury
should have been instructed that the landlord owed the tenant a duty
of reasonable care558 under Rowland v. Christian.559 The landlord
contended that his lack of possession and consequent lack of control
exonerated him from the duty of reasonable care, but the appellate
court refused to create an immunity for landlords based on these con-
siderations. Instead, it held that possession and control were merely
factors (albeit significant ones) in determining whether the defend-
ant had breached his duty of reasonable care. 560 The decision thus
acknowledges the relevancy of a tenant's possession and control to
the issue of a landlord's negligence without allowing proof of control
to become a prerequisite to the imposition of liability.
If a jurisdiction which has adopted the implied warranty of
habitability has not yet imposed a duty of reasonable care on land-
owners and occupiers,5 ' the products liability cases descending from
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.582 may provide a useful precedent
in establishing a landlord's negligence liability. If the plaintiff is su-
ing for damages caused by a structural defect and the landlord con-
structed the premises, it could be argued that the landlord should
be considered analogous to a manufacturer of a product565 or to a
builder-vendor of real property.564 If the landlord purchased the
premises following their completion and the plaintiff is injured by
a defect that was present at the inception of the lease, the landlord
should be held to the same duty of care as is imposed on distributors
of new products565 or vendors of used products.5 66  If the landlord
557. Id. at 798-99, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24.
558. Id. at 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
559. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
560. The following passage summarizes the court's position:
That a landlord must act toward his tenant as a reasonable person under all
the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury, the probable seriousness
of such injury, the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk, and his degree
of control over the risk-creating defect, seems a sound proposition and one
that expresses well the principles of justice and reasonableness upon which the
law of torts is based. It is no part of fairness and rationality to transform
possession and control from mere factors bearing on negligence into barriers
to consideration of that issue.
Brennan v. Cockrell Inv., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 800-01, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125
(1973); accord, Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741
(1975).
561. See cases cited notes 407 & 554 supra.
562. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
563. See note 545 supra.
564. See note 551 supra.
565. See note 546 supra. The Restatement, reflecting the majority position, does
not impose a duty to inspect on distributors of new products. RESTATEMENT (SEC,
OND) OF TORTS § 402 (1965). However, this view has been criticized. 2 L. FRUMER
120
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repaired or made improvements on the premises (either prior to or
during the term of the lease), he should be subject to the same duty
as repairers567 or lessors' 68 of personal property. And finally, if the
plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the landlord's failure to re-
pair a defective or dangerous condition which arose during the term
of the lease, the landlord should be judged by the same standard
as that applied to lessors of personal property, 569 provided the land-
lord had access to the leased premises for purposes of making peri-
odic inspections and repairs. 570  Thus once a lease is characterized
as a contract instead of a conveyance of real property, there is much
precedent to support the imposition of a duty of reasonable care.
In addition to the above judicial authority, there are two juris-
dictions that currently impose a duty of reasonable care on landlords
'by statute:5 71  England 572 and Georgia. 573  The English law did not
& M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LTARILITY § 18.03 [1] [b] (1974); 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 146, at § 28.29. Since a landlord is more than a "conduit" of
the leased premises, it would seem that he should be subject to the duty to inspect
imposed by the minority rule.
566. See note 547 supra. A duty to inspect has also been imposed on vendors
of used products in a minority of jurisdictions. 2 L. FRMUER & M. FRIEDMAN, PROD-
UCTS LIABILITY, § 18.03[3] (1974); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, at
§ 28.29.
567. See note 548 supra.
568. See note 549 supra. A lessor of personal property for immediate use has
a duty to inspect for latent defects. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 408, Com-
ment a (1965).
569. A lessor of personal property has a continuing duty to make periodic inspec-
tions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 408, Comment a (1965).
570. See text accompanying notes 602-05 infra.
571. In Louisiana, if a landlord is not held strictly liable, he is subject to a duty
to use reasonable care. Since negligence liability is secondary to strict liability in
Louisiana, however, the discussion of its case law appears in the next section. See
notes 698-711 infra and accompanying text.
572. DEFECTIVE PREMISES ACT 1972, ch. 35, § 4:
(1) Where premises are let under a tenancy which puts on the landlord
an obligation to the tenant for the maintenance or repair of the premises, thelandlord owes to all persons who might reasonably be expected to be affectedby the defects in the state of the premises a duty to take such care as is rea-
sonable in all the circumstances to see that they are reasonably safe from per-
sonal injury or from damage to their property caused by a relevant defect.(2) The said duty is owed if the landlord knows (whether as the result
of being notified by the tenant or otherwise) or if he ought in all the circum-
stances to have known of the relevant defect.
A landlord is under an obligation to the tenant to maintain or repair the premises
when he expressly contracts to make repairs, expressly reserves the right to enter the
premises to carry out any description of maintenance or repair, or when the lease
is subject to a statutory implied warranty of habitability. id. at §§ 4(4) & (5).
The Defective Premises Act also imposes a duty of reasonable care on building
contractors and other presons who take on work "in connection with the provision
of a dwelling," including professional persons, such as architects and surveyors. Id.
at § 1. In this respect, the Act codifies the holding in Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban
District Council, [1972] 1 Q.B. 373 (1971). For a discussion of the provisions of
the Act, see North, Defective Premises Act 1972, 36 MOD. L. REV. 628 (1973);
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go into effect until January 1, 1974, and consequently there is no
case law construing it. The Georgia statutes, on the other hand,
have existed since the late 1800's, 574 and the case law construing
them will shed some light on the issues considered in this section.
B. Issues Raised by Imposing a Duty of Reasonable Care
If, based upon the policy considerations and legal precedents
set forth above, a jurisdiction decides to impose a duty of reasonable
care on landlords, it will be necessary to identify the persons to whom
the duty of care is owed, define the nature of the duty, and specify
the defenses available to the landlord. These issues will be dis-
cussed in the remainder of this section. It will be assumed that the
jurisdiction in question has founded the implied warranty of habita-
bility on public policy considerations, but regards the housing code
as either a minimum standard of habitability or a factor to be taken
into account in determining whether there has been a breach of the
warranty.5 75  This will permit discussion of the full range of ques-
tions that would arise in a negligence action.
1. PERSONS TO WHOM THE DUTY IS OWED
To whom should the landlord owe a duty of reasonable care?
Certainly the duty should run to the tenant,576 and presumably it
should extend to certain third parties as well,577 but there is no
clearly acceptable method of identifying the third parties deserving
of protection. One alternative would be to distinguish among in-
vitees,5 78 licensees,5 79 and trespassers8 ° as is done in many of the
Samuels, Defective Premises Act 1972, 37 CONVEY. (n.s.) 314 (1973); Samuels,
Defective Premises Act 1972, 116 SOL. J. 910 (1972).
573. GA. CODE ANN. § 61-111 (1966):
The landlord must keep the premises in repair, and shall be liable for
all substantial improvements placed upon them by his consent.
Id. at § 61-112:
The landlord, having fully parted with possession and right of possession,
is not responsible to third persons for damages resulting from the negligence
or illegal use of the premises by the tenant; but he is responsible to others
for damages arising from defective construction or for damages from failure
to keep the premises in repair.
574. For a discussion of the history behind the enactment of the Georgia statutes,
see Birdsey v. Greene, 176 Ga. 688, 168 S.E. 564 (1933).
575. See note 476 supra and accompanying text.
576. Brennan v. Cockrell Inv., Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122
(1973); Minoletti v. Sabini, 27 Cal. App. 3d 321, 103 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1972).
577. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
578. A landowner or occupier owes a duty of reasonable care to invitees. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 343-44 (1965).
579. A landowner or occupier owes a limited duty of care to licensees. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 342 (1965).
580. Generally, a landowner or occupier owes no duty of care to trespassers. RE-
STATEMENT (SEcOND) OF PROPERTY § 333 (1965). In special circumstances, a land-
owner or occupier may owe a trespasser a limited duty of care. Id. at §§ 334-39.
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cases holding a landlord liable for a defective condition in -an area re-
served for the tenants' common use, 58' which would mean that per-
sons on the premises with the express or implied consent of either
the tenant or the landlord would be entitled to recover, but tres-
passers would not.5 28
Some jurisdictions have ruled that a plaintiff's status is no longer
determinative of the landowner's duty of care, however,5"' and the
cases permitting recovery against a landlord from these jurisdictions
suggest that a different method of identifying third party plaintiffs
is needed.5 84  Perhaps the pertinent inquiry should be not who the
plaintiff is, but whether the risk of harm to the plaintiff was foresee-
able.585 In resolving that question, the plaintiff's status might be a
relevant factor. Similarly, the degree of the landlord's control over
the defective condition causing the plaintiff's injury might be ger-
mane. However, no attempt would be made to identify in advance
those classes of third persons entitled to bring a negligence action
against a landlord. This second alternative has the advantage of
flexibility, although it lacks the certainty of the first. Its principal
virtue is that it shifts the focus of the judicial inquiry from the tech-
nical classification of the plaintiff's status to the more appropriate
question of whether there was a foreseeable risk of harm to the
plaintiff.
2. SCOPE OF THE DUTY
Assuming that the landlord owes the plaintiff a duty of reason-
able care, what should be the nature or scope of that duty? Since
liability is based on proof of fault, it would seem that the same stand-
ard of care ought to apply whether the landlord is a lessor of com-
mercial or residential property, and whether the residential premises
are multiple or single-unit dwellings.18 6  If the landlord is subject
581. See text accompanying notes 245-53 supra.
582. E.g., Yates v. Crumbley, 116 Ga. App. 366, 157 S.E.2d 295 (1967) ("social
invitee"); Chamberlain v. Nash, 54 Ga. App. 508, 188 S.E. 276 (1936) (business
invitee).
583. See cases cited in note 554 supra. A few jurisdictions have abolished the
distinction between licensees and invitees, but have retained the rule that a landowner
owes no duty of care to a trespasser. E.g., Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla.
1973).
584. E.g., Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority, 308 N.E.2d 467, 478 (Mass.
1974) ("common duty of reasonable care is owed by an owner to a trespasser who
has become helplessly trapped on the premises to the owner's knowledge"). See also
Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 496 P.2d 1276, 101 Cal. Rptr. 908
(1972).
585. See Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 100, 105-06 (D.C. Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 111,
115, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99, 103 (1968).
586. See text accompanying notes 441-49 supra.
HeinOnline  -- 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 123 1975
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
to a statutory duty to repair, the statute should set the minimum
standard of conduct.68 7  Otherwise, the duty ought to be a duty to
make the premises safe, 88 and it should extend to areas within the
tenant's possession as well as those under the landlord's control.6 89
A recent line of cases suggests that it should be a duty to protect
persons on the premises against criminal attacks or other dangerous
activities as well as a duty to repair defective or dangerous condi-
tions. 90 With respect to the latter, it ought to be a duty to protect
against defects arising prior to or during the term of the lease,6 91
and it should be a duty to protect against both obvious and latent
defects."0 2 As stated by the court in Sargent v. Ross, "[t]he mere
587. See section II.B.7. supra and cases cited in note 476 supra. A jurisdiction
might require proof of a "substantial violation" of a housing code. E.g., Steinberg
v. Carreras, 74 Misc. 2d 32, 33, 344 N.Y.S.2d 136, 139-40 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1973).
588. In the cases imposing a duty of reasonable care on landowners and occupiers,
a few courts have explicitly stated that the duty is one to make the premises safe.
Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, -, 489 P.2d 308, 315 (1971);
Pickard v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 135, 452 P.2d 445, 446 (1969).
Contra, Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963 (1st Cir. 1973) (applying
Massachusetts law). For a discussion of what constitutes a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability, see cases cited in notes 429-40 supra.
589. Cases cited in note 427 supra. As stated in Brennan v. Cockrell Inv., Inc.,
35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973), the landlord's lack of possession
or control may be relevant in determining whether he failed to meet the standard
of care, but should not immunize him from liability.
590. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (1970); Ramsay
v. Morrissette, 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969); Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich.
569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972); Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 331 (1972). Contra, Goldberg
v. Housing Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962); Bass v. City of New York,
38 App. Div. 2d 407, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1972); Smith v. ABC Realty Co., 71 Misc.
2d 384, 336 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Sup. Ct. 1972). In a jurisdiction which requires proof
of a violation of housing code in order to establish a breach of the implied warranty
of habitability, it is unlikely that Kline will be followed. Trice v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 14 Ill. App. 3d 97, 302 N.E.2d 207 (1973); cf. Williams v. Davis, Inc.,
275 A.2d 231 (D.C. App. 1971) (limits holding in Kline to its facts). Kline has
been discussed at length in student comments. See, e.g., Comment, Landlord's Liabil-
ity for Criminal Acts Committed Against His Tenants, 7 CAL. W.L. REv. 197
(1970); Comment, The Landlord's Emerging Responsibility for Tenant Security, 71
COLUM. L. REv. 275 (1971); Note, Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants from Crimi-
nal Acts of Third Parties: The View from 1500 Massachusetts Ave., 59 GEO. L. REv.
1153 (1971); Note, Crime in Apartments: Landlord Liability, 5 GA. L. REv. 349
(1971); Comment, Protection of Tenants: The Extent of the Landlord's Duty, 1971
LAw & Soc. ORDER 612; Comment, Landlord-Tenant Law: Landlord Held Negligent
for Criminal Assault by Third Party Intruder on Tenant, 55 MINN. L. REv. 1097
(1971); Comment, Landlord Has Duty to Take Reasonable Precautions to Protect
his Tenants Against the Criminal Acts of Third Parties, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 943
(1970).
591. Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975).
See also cases cited in note 426 supra.
592. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973). In the cases imposing
a duty of reasonable care on landowners and occupiers, the courts have generally held
that there is a duty to protect against both obvious and latent defects. E.g., Beau-
champs v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1969).
See also A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764
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fact that a condition is open and obvious . . . does not preclude it
from being unreasonably dangerous .. . ."I" Consequently, the
patency of a defect should not preclude the imposition of a duty of
reasonable care, but should simply be regarded as a factor bearing
on the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence.5 94
Finally, the landlord ought to have a duty to repair not only those
defects of which he had actual knowledge, but also those of which
he should have known.5 95 This raises questions regarding the land-
lord's duty to inspect and the tenant's obligation to notify the landlord
of dangerous or defective conditions.5 96
Since a lease transfers possession of the premises to the tenant,
careful consideration must be given to the circumstances in which
it is appropriate to hold that a landlord "should have known" of a
defect. A failure to exercise caution in this area will result in hold-
ing a landlord strictly liable. If the landlord constructed the
premises or supervised their construction, he should be presumed to
have knowledge of any latent defects in the original construction of
the building. 97  A similar rule ought to be applicable for repairs
or improvements made by the landlord prior to 598 or during the term
of the lease.599 A landlord ought to have a duty to inspect for any
(1974) (action against architect for economic loss, court indicates in dictum that it
would permit jury to impose liability for obvious defect). Georgia has held that a
landlord is not liable for injuries resulting from a patent defect existing at the time
of the rental agreement as to which both the landlord and the tenant had equal
knowledge. Hyde v. Bryant, 114 Ga. App. 535, 151 S.E.2d 925 (1966); accord,
Hearn v. Barden, 115 Ga. App. 708, 155 S.E.2d 649 (1967). However, the landlord
may be held liable if the tenant neither knew nor should have known of the defect,
particularly if it arose during the term of the lease. White v. Thacker, 89 Ga. App.
656, 80 S.E.2d 699 (1954). For a discussion of a landlord's duty to repair obvious
defects under the implied warranty of habitability, see text accompanying notes 468-
72 supra.
593. 113 N.H. at-, 308 A.2d at 532.
594. Id. at -, 308 A.2d at 533. See text accompanying notes 629-30 infra.
595. See text accompanying notes 452-63 supra.
596. Questions regarding the landlord's duty to inspect and the tenant's obligation
to notify the landlord of dangerous or defective conditions have arisen in the past
in the context of several of the exceptions to a landlord's common law immunity from
tort liability. See notes 221-26, 247, 277-91 supra and accompanying text.
597. E.g., Monahan v. National Realty Corp., 4 Ga. App. 680, 62 S.E. 127
(1908); accord, Ragland v. Rooker, 124 Ga. App. 361, 183 S.E.2d 579 (1971);
Dobbs v. Noble, 55 Ga. App. 201, 189 S.E. 694 (1937).
598. E.g., Scarboro Enterprises, Inc. v. Hirsh, 119 Ga. App. 866, 169 S.E.2d 182
(1969) (dictum). When the repairs are made by an independent contractor, knowl-
edge is not presumed, but it is a question of fact as to whether the landlord actually
knew or should have known of the defect. Id.; see note 155 supra.
599. Rourke v. Clifton, 64 Ga. App. 474, 13 S.E.2d 587 (1941). When repairs
are made by an independent contractor, knowledge is not presumed and it will be
difficult to prove that the landlord knew or should have known of the defect unless
he has retained control of that portion of the premises. Robertson v. Nat Kaiser
Inv. Co., 82 Ga. App. 416, 61 S.E.2d 298 (1950).
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defects in existence at the time possession is transferred to the ten-
ant, 600 realizing that this would not obligate him to discover every
latent defect, but only those that a reasonable inspection would dis-
close.601 After the transfer of possession, the landlord should have
a duty to inspect60 2 both those parts of the premises over which he
retains control, such as areas reserved for the tenants' common
-use,60 3 and those parts of the premises to which he has access for
purposes of making inspections and repairs, whether by express or
implied agreement604 or by law.605 In all other circumstances, the
landlord should be held liable only if he has received notice of the
defect from the tenant606 or if he knew or must have known of the
defect due to information acquired from some other source.0 7 In
Georgia, it has been held that notice of a discovered defect charges
the landlord with notice of all other defects that might reasonably
have been detected if the landlord had repaired the discovered de-
fect as requested.60 ' Otherwise, the landlord is not liable for dam-
ages caused by undiscovered latent defects. 09  A landlord who has
been notified of a defect should have a reasonable time in which
to make the necessary repairs,6 10 although he may be required to
600. E.g., Oglesby v. Rutledge, 67 Ga. App. 656, 21 S.E.2d 497 (1942); Thomson
v. Avery, 67 Ga. App. 671, 21 S.E.2d 331 (1942); Ross v. Jackson, 123 Ga. 657,
51 S.E. 578 (1905).
601. E.g., Spires v. Fitzsimmons, 106 Ga. App. 22, 126 S.E.2d 244 (1962); Elijah
A. Brown Co. v. Wilson, 191 Ga. 750, 13 S.E.2d 779 (1941).
602. It must be emphasized that imposing a duty to inspect the premises during
the term of the lease does not mean that the landlord will be held strictly liable.
He will be held responsible only for those defects which should have been detected
through a reasonable inspection. See notes 458 & 601 supra and accompanying text.
603. E.g., Smith v. Stovall, 84 Ga. App. 103, 65 S.E.2d 640 (1951). See section
II.B.6. supra.
604. Shockley v. Nunnally, 99 Ga. App. 385, 108 S.E.2d 743 (1959); Nunnally
v. Shockley, 97 Ga. App. 300, 103 S.E.2d 74 (1958); Home Owners Loan Corp. v.
Brazzeal, 62 Ga. App. 683, 9 S.E.2d 773 (1940); Crossgrove v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 30 Ga. App. 464, 118 S.E. 694 (1923).
605. There is some authority for the proposition that a landlord's duty to repair
includes a duty to seek entry, or even a right to enter, for the purpose of making
periodic inspections. See Benjamin v. Kimble, 43 Misc. 2d 497, 251 N.Y.S.2d 708(Sup. Ct. 1964), discussed in notes 290-91 supra and accompanying text; Bowles v.
Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
606. E.g., Ocean Steamship Co. v. Hamilton, 112 Ga. 901, 38 S.E. 204 (1901);
White v. Montgomery, 58 Ga. 204 (1876).
607. Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App. 3d 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975).
See also notes 287 & 455-56 supra and accompanying text.
608. E.g., Aycock v. Houser, 96 Ga. App. 99, 99 S.E.2d 298 (1957); Shaddix v.
Eberhart, 55 Ga. App. 598, 190 S.E. 408 (1937); Gledhill v. Harvey, 55 Ga. App.322, 190 S.E. 61 (1937); McGee v. Hardacre, 27 Ga. App. 106, 107 S.E. 563 (1921);
Stack v. Harris, 111 Ga. 149, 36 S.E. 615 (1900). However, notice of a separate
and independent patent defect is not constructive notice of a latent defect. White
v. Thacker, 89 Ga. App. 656, 80 S.E.2d 699 (1954).
609. E.g., Sutton v. Murray, 49 Ga. App. 130, 174 S.E. 174 (1934); Adams v,
Klasing, 20 Ga. App. 203, 92 S.E. 960 (1917).
610. E.g., Stack v. Harris, 111 Ga. 149, 36 S.E. 615 (1900),
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warn of the defective or dangerous condition in the interim. 11 The
notice requirement should be applicable not only in actions brought
by the tenant, but also in actions brought by third parties. 12  Ad-
herence to these rules regarding a landlord's duty, to inspect would
assure proof of fault, for the landlord would be held responsible for
damages caused by defects of which he should have known without
incurring liability for defects of which he could not have known.
3. DEFENSES
a. Governmental immunity
The defenses to this type of negligence action will be the same
as those that are available to a landlord in a tort action at common
law. 13 A defendant public housing authority will be in a position
to assert the defense of governmental immunity, but in most in-
stances the housing authority will be unsuccessful, either because it
will be deemed to have waived its immunity or because the court
will find that it was performing a proprietary or ministerial func-
tion.614
b. Express assumption of risk
If the lease contains an exculpatory clause, the defendant will
be able to assert that the plaintiff assumed the risk, 1 5 provided the
action is brought by the tenant, 610 and not by a third party. 61 7 How-
ever, such clauses are ineffective against fraudulent 18 and willful or
wanton misconduct.0 1 9 Moreover, there is a trend to hold such
clauses invalid, particularly if the defendant is a public housing au-
thority, 620 if the defective condition constitutes a violation of a hous-
611. E.g., Corwack v. Oglethorpe Co., 114 Ga. App. 512, 151 S.E.2d 799 (1966).
612. E.g., Echols v. Patterson, 60 Ga. App. 372, 4 S.E.2d 81 (1939); Ledbetter
v. Gibbs, 19 Ga. App. 485, 91 S.E.2d 875 (1917).
613. See section lI.C. supra.
614. E.g., Banks v. Housing Authority, 79 Ga. App. 313, 53 S.E.2d 595 (1949)
(assuming, but not deciding, that housing authority subject to suit). See section IL
C.1. supra.
615. See section II.C.2. supra.
616. E.g., Akin v. Hardeman-Long Corp., 129 Ga. App. 303, 199 S.E.2d 621
(1973); Camp v. Roswell Wieuca Court Apts., 127 Ga. App. 67, 192 S.E.2d 499
(1972). See note 326 supra and accompanying text.
617. E.g., Birdsey v. Greene, 176 Ga. 688, 168 S.E. 564 (1933); Levy v Logan,
99 Ga. App. 253, 108 S.E.2d 307 (1959). See note 332 supra and accompanying
text.
618. E.g., Ragland v. Rooker, 124 Ga. App. 361, 183 S.E.2d 579 (1971). See
note 330 supra and accompanying text.
619. E.g., Sinclair Refining Co. v. Reid, 60 Ga. App. 119, 3 S.E.2d 121 (1939).
See note 331 supra and accompanying text.
620. See note 340 supra and accompanying text.
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ing code,621 or if the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of
the lease make the clause unconscionable.622  This trend has cul-
minated in the drafting of model legislation that declares that all ex-
culpatory clauses in residential leases are void.6 23  Unless the tenant
is in an equal bargaining position with the landlord,6 24 exculpatory
clauses should not be enforced. A contrary holding would com-
pletely negate the imposition of a duty of reasonable care, for stand-
ard form leases would quickly be drafted exonerating the landlord
from any and all liability for his negligent acts.
c. Implied assumption of risk and contributory negligence
The final defenses available to a landlord are assumption of risk
and contributory negligence, and they will probably preclude recov-
ery in a significant number of actions.625 Since the 'abolition of
caveat lessee imposes a duty of reasonable care on landlords, primary
assumption of risk ought to be abolished, particularly if the defective
condition is a violation of a housing code.6 26  It would be unrealistic
to suggest that secondary assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence also be abolished,6 27 but they ought to be applied with an un-
derstanding of the special circumstances surrounding the landlord-
tenant relationship. 28  When the defect is obvious or the plaintiff
621. See note 338-39 supra and accompanying text. Contra, Carter. v. Noe, 118
Ga. App. 298, 163 S.E.2d 348 (1968).
622. See note 341 supra and accompanying text.
623. MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-406 (Tent. Draft 1969);
UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 1.403 (a) (4).
624. See note 346 supra and accompanying text.
625. See section II. c.3. The defenses of assumption of risk and contributory neg-
ligence have not been considered in depth by the courts which have imposed a duty
of reasonable care on landlords. In Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528
(1973), assumption of risk was not considered at all because New Hampshire has
abolished the defense. Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941).
The court indicated that the obviousness of the risk was "primarily relevant
to the basic issue of a plaintiff's contributory negligence," but contributory negli-
gence was not assertable against the plaintiff because the deceased was only four
years old. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, -, 308 A.2d 528, 533 (1973). In
Minoletti v. Sabini, 27 Cal. App. 3d 321, 325, 103 Cal. Rptr. 528, 530 (1972), the
court refused to hold that the plaintiff was guilty of either assumption of risk or con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law, but did not discuss either defense.
626. See notes 359-61 supra and accompanying text. For a definition of primary
assumption of risk, see text accompanying note 354 supra. Abolishing primary as-
sumption of risk would mean that no plaintiff would be barred from recovery merely
because a defective condition was obvious. E.g., Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308
A.2d 528 (1973). Contra, Hearn v. Barden, 115 Ga. App. 708, 155 S.E.2d 649
(1967); Hyde v. Bryant, 114 Ga. App. 535, 151 S.E.2d 925 (1966); Golf Club Co.
v. Rothstein, 97 Ga. App. 128, 102 S.E.2d 654 (1958).
627. See notes 362-372 supra and accompanying text. For a definition of secon-
dary assumption of risk, see text accompanying notes 355-57 supra.
628. Note, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 1161, 1172-75 (1974); Note, 43 U. CINN. L. REv.
218, 223-24 (1974).
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has actual knowledge of it, it should be a question of fact as to
whether the plaintiff acted unreasonably under the circumstances. 2 9
The jury should be permitted to take into account such factors as
the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the landlord's promises to make
the necessary repairs, the necessity of using the defective portion of
the premises, or the existence of a sudden abstraction or emergency
causing the plaintiff to forget about the known danger.6 °0 Although
a tenant should .be required to use reasonable care to avoid a known
defect, he should not be required to repair it.6 3' When the defect
is latent, the plaintiff should be found contributorily negligent only
if the defect could have been discovered by means of a reasonable
inspection, and in defining the plaintiff's duty to inspect, the courts
should recognize the plaintiff's right to rely on the landlord's duty
to discover and repair latent defects. 6 2
C. Summary
Caveat lessee was erased from the law of landlord-tenant rela-
tions with the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability. It
629. See cases cited in note 374 supra. In Georgia, it has been held that the ten-
ant has the duty to notify the landlord of a discovered defect, but "even after notice
to the landlord the tenant has a right to use those parts of the premises which are
apparently in good condition, if there is nothing to call his attention to what may
be a hidden defect." Stack v. Harris, 111 Ga. 149, 36 S.E. 615 (1900).
630. See cases cited in notes 374-77 supra and in Note, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 1161,
1173-74 nn. 64-65 (1974). In the cases imposing a duty of reasonable care on land-
owners and occupiers, this is the approach which has been taken regarding the de-
fenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. E.g., Beauchamp v. Los
Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1969). In Georgia,
the plaintiff has often been barred from recovering for injuries caused by an obvious
defect, despite the necessity of using the defective portion of the premises. E.g.,
Huey v. Nix, 94 Ga. App. 498, 95 S.E.2d 339 (1956); Banks v. Housing Authority
of City of Atlanta, 79 Ga. App. 313, 53 S.E.2d 595 (1949). Contra, Smith v. 670
New Street, Inc., 111 Ga. App. 35, 140 S.E.2d 495 (1965).
631. In jurisdictions which have enacted statutes authorizing the tenant to repair
and deduct, it has been held that a failure to exercise this statutory right does not
bar recovery in a personal injury action. E.g., Ewing v. Balan, 168 Cal. App. 2d
619, 336 P.2d 561 (1959); Boutte v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 139 La. 945, 72
So. 513 (1916). A similar rule should be adopted in those jurisdictions which recog-
nize the self-help remedy of rent application. See notes 499-501 supra and accom-
panying text.
632. See, e.g., DiMare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 300, 373 P.2d 860, 865, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 772, 777 (1962); Turner v. Dempsey, 36 Ga. App. 44, 135 S.E. 220 (1926);
Jackson v. Wyant, 265 Ore. 19, 506 P.2d 693 (1973); Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn.
538, 560-61, 46 S.W. 297, 302-03 (1898) (quoted in note 167 supra). This is the
standard which has been applied in the cases imposing a duty of reasonable care on
landowners and occupiers. Celli v. Sports Car Club of America, Inc., 29 Cal. App.
3d 511, 105 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1973). In Georgia, it has been held that where a tenant
has notified a landlord of an obvious defect, he is not guilty of contributory negli-
gence for failure to discover a latent defect in the immediate vicinity of the potential
defect. E.g., Aycock v. Houser, 96 Ga. App. 99, 99 S.E.2d 298 (1957); Shaddix v.
Eberhart, 55 Ga. App. 598, 190 S.E. 408 (1937).
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is now time to bring tort law up to date by abolishing the landlord's
common law immunity from liability for personal injury or property
damage. The policy considerations that prompted the courts to rec-
ognize the implied warranty of habitability also justify imposing a
duty of reasonable care on landlords. Moreover, the imposition of
such a duty would advance the deterrent, compensatory, and loss dis-
tribution functions of tort law. Precedent for abrogating a landlord's
immunity from tort liability can be found in those cases abolishing
the immunity of such classes of defendants as landowners and oc-
cupiers and imposing a duty of reasonable care on such classes of
defendants as lessors of personal property and builder-vendors of
real property. Statutes have also been enacted in England and
Georgia imposing a duty of reasonable care on landlords.
If a jurisdiction decides to abrogate a landlord's immunity from
tort liability, it should recognize a duty of reasonable care to any fore-
seeable plaintiff on the premises, regardless of the plaintiff's status
as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. The landlord should be re-
quired to keep the premises in a safe condition, and if there is a
housing code, it should be deemed to set the minimum standard of
care. Liability ought to be imposed only for defects of which the
landlord knew or should have known; if the landlord could not rea-
sonably have been expected to discover the defect (as in the case
of a defect arising during the term of a lease granting no express
or implied right of entry), the tenant should be required to give the
landlord notice of the defect and a reasonable opportunity to repair
it. The potential defenses to such a negligence action would be gov-
ernmental immunity, express and implied assumption of risk, and
contributory negligence. However, to guarantee the plaintiff the in-
tended protection of the duty of reasonable care, exculpatory clauses
ought to be enforced only if the parties to the lease are in an equal
bargaining position, and primary assumption of risk ought to be
abolished. Adherence to the above guidelines would create a cause
of action for all foreseeable plaintiffs, yet would impose liability
solely upon proof of fault.
V. LANDLORD'S LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PREMISES:
STRICT LIABILITY
In adopting the implied warranty of habitability, several courts
have drawn an analogy between the merchant-consumer transaction
and the landlord-tenant relation, concluding that if there is an im-
plied warranty of merchantability in the former, there ought to be
an implied warranty of habitability in the latter.683 They have char-
633. See notes 418-21 and accompanying text.
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acterized a lease as a contract pursuant to which the tenant receives
a "well-known package of goods and services-a package which in-
cludes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light
and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and
doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance. 6 34  This use of
a products liability analogy to justify the adoption of the implied war-
ranty of habitability has prompted some plaintiffs to assert that a
landlord should be held strictly liable for personal injury or property
damage caused by a defective or dangerous condition in the leased
premises. Thus far, however, in the two reported cases the courts
have expressed a willingness to impose strict liability only under
limited circumstances.
In Fakhoury v. Magner,63 5 the plaintiff, a tenant in the defend-
ant's furnished apartment, injured her back when she fell through
a couch with defective supporting straps.63 6 The plaintiff's case was
submitted to the jury on the theory of strict liability in tort, and the
jury returned a verdict in her favor, but the trial judge granted a
new trial on the grounds that he had erred in presenting the subject
of strict liability to the jury. 63 7  The appellate court reinstated the
jury's verdict, holding that "under the circumstances of this case, the
doctrine of strict liability does apply to the landlord, not as lessor
of real property, but as lessor of the furniture."638  Thus the line
of cases holding a lessor of personal property strictly liable in tort630
was extended to a landlord of a furnished apartment. The court
noted that the defendant was in the business of leasing, since it had
furnished five apartments with the type of couch that had injured
the plaintiff.640 It also noted that the couch was a "substantial" item
634. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); accord, Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616,
517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
635. 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972); Note, Fakhouy v. Magner:
From Caveat Emptor to Caveat Lessor-Strict Liability and the Landlord, 9 CAL.
W.L. REV. 547 (1973). See notes 189-91 supra and accompanying text.
636. The plaintiff fell after sitting in a "kind of a fall" while holding her 40-pound
infant son. A subsequent inspection of the straps supporting the cushion on which
she had sat revealed that two of the four straps were missing and the remaining
straps were loose. The defendant had purchased the couch approximately one year
before the accident, but the plaintiff was the first tenant to use it. Although the
plaintiff had lived in the apartment for approximately four months, she had never
sat on the spot where she fell through, nor had she had occasion to lift or clean the
cushions prior to the accident. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 62, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
637. Id. at 61-63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 474-76.
638. Id. at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
639. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178
(1970); McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 337 (1969).
640. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476. In addition to the facts set
1975:19
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of furniture that was "relatively new, subject to recent inspection and
readily traceable to the seller."64  Under these circumstances, it
concluded -that the policy reasons for imposing strict liability in tort
were present:
the injured persons are virtually powerless to protect themselves;
the lessor can recover the cost of protection by charging for it in
his business; and he has a better opportunity than does the in-
jured person of recouping from anyone primarily responsible for
the defect.6 42
Although Fakhoury applies only to "lessors of furniture," it was
decided before the California Supreme Court had adopted the im-
plied warranty of habitability. Now that the California court has
characterized a lease as a contract whereby the landlord agrees to
provide goods and services,6 43 it is quite possible that Fakhoury will
be extended to "lessors of real property."
Such an extension would put California in direct conflict with
New Jersey, which has apparently rejected strict tort liability for
landlords. 44 In Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc.,645 the plaintiff,
a tenant for fifteen years in defendant's multiple-family garden
apartment development, was scalded when she turned on the bathtub
hot water faucet and the entire fixture "came out of the tile." The
accident occurred because that portion of the faucet which was in
the wall had become "very corroded." 6416 This condition was de-
scribed as a "latent defect unknown to the tenant, unknown to the
forth in the trial court's opinion, plaintiff's brief indicates that there were other facts
supporting the determination that the defendant was in the business of leasing: the
defendant owned two apartment buildings and the building in which the plaintiff
lived was a six-story building consisting entirely of furnished apartments. Reply Brief
for Plaintiff-Appellant at 6, Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr.
473 (1972).
641. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
642. Id. at 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
643. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 623, 517 P.2d 1168, 1172, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 708 (1974).
644. Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (App.
Div.), af'd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973). In Ellis v. Caprice, 96 N.J.
Super. 539, 233 A.2d 654 (App. Div. 1967), the court stated in dictum that strict
liability did not seem appropriate in an action for personal injuries caused by a fire
in an 1891 tenement house, and in Conroy v. Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super.
75, 234 A.2d 415 (App. Div. 1967), the court held that the owner-lessor of a two-
family house was not in the business of leasing and therefore could not be held
strictly liable.
645. 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (App. Div.), affd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311
A.2d 1 (1973).
646. Id. at 51, 301 A.2d at 464. The testimony in the case was limited to that
of the plaintiff, who was awarded $1,500 by the judge after a trial to the court with-
out a jury.
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landlord and not discernible on reasonable inspection." '47  The
plaintiff contended that, by logical extension, the court's earlier
adoption of the implied warranty of habitability in Marini v. Ire-
land64 mandated "the conclusion that proof of negligence with its
traditional requisites is no longer necessary for recovery." 64 9  The
trial court found for the plaintiff on the theory that the landlord was
strictly liable because of its "contractual responsibility flowing from
a continuing implied covenant of habitability."65  The intermediate
appellate court rejected the implied warranty theory, however, char-
acterizing Marini as a decision designed solely to create a remedy
for economic loss, and concluded that it "was not intended to over-
turn existing principles of law applicable to tort actions for personal
injuries by tenants versus landlords."' 651  The intermediate appellate
court also refused to hold the landlord strictly liable in tort.6 52  Un-
like the court in Fakhoury, it found that the "underlying reasons for
the enforcement of strict liability against the manufacturer, seller or
lessor of products ...do not apply to the ordinary landlord of a
multiple family dwelling. ' 653 In a memorandum opinion, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey affirmed "substantially for the reasons
expressed by the Appellate Division." 654
647. Id. Because the plaintiff was unable to prove negligence, she could not re-
cover for a violation of the housing code nor for a failure to maintain the water sup-
ply system in good repair. The court focused on the corrosion, rather than the scald-
ing hot water, as the "defective condition."
648. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) (court created "repair and deduct" rem-
edy for breach of the implied warranty of habitability).
649. 123 N.J. Super. at 53, 301 A.2d at 465.
650. Id. at 51, 301 A.2d at 464.
651. Id. at 55, 301 A.2d at 466.
652. Id. at 54-55, 301 A.2d at 466. The plaintiff argued that
the application of the strict liability doctrine to a seller and manufacturer of
a product . . . .to a mass builder-vendor of real estate . . . . and to a lessor
of a motor vehicle . .. , when considered in the context of the rationale in
Marini, completes the circle so as to impose strict liability on every vendor,
distributor and lessor of personalty or realty engaged in a commercial enter-
prise.
Id. at 55, 301 A.2d at 466-67.
653. Id. at 55, 301 A.2d at 467. The court detailed its reasons for refusing to
impose strict liability in the following manner:
[The ordinary landlord of a multiple family dwelling] is not engaged in
mass production whereby he places his product-the apartment-in a stream
of commerce exposing it to a large number of consumers. He has not created
the product with a defect which is preventable by greater care at the time of
manufacture or assembly. He does not have the expertise to know and correct
the condition, so as to be saddled with responsibility for a defect regardless
of negligence.
An apartment involves several rooms with many facilities constructed by
many artisans with differing types of expertise and subject to constant use
and deterioration from many causes. It is a commodity wholly unlike a prod-
uct which is expected to leave the manufacturer's hands in a safe condition
with an implied representation upon which the consumer justifiably relies.
Id. at 55-56, 301 A.2d at 467.
654. 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
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A. The Case For Strict Liability
1. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Fakhoury and Dwyer thus spotlight the issue: Are the policy
considerations that have prompted the courts to impose strict liability
on manufacturers, distributors, and lessors of personal property and
on builder-vendors of real property equally applicable to lessors of
real property?65 One of the reasons commonly given for imposing
strict liability is that the products liability defendant has superior
knowledge of the product and is in a superior position to discover
its defects, while the consumer is encouraged to rely on the defend-
ant's skill, reputation, and express or implied representations of
safety. 6 6 Certainly a landlord who has a duty to maintain the prem-
ises in a habitable condition 6 7 is in a superior position to know of
or discover latent defects. In fact, caveat lessee was abolished
largely because the modem tenant has neither the skill nor the op-
portunity to inspect the premises thoroughly. 656 Furthermore, the
typical advertisement for leased premises emphasizes the conveni-
ence of renting and encourages the tenant to rely on the landlord
to maintain the premises in good repair.6 59
A second reason for imposing strict liability is that the defend-
ant is in a better position to bear and distribute the risk of loss.68°
Only landlords in the business of leasing can be held strictly liable.66 1
655. For a discussion of the reasons for imposing strict liability on traditional
products liability defendants, see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Lia-
bility to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960). For a discussion of the reasons
for extending strict liability to lessors of real property, see Note, Products Liability
at the Threshold of the Landlord-Lessor, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 458 (1970).
656. E.g., Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv.', 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90-91, 207 A.2d 314, 325-
26 (1965).
657. See section III. supra.
658. See note 410 supra and accompanying text.
659. Note, Products Liability at the Threshold of the Landlord-Lessor, 21 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 458, 480-81 & n.146 (1970).
660. E.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
661. One of the more difficult questions in a strict liability action will be deter-
mining whether a landlord is in the business of leasing. Note, Fakhoury v. Magner,
From Caveat Emptor to Caveat Lessor--Strict Liability and the Landlord, 9 CAL.
W.L. REV. 547, 554-55 (1973); Note, Products Liability at the Threshold of the
Landlord-Lessor, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 458, 482-83 (1970). See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment f (1965); Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy
of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447, 456
(1971). In Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972),
the court held that a landlord who owned two multiple-unit apartment buildings and
who had ordered five couches at one time to furnish some of his apartments was
in the business of leasing. See note 640 supra.' On the other hand, in Conroy v.
Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 234 A.2d 415 (App. Div. 1967), the court
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Such a landlord is normally in a position to spread the risk of loss
by purchasing liability insurance (or by acting as a self-in-
surer) and passing the cost on to his tenants. 62 Furthermore, at
times he will be able to shift the loss through an indemnity action
to a third party who was responsible for creating the defective condi-
tion. 68  As with the imposition of liability for negligence, there is
held that the owner-lessor of a two-family house was not in the business of leasing.
At the extreme ends of the spectrum, it can be anticipated that a lessor of a
single-unit dwelling which is the lessor's permanent residence or vacation home will
not be considered "in the business of leasing," while a landlord who rents a large
number of units on a permanent basis will be. Problems will arise with respect to
the lessor who rents a small number of units on a permanent basis. It would be
possible to draw an arbitrary line, identifying the number of units below which strict
liability would not apply. This is the approach taken by those jurisdictions which
have enacted housing codes applicable only to multiple-unit dwellings. See notes 110
& 257 supra. It would also be possible to make a case-by-case determination of when
such a landlord is in the business of leasing, taking into account such factors as the
landlord's expertise and experience in the leasing business, his representations regard-
ing the condition of the premises, and his ability to bear and distribute the risk of
loss. See W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla.
1970).
662. See notes 538-39 supra. The imposition of strict liability on landlords in
Louisiana has not resulted in any significant difference between Louisiana's rates and
those of other states for owners', landlords' and tenants' liability insurance covering
apartments, tenements, and boarding or rooming houses. In 1974, the following
rates were charged in a random sample of states for a basic limit of $25,000 for all
bodily injury damages sustained by one or more persons as the result of one occur-
rence:
Rate
State (per 100 sq. ft.) Date
Alabama 6/12/74
Birmingham $1.70






Remainder of State .54
Louisiana 2/13/75
New Orleans 1.80
Remainder of State .77
Mississippi .64 12/31/74
New Hampshire 1.80 7/17/74
Wisconsin 12/31/74
Green Bay, Kenosha,
Madison & Racine 2.00
Milwaukee 2.10
The above information was obtained from Mr. Arthur Curley of the Insurance Serv-
ices Office, 160 Water Street, New York, N.Y., 10038.
663. E.g., Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
See Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970) (discus-
sion of indemnity action by lessor of personal property against manufacturer of prod-
uct). In some jurisdictions, unless the landlord is the first purchaser of the apart-
ment, he will have no cause of action against the builder-vendor. See cases cited
in note 679 infra. See generally, Sorenson v. Safety Flate, Inc., 298 Minn. 353, 216
N.W.2d 859 (1974); Farr v. Armstrong, 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970); Dole
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a risk that holding a landlord strictly liable for personal injury or
property damage will remove some housing for the low-income ten-
ant from the market. 6 4 However the risk would not be significantly
greater than that already incurred by any jurisdiction which has
adopted the implied warranty of habitability. 65 Moreover, it is the
low-income tenant who most needs the benefit of strict liability in
the event that he sustains damages as the result of a defect in the
premises.
A final reason for imposing strict liability is to eliminate the bar-
rier of having to prove negligence. 66 6 Defective conditions in leased
premises may be caused either by the landlord's affirmative acts or
by his failure to discover or repair defective conditions created by
others (for example, by the contractor who originally constructed the
building). When a defective condition is created by the landlord's
affirmative acts, the plaintiff is in a position analogous to that of a
consumer in an action against a manufacturer. It may be difficult
for the plaintiff to prove specific acts of negligence, particularly if
he was not present at the time the defective condition was pro-
duced.667  When the landlord fails to discover or repair a defective
condition created by a third person, the plaintiff is in a position analo-
gous to that of a consumer in an action against a retailer.6 8  It may
be impossible for the plaintiff to prove that the landlord knew or
should have known of the defective condition.6 9
2. LEGAL PRECEDENT
The above discussion suggests that the reasons for imposing
strict liability on the more traditional products liability defendants are
equally applicable to lessors of real property. This is not surprising,
since the adoption of the implied warranty of habitability was prem-
v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972);
Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Li-
ability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REv. 723 (1974).
664. 5 SETON HALL L. Rav. 409, 428 & n.115 (1974). See note 536 supra and
accompanying text.
665. See notes 502-0.5 supra and accompanying text.
666. E.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
667. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LI.AILInY § 16A[4][e] (1974).
668. Id. at § 19A.
669. Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (App.
Div.), affd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
It has been said that strict liability differs from negligence "mainly in the ele-
ment of scienter: Plaintiff will not need to prove either that defendant negligently
created the unsafe condition of the product or that he was aware of it." State Stove
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 121 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966);
accord, Wade, On The Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825,
834-35 (1973).
136
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ised on products liability analogies in many jurisdictions.670 How-
ever, strict liability for personal injury or property damage was first
recognized in the context of the sale of goods, 671 and a lease of real
property is neither a sale nor a transaction relating to goods. This
distinction may engender a certain reluctance to extend strict liabil-
ity to landlords. It should therefore be emphasized that there are
numerous legal precedents for applying strict liability to non-sales
and non-goods transactions.
In refusing to hold the landlord strictly liable in Dwyer v. Sky-
line Apartments, Inc.,6 72 the court noted that "[a]n apartment in-
volves several rooms with many facilities constructed by many arti-
sans with differing types of expertise .... -"73 This passage would
suggest that there should be no strict liability for defects in real prop-
erty. Yet a substantial number of jurisdictions have held that there
is an implied warranty of habitability in the sale of a new home by
a builder-vendor67 4 and that a builder-vendor may be held strictly
670. See notes 418-21 supra and accompanying text.
671. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-314.
672. 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (App. Div.), affd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311
A.2d 1 (1973). See text accompanying notes 645-54 supra.
673. Id. at 55-56, 301 A.2d at 467.
674. Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971); Wawak v. Stewart,
247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal.
3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.,
269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969); Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272
Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78,
388 P.2d 399 (1964); Shiffers v. Cunningham Shepherd Builders CO., 28 Colo. App.
29, 470 P.2d 593 (1970); Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200
(1970); Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. App.), aff'd, 264 So. 2d 418 (1972);
Bethlamy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966); Hanavan v. Dye, 4 Ill. App.
3d 576, 281 N.E.2d 398 (1972); Theis v. Heuer, -Ind. -, 280 N.E.2d 300 (1972);
Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969); Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc.,
24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503, aff'd, 384 Mich. 257, 181 N.W.2d 271 (1970);
Hamilton Fixture Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 285 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1973); State Stove
Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966);
Smith v. Old Warson Dev. CO., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972); Hartley v. Ballou, 20
N.C. App. 493, 201 S.E.2d 712 (1974); Dobler v. Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510 (N.D.
1973); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972); Padula v. J.J. Deb-
Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254
S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Inc., 154 N.W.2d
803 (S.D. 1967); Rothberg v. Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 262 A.2d 461 (1970); Humber
v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457
P.2d 199 (1969); Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969). Contra, Neary v. Posner, 253
Md. 401, 252 A.2d 843 (1969); Mitchem v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 2d 66, 218 N.E.2d
594 (1966).
The application of the implied warranty of habitability to builder-vendors has
been advocated and analyzed by several commentators. Bearman, Caveat Emptor in
Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541 (1961);
Bixby, Let the Seller Beware: Remedies for the Purchase of a Defective Home, 49
J. URBAN L. 533 (1971); Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in
Sales of Real Property, 53 GEO. L.J. 633 (1965); Murray, Under the Spreading Anal-
137
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liable for personal injury or property damage caused by defects in
construction." 5 The courts have recognized that a structure on real
property is more complex than the average product, but it is this very
complexity that has justified the imposition of strict liability because
it is impossible for the average purchaser to detect even dangerous
defects in construction.6 76
The Dwyer court also refused to impose strict liability because
an apartment is "subject to constant use and deterioration from many
causes," 677 which suggests that strict liability is inapplicable because
landlords typically lease "used," rather than "new" property. It is
true that some courts have refused to hold vendors of used goods67 s
or real property6 79 strictly liable. However, there has been relatively
little litigation of the issue, and the more recent decisions have ex-
pressed a willingness to impose strict liability on sellers of used
goods, 680 since they are in a superior position to inspect for defects
ogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447,
454-59 (1971); Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing
Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835 (1967); Schwartz, Defective Housing: The
Fall of Caveat Emptor, 33 A.T.L.J. 122 (1970); Young & Harper, Quare: Caveat
Emptor or Caveat Venditor? 24 ARK. L. REv. 245 (1970). UNIFORM LAND TRANS-
ACTIONS ACT § 2-309 (Tent. Draft. No. 3, 1974) provides:
A seller . . . who is in the business of leasing impliedly warrants that
the real estate is suitable for the ordinary uses of real estate of its type and
that any improvements made or contracted for by him will be
(1) free from defective materials; and
(2) constructed in accordance with applicable law, according to sound
engineering and construction standards, and in a workmanlike manner.
675. Miller v. Los Angeles City Flood Control Dist., 8 Cal. 3d 689, 505 P.2d 193,
106 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973) (recovery denied because plaintiff failed to prove that the
home was in a defective condition); Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 111
Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314
(1965). Contra, Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179
(1972) (rejects strict tort liability).
676. Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1094-95, 449 S.W.2d 922, 923 (1970);
Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 379, 525 P.2d 88, 91, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 648, 651 (1974); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo.
1972); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 314, 325-26 (1965);
Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 128, 288 A.2d 771, 777 (1972).
677. Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 56, 301 A.2d 463,
467 (1973), aff'd mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
678. Yanish v. Fernandez, 156 Colo. 225, 397 P.2d 881 (1965); Chaq Oil Co.
v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
679. Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev. Co., 154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967) (dictum);
H.B. Bolas Enterprises, Inc. v. Zarlengo, 156 Colo. 530, 400 P.2d 447 (1965). It
has also been held that a purchaser of a "used home" has no cause of action for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability against the builder-vendor. Utz v.
Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475, 503 P.2d 365 (1972); Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo.
App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972); Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wash. App. 595, 494 P.2d 1371
(1972). This "privity" requirement has been rejected in strict tort liability actions
against the builder-vendor. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224,
74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) (action by second purchaser); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965) (action by tenant of original purchaser).
680. McHugh v. Carlton, 369 F. Supp. 1271 (D.S.C. 1974) (retailer of recapped
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and determine whether to repair the product or remove it from the
market place.681 The imposition of strict liability can be justified
because of its deterrent effect (promoting the sale of safe used
goods) and because of the seller's ability to distribute both the cost
of repairs and the risk of loss upon resale of the used product.882
It could of course be argued that strict liability should not be
applied because a lease is an agreement to provide services, 8 3 rather
than a transaction relating to new or used real property. Not all pro-
viders of services are immune from strict liability, however. 684  If
tires); Georgia Timberland, Inc. v. Southern Airway Co., 125 Ga. App. 404, 188 S.E.
2d 108 (1972); Peterson v. Lou Backrodt Chevrolet Co., 17 I11. App. 3d 690, 307
N.E.2d 729 (1974); Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292
N.E. 168 (1972); Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974)
(used car dealer "ought to be subject to strict liability in tort with respect to a mis-
hap resulting from any defective work, repairs or replacements he has done or made
on the vehicle before the sale"); Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 337 (1973); Annot., 22 A.L.R.
3d 1387 (1968).
In several cases, sometimes erroneously interpreted as rejecting strict liability,
the courts have permitted the plaintiff to bring a strict liability action against the
seller of used goods, but have denied recovery because of the plaintiff's failure to es-
tablish one of the elements of the prima facie case. Grady v. Kenny Ross Chevrolet
Co., 332 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (no defect); Chamberlain v. Bob Matick
Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 685, 4 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 936 (1967) (no defect);
Brown v. Hall, 221 So. 2d 454 (Fla. App. 1969) (no privity); Keating v. DeArment,
193 So. 2d 694 (Fla. App. 1967) (no defect); Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 258
Ore. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971) (no defect) (reserves ruling on whether used car
dealer is subject to strict tort liability); Tracy v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 130 Vt. 512,
296 A.2d 269 (1972) (no defect); Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primavera, 68
Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1972). On occasion, the facts have supported the
implication of a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. E.g., Enix v. Diamond
T. Sales & Serv. Co., 188 So. 2d 48 (Fla. App. 1966). See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-315.
Although there are no cases holding the seller of a used home strictly liable,
reconditioners and remodelers have been held strictly liable. Philadelphia v. Page,
363 F. Supp. 148 (8.D. Pa. 1973) (reconditioner-vendor); Worrell v. Barnes, 87
Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971) (remodeler). Strict liability for sellers of used
homes has been advocated by the commentators. E.g., Bixby, Implied Warranty of
Habitability: New Right for Home Buyers, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 468 (1972); Has-
kell, The Case for an Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53
GEO. L.J. 633 (1965).
681. Peterson v. Lou Backrodt Chevrolet Co., 17 II. App. 3d 690, 697, 307 N.E.
2d 729, 733-34 (1974).
682. Id. at 694, 697; 307 N.E.2d at 732, 734.
683. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert, denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517
P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
684. For a comprehensive review of the law governing the sale of services and
a suggestion that strict liability should be applied to all sellers of services in consumer
transactions, see Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied
Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 661. For other commen-
taries on the application of strict liability to service transactions, see Farnsworth, Im-
plied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957);
Miller, A "Sale of Goods" as a Prerequisite for Warranty Protection, 24 Bus. LAWYER
847 (1969); Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform
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the transaction is a "pure service" transaction, strict liability is gen-
erally inapplicable.685 But if the transaction is a "hybrid sales-
service" transaction, the defendant can be held strictly liable for
damages caused by the transfer of a defective product incident to
the rendition of a service, 8 6 provided the essence of the transaction
is not the performance of a professional service. 6 7  In cases where
the plaintiff's injury was caused by the landlord's failure to repair
a defect in the premises, it can be anticipated that the landlord-
tenant relationship will be analogized to a "hybrid sales-service"
transaction and that the services to be provided by the landlord will
be characterized as "commercial," rather than "professional." 688
Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447 (1969); Phipps, When Does a "Service"
Become a "Sale," 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 274 (1972); Note, Products Liability and the
Professional: Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGS
L.J. 111 (1972); Note, Extension of Warranty Concept to Service-Sales Contracts,
31 INr. L.J. 367 (1956); Comment, Torts-Strict Liability for Services, 4 N.M.L.
REV. 271 (1974); Note, Implied Warranties in Service Contracts, 39 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 680 (1964); Note, Application of Implied Warranties to Predominantly
"Service" Transactions, 31 OHIo ST. L.J. 580 (1970); Comment, Sales-Service Hybrid
Transaction: A Policy Approach, 28 S.W.L.J. 575 (1974); Comment, Continuing
the Common Law Response to the New Industrial State: The Extension of Enter-
prise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 401 (1974); Annot., 29
A.L.R.3d 1425 (1970).
685. E.g., La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968); Gagne
V. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954); Swett v. Gribaldo, Jones & Assoc.,
40 Cal. App. 3d 573, 115 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1974); Stuart v. Crestview Mutual Water
Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 802, 110 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1973); Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d
54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969); Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 111. App. 2d 153, 222
N.E.2d 584 (1966). A few recent cases, however, seem to express a willingness to
impose strict liability on the provider of a pure service. E.g., Johnson v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (hospital can be held strictly liable
for the performance of "mechanical and administrative [as opposed to "profes-
sional"] services"); Buckeye v. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich.
App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972) (suppliers of electricity, a "dangerous force," may
be held strictly liable, but plaintiff failed to prove the existence of a defect). Two
commentators have advocated the extension of strict liability to persons who perform
"pure services," including professionals. Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service
Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 Utah L. Rev.
661; O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals,
59 VA. L. REV. 749 (1973); contra, Note, Liability of Design-Professionals-The
Necessity of Fault, 58 IowA L. REV. 1221 (1973).
686. Sampson Constr. Co. v. Farmers Coop. El. Co., 382 F.2d 645 (10th Cir.
1967); Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 257 (1961); Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969);
Jerry v. Borden Co., 45 App. Div. 2d 344, 358 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1974); Carpenter v.
Best's Apparel, Inc., 4 Wash. App. 439, 481 P.2d 924 (1971).
687. E.g., Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972);
Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971);
Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971); Magrine v.
Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), afrd sub.
nom., Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1968); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968).
688. See Note, Products and the Professional: Strict Liability in the Sales-Service
Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 111 (1972).
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Consequently, strict liability ought to be imposed on landlords as pro-
viders of services, except possibly in those rare situations where the
plaintiff's injury was caused by what could be characterized as the
failure to perform a "pure service" (for example, the failure to pro-
vide security measures sufficient to protect the plaintiff against a
criminal attack by a third party).68 9
The preceding discussion demonstrates that, although a lease
of real property is not a transaction involving "goods," there is still
legal precedent for holding a landlord strictly liable. This is true
regardless of whether the lease is characterized principally as a trans-
fer of real property (new or used) or as an agreement to provide
services. The remaining question is whether a landlord should be
exempt from strict liability because a lease is not a "sale." The cases
holding lessors of personal property strictly liable690 suggest that the
question should be answered in the negative. Generally speaking,
the courts have perceived "no substantial difference between sellers
of personal property and non-sellers, such as bailors and lessors."69'
689. See cases cited in note 590 supra.
690. Summers v. Interstate Tractor & Equip. Co., 466 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1972);
Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) (manufacturer-lessor); Bach-
ner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alas. 1970); Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz.
App. 32, 467 P.2d 256 (1970); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428
S.W.2d 46 (1968); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178 (1970); Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970) (licen-
sor); McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr.
337 (1969); Whitfield v. Cooper, 30 Conn. Supp. 47, 298 A.2d 50 (Super. Ct. 1972);
W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970); Stewart
v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Galluchio v. Hertz
Corp., 1 Ill. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews
Co., Inc., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973); Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing, Inc.,
53 N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434,
212 A.2d 769 (1965); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972);
Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 35 App. Div. 2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352
(1970); Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971); Rourke v. Garza,
511 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 121 (1973). Contra,
Speyer, Inc. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 403 F.2d 766 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 1015 (1969) (defendant not in business of leasing); Bona v. Graefe, 264
Md. 69, 285 A.2d 607 (1972); Katz v. Slade, 460 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1970); Freitas
v. Twin City Fisherman's Coop. Ass'n, 452 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). For
a discussion of the above cases, see Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in
Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957); Murray, Under the Spreading
Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 447
(1969); Comment, The Extension of Warranty Protection to Lease Transactions, 10
B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 127 (1968); Comment, Strict Liability of the Bailor,
Lessor and Licensor, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 111 (1973); Comment, Products Liability-
Liability of the Bailor for Hire for Personal Injuries Caused by Defective Goods, 51
N.C.L. REV. 786 (1973); Note, Warranties in the Leasing of Goods, 31 Omo ST.
L.J. 140 (1970); Comment, Finance Lessor's Liability for Personal Injuries, 1974 U.
ILL. L.F. 154; Comment, Implied Warranties of Quality: Protection in Chattel
Leases, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 115.
691. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178, 182 (1970).
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Lessors, much like retailers and manufacturers, place products in the
stream of commerce. 692 They are in a better position than the lessee
to know and control the condition of the chattel transferred6 93 and
to distribute the losses attributable to its defective condition through
an adjustment of the rental rate.69 4  Since the lessor controls the
length of the lease, he is in the best position to prevent the circula-
tion of defective products.695 And since the lessee normally has an
immediate need for the product and acquires only temporary posses-
sion of it, he places greater reliance on the competence and expertise
of a lessor than he would if he were a buyer purchasing the same
product from a seller. 0 6 For all these reasons, "[p]ublic policy de-
mands that in this day of expanding rental and leasing enterprises
the consumer who leases be given protection equivalent to the con-
sumer who purchases. 69 7
If the policy considerations and products liability analogies dis-
cussed above are not sufficiently persuasive, it should be noted that
Louisiana, following civil law precedents, has imposed strict liability
on landlords since the early 1800's.9 a A landlord is strictly liable
to the tenant for any loss resulting from a "vice" or "defect" in the
premises,699 and is similarly liable to third persons on the premises
692. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alas. 1970).
693. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 446, 212 A.2d
769, 775 (1965).
694. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alas. 1970); Price v. Shell Oil Co.,
2 Cal. 3d 245, 252, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 182 (1970); McClaflin
v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 452, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337, 340
(1969); W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 451, 212 A.2d 769,
778 (1965).
695. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alas. 1970); McClaflin v. Bayshore
Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 452, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337, 340 (1969); Cin-
trone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 448, 212 A.2d 769, 777
(1956).
696. W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 449, 212 A.2d 769,
777 (1965).
697. W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, 238 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1970).
698. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 670 (West 1952); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2315-
16, 2322 (West 1971); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2669, 2681, 2692-95, 2700, 2716-
17 (West 1952); LA. REv. STAT. § 9:3221 (West 1951); Comment, Repairs of Leased
Premises in Lousiana, 23 LA. L. REv. 458 (1963); Comment, Responsibility of Land-
lord and Tenant for Damages from Defects in Leased Premises, 20 LA. L. REv. 76
(1959); Comment, Lessor's Liability for Personal Injuries, 7 LA. L. REv. 406 (1947);
Editorial, Landlord and Tenant-Injuries from Defective Condition of Premises, 3
So. L.Q. 214 (1918); Comment, The Louisiana Law of Lease, 39 TuL. L. REv. 798
(1965) (comprehensive survey); Comment, Liability of Lessor or Property Owner
to Third Persons for Accidental Personal Injury Caused by Defective Premises, 4
TUL. L. REv. 611 (1930).
699. LA. Cv. CODE ANN. art. 2695 (West 1952). E.g., Bates v. Blitz, 205 La.
536, 17 So. 2d 816 (1944); Lasyone v. Zenoria Lumber Co., 163 La. 185, 111 So.
670 (1927); Boutte v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 139 La. 945, 72 So. 513 (1916);
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for any damage caused by the "ruin" of a building or a "vice"' in
its original construction. 700 If the plaintiff fails to prove the exist-
ence of a "vice," "defect" or "ruin," the landlord is not strictly lia-
ble.710 Strict liability may also be avoided if the lessee assumes re-
sponsibility for the condition of the premises. 70 2  In both instances,
however, the landlord continues to owe the plaintiff a duty of reason-
able care.7 08
Strict liability is not absolute liability in Louisiana. The plaintiff
must prove that the defect was the proximate cause of the damage, 70 4
and plaintiffs have been barred from recovery because the damage
resulted from an "abnormal ' 70 5 or "unforeseeable"706 use of the
premises or from the intervention of an "act of God"707 or a third
party.708 Assumption of risk and contributory negligence are both
defenses,709 but it appears that the plaintiff has no duty to inspect
Wilson v. Virgademo, 258 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 1972); Joyner v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 240 So. 2d 545 (La. App. 1970); Tewis v. Zurich Ins. Co., 233 So. 2d 357 (La.
App. 1970); Johnson v. Crescent Arms Apts., Inc., 221 So. 2d 633 (La. App. 1969);
Anselm v. Travelers Ins. Co., 192 So.2d 599 (La. App. 1966); Phillips v. Cohen,
183 So. 2d 473 (La. App. 1966); Morgan v. American Indem. Co., 180 So. 2d 429
(La. App. 1965) (discussion of art. 2695).
700. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 670 (West 1952); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2322
(West 1971). E.g., Ciaccio v. Carbajal, 142 La. 125, 76 So. 583 (1917); Krennerich
v. WCG Inv. Corp., 278 So. 2d 842 (La. App. 1973); Crawford v. Wheless, 265 So.
2d 661 (La. App. 1972); Adamson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 236 So. 2d 556 (La.
App. 1970); Fontenot v. Sarver, 183 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 1966).
701. E.g., Weiland v. King, - La. -, 281 So. 2d 688 (1973); Smolinski v. Taulli,
- La. -, 276 So. 2d 286 (1973); Davis v. Royal-Globe Ins. Co., 257 La. 523, 242
So. 2d 839 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1971); Cothern v. LaRocca, 255 La.
673, 232 So. 2d 473 (1970); Jarvis v. Prout, 247 So. 2d 244 (La. App. 1971); Mor-
gan v. American Indem. Co., 180 So. 2d 429 (La. App. 1965). The above supreme
court cases have given a restrictive definition to the terms "vice," "defect," and
"ruin," suggesting that the judiciary may be using the vehicle of statutory construction
to express its displeasure with the legislative imposition of liability without fault.
702. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:3221 (West 1951). E.g., Herbert v. Valenti, 235 So. 2d
193 (La. App. 1970).
703. E.g., Weiland v. King, - La. -, 281 So. 2d 688 (1973); Davis v. Royal-
Globe Ins. Co., 257 La. 523, 242 So. 2d 839 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911
(1971) (insufficient proof of negligence).
704. E.g., Jackson v. Ins. Co. of North America, 243 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 1971);
King v. Allstate Ins. Co., 224 So. 2d 42 (La. App. 1969).
705. E.g., Richter v. Koffman, 223 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 1969); Montgomery v.
Cantelli, 174 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 1965).
706. E.g., Poe v. American Ins. Co., 175 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1965).
707. E.g., Joyner v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 So. 2d 545 (La. App. 1970) (dic-
tum); Rau v. Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y., 239 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 1970).
708. E.g., Carlysle v. Aetna Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 1971); Surry v.
Ark. La. Gas Co., 170 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 1964).
709. E.g., Joyner v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 So. 2d 545 (La. App. 1970); Rau
v. Sun Ins. Co. of N.Y., 239 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 1971); Anslem v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 192 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 1966). It is not an act of contributory negligence
for the tenant to fail to exercise his statutory right to repair the premises and deduct
the cost of the repairs from the rent. Boutte v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 139 La.
945, 72 So. 513 (1916).
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for latent defects.71 Recovery is precluded only if the tenant knew
of and voluntarily encountered the risk created by an "imminently
dangerous" condition."'
B. Issues Raised by Imposing Strict Liability
1. STRICT LIABILITY PER SE
Assuming that a jurisdiction decides to impose strict liability on
a landlord for personal injury or property damage caused by a defect
in the premises, what legal theory should be utilized to accomplish
this objective? If the jurisdiction has adopted an implied warranty
of habitability based on legislative enactment of a housing code,712
and wants to impose strict liability only for violations of the code,
it could impose "strict liability per se. '' 718  An action under such a
theory would be analogous to a negligence per se action,714 except
that the landlord would not be required to have received notice of
the defect as a prerequisite to the imposition of liability, and contrib-
utory negligence would not be recognized as an affirmative defense.
There is no direct precedent for imposing strict liability per se on
a landlord, although one jurisdiction has eliminated the notice re-
quirement in a case involving a landlord's violation of a housing code
provision creating an absolute duty of care.715 In abolishing con-
tributory negligence, the courts would have to rely on the precedent
set by cases imposing strict liability per se for the violation of other
types of statutes that were enacted "to protect the plaintiff against
his inability to protect himself. ' 71 6  Strict liability per se would im-
pose no increased duty of care, as a landlord is already subject to
strict liability in a criminal prosecution for failing to comply with the
provisions of a housing code.71 7 Its sole impact would be to advance
the compensatory and loss distribution functions of tort law.
710. E.g., Krennerich v. WCG Inv. Corp., 278 So. 2d 842 (La. App. 1973); Car-
lysle v. Aetna Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 1971); Green v. Jee, 224 So. 2d
153 (La. App. 1969).
711. E.g., Wilson v. Virgademo, 258 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 1972) (dictum).
712. See note 429 supra and accompanying text.
713. Comment, Housing Codes and a Tort of Slumlordism, 8 HOUSTON L. REV.
522, 539-43 (1971). See also, Falick, A Tort Remedy for the Slum Tenant, 58 ILL.
BAR J. 204 (1969).
714. See section II.B.7.
715. Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco Co., 155 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. App. 1938). See
notes 280-83 supra and accompanying text.
716. See cases cited note 371 supra. It may be questioned whether it is appropri-
ate to classify a tenant as a plaintiff who is unable to protect himself. In some in-
stances, a tenant may be capable of detecting and avoiding a dangerous condition.
In others, however, he will either find it very difficult to conduct a thorough inspec-
tion or will find it necessary to continue to use the defective portion of the premises
after discovery of the defect.
717. See note 108 supra and accompanying text. It is true that, as a matter of
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2. STRICT TORT LIABILITY OR IMPLIED WARRANTY
If a jurisdiction has adopted an implied warranty of habitability
based on public policy considerations 18 and wants to hold a landlord
strictly liable for any defect in the premises regardless of whether
it is proscribed by the housing code, the jurisdiction could utilize one
of two products liability theories-implied warranty or strict tort lia-
bility.719  The implied warranty theory would permit recovery of
consequential damages for breach of the implied warranty of habita-
bility, following the pattern established by actions for breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability under the Uniform Commercial
Code.720  Strict tort liability would permit the plaintiff to bring an
action against the landlord under the theory set out in section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.721  Strict tort liability would
probably be preferable, as will be demonstrated by comparing both
the elements of the prima facie case and the defenses under each
theory of recovery.722
a. Privity of contract
To the extent that the implied warranty of habitability has con-
practice, housing code enforcement officials usually notify the landlord of a defect
and give him an opportunity to repair it before commencing a criminal prosecution,
but in the absence of a statutory notice requirement, they are not required to do so.
Comment, Housing Codes and a Tort of Slumlordism, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 522, 541
(1971).
718. See note 432 supra and accompanying text.
719. A number of recent articles have compared negligence with strict liability,
and have generally concluded that strict liability is the superior theory of recovery.
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055
(1972); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEO. STUD. 151 (1973); Epstein,
Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 165
(1974); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HAiv. L. REv. 537 (1972).
Contra, R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.15 (1973); Posner, Strict Lia-
bility: A Comment, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 205 (1973). For an economic analysis of
products liability law, see Symposium, Products Liability: Economic Analysis and
the Law, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1970).
720. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, 2-715; 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIED-
MAN, PRODUCTS L ILrrY §§ 16, 19 (1974); W. PROSSER, supra note 146, at § 97.
Another precedent would be the common law right to recover consequential damages
for breach of the implied warranty of habitability in a short-term lease of a furnished
dwelling. See section II.B.3. supra.
721. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); 2 L. FRUMER & M.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 16A, 19A (1974); W. PROSSER, supra note 146,
at § 98; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1057 (1967).
722. For a comparison of the implied warranty and strict tort liability theories
of recovery in the context of the sale of goods, see Dickerson, The ABC's of Products
Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REV. 439
(1969); Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in
Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966); Shanker, Strict Tort Theory
of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 WEST. RES. L. REV.
5 (1965); Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts 402A and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1970).
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tractual origins, recovery might be restricted to the tenant, who is
in privity of contract with the landlord.72 8  Despite judicial decisions
abolishing privity as a requirement in actions for breach of the im-
plied warranty of merchantability,724 the majority of courts have
adopted a provision of the Uniform Commercial Code that explicitly
permits recovery only by persons in the family or household of the
buyer or by guests in his home.725 By contrast, although the Ameri-
can Law Institute expressed "no opinion" regarding the application
of section 402A "to harm to persons other than users or consum-
ers,"726 there is a decided trend toward extending strict tort liability
beyond users and consumers to bystanders.727 Strict tort liability
would therefore offer protection to a broader spectrum of plaintiffs.
The remaining question would be whether the courts should limit
recovery to those persons lawfully on the premises, or permit recov-
ery regardless of the plaintiffs status vis-4-vis the landlord or tenant
as landowner or occupier. Presumably this issue would be resolved
in the same manner in strict tort liability actions as in negligence ac-
tions.728
b. Defect
The next point of contrast between the two theories of liability
is the method of determining what constitutes a defect. Under the
implied warranty of habitability, a defective condition would be
judged by the standard developed in the cases involving an implied
warranty action for economic loss. 729  Under strict tort liability, on
the other hand, the question would be whether the premises were
leased "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to the
plaintiff 7 ° or, in some jurisdictions, whether the premises were "de-
723. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 16.03, 19.01[2]
(1974); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 146, at § 28.16; W. PROSSER, supra
note 146, at § 100; Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961).
724. E.g., Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461
(1973); Comment, Codling v. Paglia-New York Stands by the Innocent Bystander,
40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 390 (1973).
725. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318 (Alternative A).
726. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Caveat (1965).
727. E.g., Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972);
Noel, Defective Products: Extension of Strict Liability to Bystanders, 38 TENN. L.
REV. 1 (1970); Comment, Strict Products Liability to Bystander: A Study in Com-
mon Law Determinism, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 625 (1971); Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 415
(1970).
728. See notes 577-85 supra and accompanying text.
729. See notes 428-40 supra and accompanying text.
730. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 352
(1973).
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fective. ' 731 Although different tests are thus employed, it is unlikely
that there would be a significant discrepancy in the conditions ulti-
mately characterized as defective under the two theories of recov-
ery.78 2  To the extent that such a discrepancy might develop, the
strict tort liability test would probably be better.
In reality, the difficult questions under either theory will be
whether to permit recovery for damages caused by obvious defects,
by defects which result from ordinary wear and tear, and by latent
defects not discoverable upon a reasonable inspection. With respect
to obvious defects, there is a trend in the recent products liability
decisions to hold that such defects may be actionable, and to bar re-
covery only if the defendant is able to prove that the plaintiff as-
sumed the risk.738 This would be consistent with the proposed treat-
ment of obvious defects in a negligence action against a landlord.7 11
In determining whether the plaintiff assumed the risk, the courts
ought to be influenced by the same factors that are considered in
determining whether a plaintiff who has sustained economic loss has
waived the landlord's breach of the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity. 7835
731. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973);
7 ACRON L. REV. 361 (1974); 6 CREGHToN L. REV. 434 (1973); 42 FORDHAM L.
REV. 943 (1974); 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 189 (1974); 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 152
(1973); 49 WASH. L. REV. 231 (1973); see Pyatt v. Engel Equip. Inc., 17 Ill. App.
3d 1070, 309 N.E.2d 225 (1974). Contra, Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., -
Okla. -, 521 P.2d 1353 (1974).
732. For a discussion of what constitutes a "defect" in a products liability action,
see W. PROSSER, supra note 146, at § 99; Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good
Does a Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967); Fischer, Products Liability-
The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339 (1974); Freedman, "Defect" in the
Product: The Necessary Basis for Products Liability in Tort and in Warranty, 33
TENN. L. REV. 323 (1966); Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973); Kee-
ton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Kee-
ton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and De-
sign of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969); Keeton, Products Liability-Lia-
bility Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 855 (1963);
Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REV. 325 (1971);
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Prod-
ucts, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.
L.J. 5 (1965).
733. E.g., Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443
(1972); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); Marschall,
An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability for Patently
Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1065 (1973); Note, Patent Hazards and the
Delimitation of "Defect" in Strict Liability Cases-Luque v. McClean, 27 S.W.L.J.
702 (1973).
734. See notes 592-94 supra and accompanying text.
735. See notes 468-72 supra and accompanying text.
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Defects arising from ordinary wear and tear are covered by the
implied warranty of habitability:
Actually it is a covenant that at the inception of the lease,
there are no latent defects in facilities vital to the use of the
premises for residential purposes because of faulty original con-
struction or deterioration from age or normal usage. And fur-
ther, it is a covenant that these facilities will remain in usable
condition during the entire term of the lease.73 6
This would suggest that a landlord ought to be held strictly liable
for personal injury or property damage arising from such defects.
Landlords will undoubtedly contend that different standards should
be applied in determining the "defectiveness" of new and used
rental property. Support for such a position can be found in the
cases imposing strict liability on vendors of used goods. 7 7  How-
ever, a lessor differs from a vendor of used property in that the lessor
has a continuing duty to maintain the premises in good repair.738
For this reason, the same standard ought to be applied in judging
the defectiveness of new and used rental property. 73 9  The fact that
the deteriorated condition of the premises was obvious or reflected
in the rental rate could be asserted under the defense of assumption
of risk.
Perhaps the most difficult question is whether to impose strict
liability for latent defects not known to the landlord and not discov-
erable by a reasonable inspection. 740  Manufacturers have been held
736. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970).
737. E.g., Keating v. De Arment, 193 So. 2d 694 (Fla. App. 1967); Cornelius
v. Bay Motors, Inc., 258 Ore. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971); Tracy v. Vinton Motors,
Inc., 130 Vt. 512, 296 A.2d 269 (1972); Regan Purchase & Sales Corp. v. Primevera,
68, Misc. 2d 858, 328 N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1972); accord, UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 2-314, Comment 3.
738. See section III. supra.
739. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 448, 212 A.2d
769, 777 (1965). The court may have been influenced by the fact that the rental
rate was the same for both new and used vehicles. Id.
740. Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463
(1973), af'd mere., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973). If a plaintiff sustained per-
sonal injury or property damage as the result of such a defect, and sought to recover
for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, the landlord might deny the estab-
lishment of a prima facie case on the grounds that the plaintiff had not given the
landlord notice of the defective condition and a reasonable time in which to repair
it. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 3-5, Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123
N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (1973), ai/'d mem., 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973).
See section III.C.3. supra. However, the notice requirement was developed in the
context of actions for economic loss and is designed to permit the landlord to cure
the defect before the tenant invokes his rent impairment remedies. Brief for Plain-
tiff-Respondent at 4-5, 15-18; Petitioner's Brief for Certification at 10-12, Dwyer v.
Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J. Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463 (1973); afI'd mem., 63
N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973). See section III.E. supra. Transferring the notice re-
quirement to an action for personal injury or property damage in this type of fact
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strictly liable for damage caused by such defects upon proof that the
defect was in existence at the time the product left the manufactur-
er's control.7 4' By analogy, if a latent defect in leased premises was
created by the landlord, he should be held strictly liable. Retailers
have also been held strictly liable for such latent defects, even though
they did not create them, on the theory that retailers form part of
the conduit by which the product reaches the consumer and have
a right of indemnification against the manufacturer.7 42  These cases
would suggest that a landlord should be held strictly liable for latent
defects caused by a third party (such as the original builder-vendor)
when the landlord is in a position to obtain indemnification from such
a third party.743 In all other circumstances, it could be argued that
strict liability would be inappropriate.744
There is a line of cases, however, that holds a defendant strictly
liable for any damage caused by a risk arising out of the operation
of his business enterprise. 745  According to these cases, vendors of
used goods746 and lessors of personal property747 may be held strictly
liable for undiscoverable latent defects, regardless of their original
situation would preclude the use of the implied warranty as a means of imposing
strict liability, for requiring proof of notice would be tantamount to requiring proof
of negligence. See notes 597-611 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the notice requirement in a strict liability action, see section V.B.2.c. infra.
741. E.g., Markle v. Mulholland's Inc., 265 Ore. 259, 509 P.2d 529, 534 (1973)
(recapped tire blew out due to a latent weakness in the casing):
The requirement that the defect must have existed when the product left the
remanufacturer's control does not mean that the defect must manifest itself
at once. The defect may be latent. The fact that there was no evidence that
the remanufacturer by the exercise of reasonable care could have detected the
weakness in the casing would be relevant if this were a negligence case. How-
ever, it is irrelevant in a strict liability action.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment g (1965); 54 A.L.R.3d
1079 (1973).
742. E.g., Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Ct. App. 1936); see also Van-
dermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
743. For a discussion of a lessor's right to indemnification against third parties,
see note 663 supra and accompanying text.
744. In at least two cases, it has been held that a lessor of personal property is
not subject to strict liability in the absence of proof that the defect occurred in the
manufacturing process. E.g., Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467
P.2d 256 (1970); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972). A few
other courts have refused to hold the vendor of used goods strictly liable for a latent
defect not discoverable by a reasonable inspection. E.g., Chamberlain v. Bob Matick
Chevrolet, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. 685, 4 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 936 (1967); Cornelius v.
Bay Motors, Inc., 258 Ore. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971).
745. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1972); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965).
746. E.g., Peterson v. Lou Backrodt Chevrolet Co., 17 Ill. App. 3d 690, 307 N.E.
2d 729 (1974); Reulmato v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440 (1974).
747. E.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178
(1970); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965).
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cause. The imposition of strict liability on lessors of personal prop-
erty under these circumstances has been justified in the following
manner:
The operator of the rental business must be regarded as posses-
sing expertise with respect to the service life and fitness of his
vehicles for use. That expertise ought to put him in a better
position than the bailee to detect or to ancitipate flaws or defects
or fatigue in his vehicles. Moreover, as between bailor for hire
and bailee the liability for flaws or defects not discoverable by
ordinary care in inspecting or testing ought to rest with the bailor
. . . . And, with respect to failure of a rented vehicle from
fatigue, since control of the length of the lease is in the lessor,
such risk is one which . . . ought to be imposed on the rental
business. 748
Under this line of reasoning, landlords should also be held strictly
liable for latent defects unknown to the landlord and undiscoverable
upon a reasonable inspection because such defects are a risk of the
business of leasing real property.749
c. Notice
Assuming that the plaintiff is able to prove the existence of a
defect, must he prove that he gave the landlord notice of it to estab-
lish liability? 750 As a'general rule, notice is not required in a strict
tort liability action, 751 but is a condition of recovery in an action
against a seller of goods for breach of the implied warranty of mer-
chantability. 752  It could be argued that the notice requirement
should be confined to warranties relating to the sale of goods, par-
ticularly since notice was not a prerequisite to recovery for breach
of implied warranty at common law. 758  There is precedent, how-
748. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 450-51, 212
A.2d 769, 778 (1965).
749. In Louisiana, the landlord can be held liable for damage caused by a defec-
tive condition of which he neither knew nor could have known. Krennerich v. WCG
Inv. Corp., 278 So. 2d 842 (La. App. 1973); Joyner v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240
So. 2d 545 (La. App. 1970); Phillips v. Cohen, 183 So. 2d 473 (La. App. 1966).
750. For a discussion of the notice requirement, see 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIED-
MAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 16A[5][d], 19.05 (1974); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 146, at § 28.17; Phillips, Notice of Breach in Sales and Strict Tort Lia-
bility Law: Should There Be A Difference?, 47 IND. L.J. 369 (1972).
751. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965); accord,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963).
752. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 49; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3)(a);
Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974); Redfield v. Mead,
Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1973).
753. Caparelli v. Rolling Greene, Inc., 39 N.J. 585, 593, 190 A.2d 369, 373
(1963).
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ever, for extending the notice requirement to implied warranties aris-
ing in the context of real property transactions."' Further consid-
eration therefore must be given to the appropriateness of requiring
notice in a strict liability action against a landlord.
Under the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial
Code, a plaintiff is required to notify the defendant of the defect
which caused the injury within a reasonable time after the acci-
dent.755' The purpose of this notice requirement is to permit the
defendant to inspect the defective product and promote settlement
through negotiation.75 Requiring post-injury notice in implied war-
ranty (as opposed to strict tort liability) actions has been justified
on the ground that contract actions are normally governed by a
longer statute of limitations than tort actions,757 making it desirable
for the defendant to be informed of the accident prior to the filing
of the complaint. 75  If a post-injury notice requirement were im-
posed in actions for breach of the implied warranty of habitability,
the requirement ought to be construed liberally, following the prece-
dent established in actions for personal injury or property damage
under the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial Code.759
It would, of course, be inappropriate to require notice in a strict tort
liability action against a landlord. 76 0
In contrast to the above situation, it would also be possible to
preclude recovery by a plaintiff who had discovered a defect prior
to the accident if the plaintiff failed to notify the landlord of the de-
fect before sustaining personal injury or property damage.76' The
754. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 380, 525 P.2d 88, 92,
115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 652 (1974) (action for economic loss):
The requirement of notice of breach is based on a sound commercial rule de-
signed to allow the defendant opportunity for repairing the defective item, re-
ducing damages, avoiding defective products in the future, and negotiating set-
tlements. The notice requirement also protects against stale claims ...
These considerations are as applicable to builders and sellers of new construc-
tion as to manufacturers and dealers of chattels.
Accord, Metro Inv. Corp. v. Portland Rd. Lumber Yard, Inc., 263 Ore. 266, 501 P.2d
312 (1972). See section III.C.3. supra.
755. See note 752 supra.
756. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974); Phillips,
Notice of Breach in Sales and Strict Tort Liability Law: Should There Be a Dif-
ference?, 47 IND. L.J. 369, 466, 468 (1972).
757. See section V.B.3.d. infra.
758. Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
759. E.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3) (a), Comments 4-5; Tomczuk
v. Town of Chesire, 26 Conn. Supp. 224, 217 A.2d 71 (1965); Chapman v. Brown,
198 F. Supp. 78 (D.C. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Kennedy
v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 205 App. Div. 648, 200 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1923); Wojciuk v.
United States Rubber Co., 19 Wis. 2d 224, 122 N.W.2d 737 (1963).
760. See note 751 supra.
761. Such a notice requirement is imposed in actions for economic loss. See sec-
tion III.C.3. supra.
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purpose of the notice requirement in this setting would be to give
the landlord an opportunity to repair the defect. There is no prod-
ucts liability precedent for barring recovery based on a failure to give
notice under such circumstances. 72 Instead, the plaintiff's knowl-
edge is considered relevant to the defense of assumption of risk.7 68
This position would also seem appropriate in a strict liability action
against a landlord. If notice were required, however, it would be
important to provide for its waiver when the plaintiff had made rea-
sonable, but unsuccessful,, attempts to contact the landlord76 4 or
when the landlord knew of the defect.768 It might also be appro-
priate to distinguish between defects created by the landlord or dis-
coverable at the time possession was transferred and those not
discoverable until after the commencement of the lease.766 With
respect to the first class of defects, no notice would be required be-
cause the landlord would have had an opportunity to discover
them.76 7  With respect to. the second class, notice would not be
required as to defects in areas under the landlord's control,768 but
would be required for defects in areas under the tenant's control6 9
unless the landlord had a right of entry for purposes of inspecting
the premises and making repairs. 770  To protect the tenant's privacy,
this right of entry could be conditioned upon the landlord's receiv-
762. An exhaustive search of the reported cases produced only two decisions of
remote relevance, and they are cited here primarily for their anecdotal value. In
Maecherlein v. Sealy Mattress Co., 145 Cal. App. 2d 275, 302 P.2d 331 (1956), the
defendant was unsuccessful in asserting that the plaintiff should have notified it of
her intent to claim damages at the time she first observed a "bunching" in the mat-
tress, instead of a few days after a spring came through the mattress and "penetrated
into [her] gluteal prominence." There was evidence to establish that the bunching
of a mattress would not indicate the existence of a broken spring. And in Waddell
v. American Breeders Serv., Inc., - Mont. -, 505 P.2d 417 (1973), the court re-
jected the defendant's argument that the plaintiff should have notified the defendant
when he first found that defendant's semen was defective (because the "clean-up bull"
was "overworked"), instead of some ten months later when he had a substantial calf
crop failure.
763. See section V.B.3.c. infra.
764. See note 457 supra and accompanying text. If the plaintiff were a third
party, rather than the tenant, it should be easier to establish either compliance with
or waiver of the notice requirement.
765. See note 456 supra and accompanying text.
766. See notes 597-611 supra and accompanying text.
767. See notes 597-601 supra and accompanying text.
768. See notes 602-04 supra and accompanying text.
769. The plaintiff must have actual knowledge of the defect before notice can be
required, since contributory negligence is generally not a defense to a strict liability
action. See section V.B.3.c. infra. Therefore, if the plaintiff failed to discover a
discoverable defect or if the defect were not discoverable until the time of the injury,
the notice requirement would not bar recovery. See note 740 supra.
770. Louisiana has created a statutory right of entry to make repairs under cer-
tain circumstances. LA. CIrv. CoDE ANN. § 2700 (West 1952). See also notes 290-
91 & 605 and accompanying text.
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ing the tenant's permission to enter at a specified time. If the tenant
unreasonably refused to permit the landlord to enter, the tenant
could be precluded from bringing a strict liability action in those
situations where the defect could have been discovered by a reason-
able inspection and the tenant failed to notify the landlord of the
need for repairs.
3. DEFENSES
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the principal differ-
ence between the prima facie case in a strict tort liability action
and an implied warranty action would be the inapplicability of the
contract limitations-privity and notice of breach-to the strict tort
theory of recovery. We must now turn our attention to a comparison
of the affirmative defenses.
a. Governmental immunity
If the defendant were a public housing authority, it might be
successful in asserting the defense of governmental immunity under
either theory of recovery. The crucial question would be whether
a governmental entity can be held strictly liable for causing personal
injury or property damage. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, for
example, it has been held that the United States is not subject to
strict liability for engaging in ultrahazardous activities 771 because
such activities are not "wrongful. '772  To the extent that an action
for strict tort liability or implied warranty is an action based on "en-
terprise liability," it too might be Construed as involving the com-
mission of an act which is not "wrongful. 778
b. Express assumption of risk
There is a significant difference between the two theories of
recovery with respect to the validity of an exculpatory clause. Dis-
claimers of liability cannot be asserted as an affirmative defense in
a strict tort liability action.774 In an implied warranty action, on the
771. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
772. The Act provides for recovery for damages "caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission" of a government employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
773. For a discussion of strict liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, see
Peck, Laird v. Nelms: A Call for Review and Revision of the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 48 WASH. L. REV. 391 (1973); Peck, Absolute Liability and the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 9 STAN. L. REV. 433 (1957); Reynolds, Strict Liability Under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act: Does "Wrongful" Cover a Few Sins, No Sins, or Non-Sins?,
23 AM. U.L. REV. 813 (1974); Comment, Absolute Liability Under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 60 MILrrARY L. REV. 53 (1973).
774. E.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965).
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other hand, they are generally enforceable. 775  Exceptions to this
general rule have been recognized in certain circumstances, how-
ever. For example, an exculpatory clause might not bar recovery
in an implied warranty action brought by a person who was not a
party to the lease.7 6 Similarly, by drawing an analogy to the Uni-
form Commercial Code, it could be argued that exculpatory clauses
should be deemed prima facie unconscionable in actions for personal
injury.777  To be consistent with the rules applicable in implied war-
ranty actions for economic loss, disclaimers ought to be invalidated
when proven unconscionable 778 or when the plaintiff's damages were
caused by a housing code violation.779 Since there are very few cir-
cumstances in which it would be desirable, as a matter of public
policy, to permit a landlord to disclaim strict liability for personal
injury or property damage, 7 0 strict tort liability would be the prefer-
able theory of recovery in the absence of a statute or judicial deci-
sion invalidating disclaimers of the implied warranty of habitability
in leases.7s '
A few cases have suggested that a disclaimer of strict tort liability might be valid
if it were negotiated by two parties with equal bargaining power in a commercial
context. E.g., Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 364 F. Supp. 1063
(W.D. Pa. 1973); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., CCH PROD.
LTAB. REP. 7,354 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,
238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965).
775. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-316, 2-719; 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIED-
MAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 16.04[2][e], 19.07 (1974); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 146, at § 28.25; Moye, Exclusion and Modification of Warranty Under
the U.C.C.-How to Succeed in Business Without Being Liable for Not Really Try-
ing, 46 DENVER L.J. 579 (1969); Comment, Restricting Disclaimer of the Warranty
of Merchantability in Consumer Sales: Proposed Alternative to the U.C.C., 12
WM. & MARY L. REV. 895 (1971).
776. E.g., Velez v. Crane & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750,
350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973).
777. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(3). For a suggestion that the Code
should be extended by analogy to lease transactions, see Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing
Corp., 244 Ark. 943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968); Baker v. Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484
P.2d 405 (1971); Comment, An Attack on Confession of Judgment Clauses in Resi-
dential Leases Through Section 2-302 of the U.C.C., 50 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 482
(1974). If the Code provisions were applied by analogy to a lease, it would also
be possible to invalidate a disclaimer for being inconspicuous. E.g., Baker v. Seattle,
79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp., 244 Ark.
943, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968). See generally, Comment, The Application of the Doc-
trine of Unconscionability to Warranties: A Move Towards Strict Liability within
the U.C.C., 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1969).
778. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302; see note 473 supra and accompanying
text.
779. See note 474 supra and accompanying text.
780. E.g., Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 364 F. Supp. 1063
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (parties in equal bargaining position); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Doug-
las Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965) (same). See also
Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., Inc., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973)
(plaintiff sustained economic loss and property damage).
781. E.g., MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-406 (Tent. Draft
1969); UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LAND!MQnP , TNANT AcT § 1.403,
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c. Implied assumption of risk and contributory negligence
Strict liability is not absolute liability because the plaintiff's con-
tributory fault may bar his recovery under certain circumstances.7 82
Misuse or abnormal use of the leased premises would be recognized
as an affirmative defense in both strict tort liability and implied war-
ranty causes of action.783 Similarly, implied assumption of risk (at
least in its secondary sense)784 would be a defense under either
theory of recovery. 785 The potential difference between the two
causes of action arises with reference to contributory negligence.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that contributory negli-
gence is not a defense to a strict tort liability action "when such
negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence" 786 and,
with one exception,78 7 the courts have so held. 788  There is no such
unanimity of opinion regarding the applicability of contributory negli-
gence as a defense in implied warranty actions. A majority of courts
have held that contributory negligence is not a defense,789 but a few
jurisdictions, including New York, have recently ruled that a plaintiff
who could have discovered the defect and perceived its danger, or
who could otherwise have averted his injuries by the exercise of
782. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 16A[5][f], 19.08
(1974); W. PROSSER, supra note 146, at § 102; Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses
Based on Plaintiffs Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 267; Kissel, Defenses to Strict Lia-
bility, 60 ILL. B.J. 450 (1972); Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of
the Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty, 52 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1968); Noel, De-
fective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk,
25 VAND. L. REV. 93 (1972); Noel, Products Liability: Bystanders, Contributory
Fault and Unusual Uses, 50 F.R.D. 321 (1970); Rossi, Contributory Negligence as
a Defense in a Products Liability Suit to Recover Economic Loss, 38 INS. COUNSEL
J. 629 (1971); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501 (1965).
783. See cases cited in Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory
Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 95-105 (1972). See note
464 supra and accompanying text.
784. Implied assumption of risk in its secondary sense denotes the plaintiff's vol-
untarily and unreasonably encountering a known risk. See notes 355-57 supra and
accompanying text.
785. E.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alas. 1970) (strict tort liability);
Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 663, 527 P.2d 353, 117 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1974); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973) (implied war-
ranty); Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240, § 5 (1972); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501, § 5 (1965);
Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Prod-
ucts Liability Era, 60 IowA L. REv. 1 (1974).
786. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965).
787. Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970).
788. E.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alas. 1970); Williams v. Brown
Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co.,
265 Ore.; 300, 509 P.2d 28 (1973).
789. E.g., Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); Kassouf v. Lee
Bros., Inc., 209 Cal. App. 2d 568, 26 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1962); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d
501, § 4 (1965).
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reasonable care, is barred from recovering for breach of an implied
warranty.79 0 This recent trend to recognize contributory negligence
as a defense in implied warranty actions can be supported by refer-
ence to the Official Comments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 791
but it is inconsistent with the general tort principle that contributory
negligence is not a defense in strict liability actions.792 Since con-
tributory negligence has proven to be a particularly troublesome de-
fense in common law tort actions by tenants against landlords, 798
strict tort liability emerges from this discussion as the preferable
theory of recovery.
d. Statute of limitations
The final point of comparison between the two theories is the
statute of limitations.794 As a general rule, the tort statute of limita-
tions applies to a strict tort liability action 795 and the contract statute
of limitations governs an implied warranty action. 790  The principal
difference between these two types of statutes is that the tort statute
of limitations begins to run from the time of the injury,797 whereas
the contract cause of action accrues at the time of the sale (or
lease). 798  The advantage to the landlord of the contract statute of
790. E.g., Velez v. Craine & Clark, 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d
617 (1973); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973); accord, Ste-
phan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 N.H. 248, 266 A.2d 855 (1970); Annot., 4 A.L.R.
3d 501, § 3 (1965).
791. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314, Comment 13; 2-316(3)(b), Com-
ment 8; 2-715, Comment 5.
792. W. PROSSER, supra note 146, § 102 at 670-71.
793. See section II.C.3. supra.
794. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[5][g] (1974).
Lo Pucki, Statute of Limitations in Warranty, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 337 (1969); Com-
ment, Time Limitations on Warranties: Application and Validity under the U.C.C.,
11 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 340 (1970); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 821 (1965). See
generally Note, Developments in the Law-Statute of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1177 (1950).
795. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Heav-
ner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-
Hamilton Corp., - Pa. -, 319 A.2d 914 (1974); Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc.,
210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969).
796. Val Decker Packing Co. v. Corn Products Sales Co., 411 F.2d 850 (6th Cir.
1969); Sinka v. Northern Comm. Co., 491 P.2d 116 (Alas. 1971); Mendel v. Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969);
Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d 776 (1973); Gardiner v.
Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964); Layman v. Keller Lad-
ders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d 594 (1970). Contra, Abate v. Barkers of
Wallingford, Inc., 27 Conn. Supp. 46, 229 A.2d 366 (1967).
797. E.g., Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 330, 68 Cal. Rptr. 617
(1968); Rosenau v. New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 153, 238 A.2d 169 (1968); Caudill v.
Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d 257 (1969).
798. E.g., Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207,
305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273, 512 P.2d
776 (1973); Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965). Con-
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limitations is that it exposes the defendant to liability for a limited
period of time, and it may expire prior to the date on which the
plaintiff sustains injury. 79   In the case of a lease renewed on a
periodic basis at intervals of one year or less, there would be little
actual difference between the operation of the two statutes of limita-
tion. In the case of a long term lease, however, the plaintiff could
easily be barred from recovery before sustaining injury. The plain-
tiff's only recourse in such a situation would be to argue that the
implied warranty of habitability is a prospective warranty because
it imposes a continuing,duty to repair.800 The statute of limitations
would then not begin to run until such time as the breach was or
should have been discovered.81 If the implied warranty of habit-
ability were characterized as a prospective warranty, there would be
little difference between the tort and contract statutes of limitations
in a strict liability action against a landlord. Otherwise, the tort stat-
ute of limitations governing the strict tort liability theory of recovery
would be more advantageous to the injured plaintiff.
C. Summary
Because products liability law has provided many of the policy
justifications for recognizing an implied warranty of habitability in
leases of real property, plaintiffs have urged the imposition of strict
liability for personal injury or property damage caused by landlords
in the business of leasing. Thus far, they have been successful only
when the damage was caused by a defect in personal property leased
as part of a furnished apartment. However, as an increasing number
Ira, Crevistan v. General Motors, Corp., 225 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1969); Parrish v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 46 Mich. App. 85, 207 N.W.2d 422 (1973); Puretex Lemon Juice,
Inc. v. S. Riekes & Sons of Dallas, Inc., 351 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
799. E.g., Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 339 F. Supp. 1385 (M.D. Pa. 1972);
Sinka v. Northern Commercial Co., 491 P.2d 116 (Alas. 1971); Mendel v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969). In some
cases, however, the contract statute of limitations permits a plaintiff to recover who
would be barred by the tort statute of limitations. E.g., Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 550 (1974); Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305
N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953); Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Ore. 273,
512 P.2d 776 (1973); Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d
594 (1970).
800. Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 330, 68 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1968).
For cases discussing the concept of a prospective warranty, see Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack
Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1961); Southern
Cal. Enterprises, Inc. v. D.N. & E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 750, 178 P.2d
785 (1947); Rempe v. General Elec. Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 160, 254 A.2d 577 (1969);
Citizens Util. Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 409, 184 N.E.2d 171
(1962); Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc., 42 App. Div. 573, 344 N.Y.S.2d
101 (1973); Ingalls v. Angell, 76 Wash. 692, 137 P. 309 (1913); Krueger v. V.P.
Christianson Silo Co., 206 Wis. 460, 240 N.W. 145 (1932).
801. E.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-725(2).
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of courts recognize a landlord's liability for negligence, it can be
anticipated that at least a few will take the next step and impose
strict liability on the landlord in the business of leasing. Like the
typical products liability defendant, the landlord puts the premises
in the stream of commerce, is in a superior position to discover de-
fects in the premises, and can better bear and distribute the risk
of loss. Like the typical consumer, the tenant relies on the land-
lord's skill, reputation and express or implied representations of
safety. Builder-vendors of real property, sellers of used property,
providers of commercial services rendered in conjunction with the
sale of a product, and lessors of personal property have all been
held strictly liable. The extension of strict liability to a lessor of
real property, a step taken long ago by Louisiana, would therefore
represent a logical extension of existing products liability precedents.
If strict liability were imposed on landlords for defects causing
personal injury or property damage, strict tort liability would be the
preferable theory of recovery. Unlike the implied warranty theory,
strict tort liability would require no proof of privity or notice; express
assumption of risk and contributory negligence would not bar re-
covery; and the statute of limitations would not begin to run until
the time of the injury or damage.
The plaintiff's principal problem under a strict tort liability
theory would be establishing the existence of a defect. Recovery
should be allowed regardless of whether the defect could be charac-
terized as obvious, latent, or attributable to ordinary wear and tear.
Misuse and implied assumption of risk would be the principal de-
fenses. Because strict liability does not require proof of fault, a
landlord could be held liable for a latent defect of which he neither
knew nor should have known. Liability would be imposed on the
theory that a landlord is in the best position to bear and distribute
the risks of loss attributable to the business of leasing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law of landlord-tenant relations and the principles govern-
ing the tort liability of a landlord are inextricably intertwined. At
common law, the nature of the landlord-tenant relation moved from
status to contract to property. At the culmination of this progres-
sion, the lease was characterized as a conveyance of property; caveat
emptor generally precluded the imposition of a duty to repair on the
landlord; and if the lease contained an express or implied covenant
to repair, it was regarded as independent of the tenant's covenant
to pay rent. These common law principles were appropriate to the
agrarian setting in which they were developed, but they worked
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severe injustices in an industrialized, urban environment. The task
of tempering the common law fell to the legislatures. Housing codes
were enacted imposing a duty to repair on residential landlords (or
at least on landlords of multiple-unit dwellings). In most jurisdic-
tions, however, these codes could be enforced only by public officials
through criminal proceedings. When an innovative legislature did
recognize a private remedy, it was ordinarily surrounded by restric-
tions consistent with the common law doctrine of independent cove-
nants. In effect, then, the housing codes substantially eroded caveat
emptor in the realm of residential leases, but left intact the common
law notion that a lease is a conveyance.
Against this background, the courts granted the landlord a gen-
eral immunity from tort liability. The common law doctrine of
caveat lessee has retained its vitality, and exceptions to the general
rule are recognized today only when they can be harmonized with
the characterization of a lease as a conveyance of property or when
they are mandated by the trend toward short-term leases, multiple
dwellings, and the enactment of housing codes. Thus a landlord
can be held liable in tort only if the plaintiff sustained personal injury
or property damage as the result of an undisclosed latent defect, a
defect in premises leased for admission of the public, a breach of
the implied warranty of habitability or merchantability in a short-
term lease of furnished premises, a breach of a covenant to repair,
negligent repairs, a defect in the "common areas" under the land-
lord's control, or a violation of a housing code.
A landlord's immunity from tort liability, subject to the seven
exceptions listed above, is perfectly compatible with the common
law, but is completely out of step with recent developments in the
law of landlord-tenant relations. The lease, which was once charac-
terized as a conveyance of property, is now considered a contract
composed of mutually dependent covenants, including an implied
warranty of habitability imposing a continuing duty to repair. Al-
though the standard of habitability may be established by the legisla-
ture through the provisions of a housing code, the judiciary has cre-
ated its own more comprehensive and flexible standard in several
jurisdictions. To enforce the landlord's duty to repair, the tenant
may invoke the complete spectrum of contract remedies, including
the powerful sanction of rent abatement.
As a result of these recent developments, tort law now lags be-
hind landlord-tenant law. To bring the law of torts up to date, the
courts should abolish a landlord's common law immunity and replace
it with a duty to use reasonable care. Failure to take such action
will result in an intolerable inconsistency between these two
branches of the law, since a tenant who is able to withhold rent be-
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cause of the landlord's failure to repair a defect in the premises will
not be permitted to recover if that same defect causes personal in-
jury or property damage (unless, of course, the tenant is able to
bring his case within one of the seven exceptions to the general rule
of nonliability). It is therefore imperative that courts, lawyers, and
legal scholars reexamine caveat lessee in light of the development
of the implied warranty of habitability. New Hampshire and Cali-
fornia have already established a precedent for imposing a duty of
reasonable care. The American Law Institute could facilitate the
process of updating the law of torts by refusing to incorporate into
the Restatement (Second) of Property those sections of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts which set forth the old common law tort
liability of a landlord and by drafting substitute sections imposing
a duty of reasonable care.
Although the recognition of liability for a landlord's failure to
exercise due care would certainly help to harmonize tort law with
the modem law of landlord-tenant relations, the process will not be
complete until strict liability is imposed on landlords in the business
of leasing. The adoption of the implied warranty of habitability was
premised in large part on products liability analogies. If a lease is
a contract to provide goods and services, these same products liability
precedents suggest that a landlord (like a builder-vendor of real
property, seller of used property, provider of commercial services,
or lessor of personal property) should be held strictly liable for per-
sonal injury or property damage caused by a defect in the premises.
The landlord is in a superior position to discover and repair defects
(thereby encouraging reliance on his expertise) and is also in a
better position to bear and distribute the risk of loss. New Jersey
has rejected strict tort liability for landlords, but it should be noted
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey was asked to impose strict
liability before it had been given an opportunity to abolish a land-
lord's common law tort immunity and impose a duty of reasonable
care. In other jurisdictions, it can be anticipated that, following the
pattern established in the products liability field, most courts will
recognize a duty of reasonable care, and many will then impose strict
liability on landlords in the business of leasing.
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